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Abstract 
The thesis studies how financial markets discipline commercial and central banks’ behavior in 
various ways. In the first part, two papers test different aspects of market discipline of 
commercial banks’ risk taking, using a dataset of several hundred banks worldwide. In the 
first paper, it is shown that the risk-shifting opportunity of shareholders introduced by deposit 
insurance depends on ownership structure and the extent of market discipline by uninsured 
creditors. I find that the effect of shareholder control on risk is convex, and that creditor 
discipline tempers this effect but has little individual influence on risk.  The second paper 
tests the monitoring dimension of market discipline and formulates a two-step procedure 
which makes it possible to sidestep the common methodological problem that banks’ ‘true’ 
risk is unobserved. Results suggest that if the quality of institutions is sufficiently high, some 
market-based indicators may be more accurate measures of banks’ true risk than a set of 
commonly used accounting-based benchmark indicators – a possibility effectively precluded 
by much of previous research. 
In the second part of the thesis, three papers study constraints on central bank behavior 
introduced by financial markets, using data from a set of small, open European economies 
during the 1980s and 1990s. The first of these papers tests how capital account liberalization 
and exchange-rate regime constrain monetary policy autonomy. Contrary to traditional theory, 
the paper finds no autonomy effect of exchange rate flexibility, whereas capital controls 
provided some (albeit limited) independence from innovations in foreign money market 
interest rates. The remaining two papers address how deregulation, innovation, and growth in 
domestic money markets interplay with central banks’ choices of monetary policy operating 
procedures. The analysis of the European countries suggests that while deregulation and the 
emergence of short-term financial markets constrained central bank discretion and compelled 
increased reliance on open market operations, the paths of money market development in 
different countries were also partially determined by the respective central banks’ decisions. 
In the final paper, the same framework of analysis is applied to China, which has announced 
its intention to rely increasingly on market operations in monetary policy. The results suggest 
that the disciplining effect of domestic financial markets on central bank behavior in China is 
so far very small, largely due to remaining de facto financial repression. 
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Introduction 
The main theme for this thesis is how financial markets discipline, or restrict, the behavior 
and actions of commercial and central banks in various ways. The thesis is divided into two 
parts. The first part deals with commercial banking, and consists of two papers – both 
essentially concerned with the extent to which financial markets discipline banks’ risk taking. 
The second part of the thesis deals with central banking, and consists of three papers. The first 
of these papers studies how capital account openness and varying degrees of exchange rate 
rigidity restrict central banks’ autonomy in setting monetary policy. The remaining two papers 
address how financial market development affects the arsenal of instruments used by central 
banks to implement monetary policy. 
In commercial banking, the full effect of market discipline is dulled because banks’ 
financing comes in large part in the form of relatively small deposits which benefit from 
explicit or implicit deposit insurance. Having their funds thus insured, depositors have little 
incentive to monitor their bank’s risk behavior. Of course, market discipline may still be 
exerted by uninsured investors. The extent to which this occurs has been primarily an 
empirical issue in the literature. 
The incentive for banks to increase asset risk when market discipline is muffled by the 
existence of a safety net – i.e., the moral hazard effect of deposit insurance – can be traced 
back to the option value of equity: the value of an equity stake in a firm is increasing in the 
volatility of the value of the firm’s assets. It is therefore the bank’s shareholders that have the 
incentive to increase risk. But the extent to which this incentive is acted upon depends on how 
well the shareholders can convince the bank’s managers to act in their interest. The overall 
risk effect of deposit insurance thus depends both on the extent of market discipline by 
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creditors not benefitting from deposit insurance, and on shareholder control. Essay 1 studies 
the interplay between these factors both analytically and empirically. The formal analysis is 
done within the context of a Jensen-Meckling-type model, amended to account for partial 
deposit insurance. It is demonstrated why shareholder control may have a non-monotonic 
influence on risk (a common empirical result in the literature), it shows how the risk effects of 
the two main governance variables of interest – market discipline and shareholder control – 
are interrelated, and how leverage partially determines the impact of the governance variables 
on risk. The main predictions of the model are then tested on a panel of several hundred banks 
worldwide over the years 1994-2005. The empirical results essentially bear out the predictions 
of the model, but indicate a weak and primarily indirect effect of creditor discipline on bank 
risk. 
If Essay 1 was partially motivated by a shortage of formal analyses of the market 
discipline mechanism in banking, Essay 2 focuses on a particular methodological problem in 
a large part of the empirical market discipline literature. A central question in this literature is 
how well financial markets carry out the monitoring aspect of market discipline – i.e., how 
well the market tracks bank-specific risk. This has often been tested by regressing market-
based risk indicators on various benchmark risk measures (such as accounting ratios and 
credit ratings). The problem on which the paper focuses is that the benchmark measures 
typically used are also imperfect proxies of ‘true’ default risk (which is necessarily unknown), 
and regressing one imperfect proxy on another when the ‘true’ value is unknown does not 
necessarily say much about the adequacy of either proxy – particularly if no significant 
association between the proxies can be established. 
However, the expected accuracy of market-based risk indicators depends positively on 
the institutional conditions for market discipline to function (such as financial market 
openness and the absence of bailout expectations). Assuming that the benchmark measures 
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typically used are comparatively insensitive to such conditions, the paper develops a measure 
of ‘divergence’ between market-based and non-market risk indicators. Divergence between a 
market-based indicator and a benchmark indicator may arise either because the market-based 
indicator is less informative about ‘true’ risk or because it is more informative than the 
benchmark indicator, suggesting that divergence is a non-linear function of the conditions for 
market discipline (‘institutional quality’). 
Using essentially the same dataset as in Essay 1, the paper then applies the 
methodology to three different market-based risk indicators commonly used in the banking 
literature, using various accounting ratios as benchmark risk measures. The results suggest, 
among other things, that yield spreads on uninsured bank debt may be more informative than 
either equity-based or accounting-based risk measures when the conditions for market 
discipline are well satisfied. This result calls into question some recent results within the 
market discipline literature, where failure to establish significant relationships between 
spreads on uninsured bank debt and various benchmark risk indicators has been interpreted as 
absence of market discipline. 
Moving on to part 2 of the thesis, the perspective on market discipline is more macro-
oriented. The included papers study how central banks are constrained both in setting 
monetary policy and in the use of various policy instruments as a consequence of the 
increased cross-border mobility of capital and the emergence of increasingly sophisticated 
alternatives to central-bank money that result from financial deregulation and innovation. 
Thus, Essay 3 investigates international monetary-policy transmission under different 
exchange-rate and capital-account regimes in a number of small and open European 
economies during the 1980s and 1990s. The period was one of broad-based financial 
deregulation in the included countries, and one of general reorientation of the goals as well as 
the instruments of monetary policy (including formal exchange-rate arrangements). 
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Interpreting transmission of foreign innovations in money-market interest rates as 
absence of monetary-policy autonomy, the paper – in contrast with the traditional Mundell-
Fleming trilemma – finds no systematic link between observed (ex post) autonomy and 
exchange-rate regimes. Capital controls appear to have provided a degree of temporary 
insulation from foreign monetary policy shocks, though not strict autonomy. Overall, the 
results are consistent both with short term autonomy for small countries even under fixed 
exchange rates and an open capital account, and with long term dependence under flexible 
exchange rates and an independent stability target. 
Still focusing on the same set of European countries and the same time period, Essay 4 
studies the interplay between financial deregulation, the development of an efficient short-
term segment in domestic financial markets, and changes in monetary policy operating 
procedures. The paper recounts and empirically examines the extent of reorientation of 
monetary policy instruments away from quantitative direct control instruments toward 
indirect market-based instruments, and relates this process to that of financial deregulation 
and money market development. While the process of financial deregulation was relatively 
uniform across the different countries studied, the path of money market development varied 
substantially. Central bank responses in terms of adopting new instruments and operating 
procedures show both similarities and differences. 
Overall, the analysis indicates that while central banks’ decisions to increase the use of 
open market operations were clearly prompted in large part by financial deregulation and 
innovation, developments in domestic money markets were in themselves influenced by the 
central banks’ choices and decisions. Central banks – once traditional direct-control 
instruments had become ineffective or unavailable – typically had an incentive to stimulate 
some market segments, because more efficient money markets would result in increased 
transmission and precision of open market operations. 
4 5 5 
Essay 5, finally, addresses China’s present level of money market development and 
prospects for a transition to a market-based operating framework for Chinese monetary 
policy. Making use of the results in Essay 4, a comparative analysis of the Chinese situation 
up to about 2005 and developments in the European countries between the late 1970s and the 
late 1990s is performed. China is currently experiencing problems with monetary policy 
similar to those experienced by several of the European countries in the 1970s and 1980s, 
including inability to counteract the liquidity effects of a non-credible exchange rate goal, 
poor monetary transmission due to excess liquidity in the banking system, and conflicts of 
interest due to unclear priority among multiple policy goals. 
Although the process of opening up financial markets and reforming monetary-policy 
operating procedures has been initiated, the evidence shows that it has not come far: the 
financial system remains repressed, the significance of open-market operations for the 
conduct of monetary policy seems negligible, and the money market (beyond a primary 
market for central bank paper) is essentially non-existent. Despite commitments to the 
contrary, the Chinese central bank seems to habitually resort to methods such as de facto 
credit controls and moral suasion in order to influence the banking system. Of course, under 
these circumstances the banks have no incentive to act as though the credit system were 
deregulated. In some sense, the central bank’s own manoeuvres to sidestep the market 
discipline of cross-border capital movements largely nullifies efforts to develop a domestic 
money market that can serve as arena for an effective market-based monetary policy. 
6 7
6 7
 
 
 
2008-10-02 
 
 
 
Ownership structure, market discipline, and banks’ risk taking 
incentives under deposit insurance 
 
 
 
Jens Forssbæck 
Lund University and Copenhagen Business School 
phone + 46-(0)40-30 06 36 
e-mail: jens.forssbaeck@fek.lu.se 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper studies the effect of two governance factors, ownership structure and market 
discipline by creditors, on banks’ risk-taking incentives in the presence of deposit 
insurance and related bank safety net components. A simple Jensen-Meckling-type model 
is developed, where optimal capitalization and the deposit-insurance-induced risk 
incentive are determined by equity and debt agency costs. Explicit and implicit deposit 
insurance coverage determines the level of creditor discipline. It is demonstrated why 
shareholder control may have a non-linear effect on risk-taking, how the risk effects of 
ownership structure and market discipline are interdependent, and what role is played by 
the bank’s level of capitalization. The implications of the model are tested on a panel of 
several hundred banks worldwide over the years 1995-2005. The empirical results 
suggest that creditor discipline has an insignificant effect on risk as a stand-alone 
variable, but reduces risk for poorly capitalized banks. Shareholder control has a convex 
individual effect on risk, but whether the negative or positive effect dominates depends 
on the measure of risk used. Finally, the empirical results by and large support the 
theoretical model’s prediction that creditor discipline and shareholder control have a 
mutually counteracting effect on bank risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks’ risk taking incentives is an issue of considerable importance for overall financial 
system stability – the more so the greater the importance of bank finance within a 
particular (national) financial system – and is therefore an issue of much interest for 
financial supervisory authorities, central banks, and equivalent government agencies 
entrusted with the task of overseeing financial and payment system stability in countries 
around the world. The importance of banks’ risk taking has resulted in the imposition in 
most countries of various safety net arrangements targeting banks and intended, inter 
alia, to stave off excessive risk taking in banks and to protect bank customers from the 
possible consequences of such excessive risk taking should it occur. The importance of 
the issue has also sparked a considerable interest among researchers for the drivers of 
risky behavior within banking institutions in general and, in particular, the effects of the 
safety net arrangements on different bank stakeholder groups’ taste for risk – i.e., the risk 
taking incentive effects of safety net arrangements on bank shareholders, managers, 
depositors, and other creditors. As a consequence of such research, the extent and design 
of safety net arrangements have progressively come to be widely recognized as an 
important determinant of the risk taking incentives of banks, particularly bank 
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shareholders. Because different stakeholder groups are differently affected by safety net 
arrangements, not only the safety net arrangements as such, but also corporate 
governance factors (such as ownership structure and the control powers associated with 
various forms of stakes in the bank) matter for banks’ risk taking behavior. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of bank governance factors on the 
relationship between safety net characteristics and bank risk taking. Two specific 
governance factors are at the focus of interest: equity ownership structure and market 
discipline by the bank’s creditors. 
 The discussion of the association between bank ownership structure and risk 
taking trails back to the issue of the ‘moral hazard risk’ introduced by deposit insurance 
(Merton, 1977, and many subsequent papers). Roughly, the basic argument here is that 
deposit insurance introduces an incentive for owners of a bank to increase the bank’s risk 
in search for higher profits, because the insurance will cover a large part of the bank’s 
debts in case of default. In other words, deposit insurance limits the bank’s downside 
risk. The research on ownership structure and risk (e.g., Gorton and Rosen, 1995) 
suggests that the extent of the moral hazard problem introduced by deposit insurance 
depends on the extent of shareholder control over the bank. This is because the risk-
increasing incentive introduced by deposit insurance lies with the shareholders, whereas 
the ones who make the lending decisions (and therefore have the most direct influence on 
the risk profile of the bank’s asset portfolio) are the bank’s managers, and they may have 
other interests. Hence, this literature brings the issue of deposit-insurance-related moral 
hazard into the context of a traditional owner-manager agency conflict.  
10 11
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The extent to which deposit insurance induces banks to take on excessive risk is 
not only determined by the level of shareholder control, but also directly on the scope of 
the deposit insurance as such (deposit insurance coverage), or – conversely – the level of 
market discipline exerted by those creditors who are not covered by the insurance. This 
line of research, however, has been less pursued, and consideration of the effect of 
variations in deposit insurance coverage, related bank safety net characteristics, and other 
institutional factors, has so far been limited (partly as a consequence of the dominance of 
empirical results on US data alone). The empirical literature on ownership structure and 
risk studies shareholder control as an individual risk determinant, rather than as a factor 
conditioning the risk effects of deposit insurance. A certain ‘consensus’ view seems to be 
emerging within this research area, and many recent empirical studies find a convex 
effect of shareholder control on bank risk (although the underlying theory remains 
somewhat unclear). 
Now, the argument that shareholder control conditions the effect of deposit 
insurance on risk suggests interdependence between deposit insurance coverage and 
shareholder control. But because the effect of shareholder control on risk is empirically 
ambiguous, the argument that increased shareholder control strengthens the risk-
increasing effect of deposit insurance may be too simplified. 
There are thus outstanding issues to be addressed both when it comes to the effect 
of ownership structure and the effect of deposit insurance coverage/creditor discipline on 
banks’ risk taking. The motive for studying both factors together is that the suggestion of 
previous literature that they are interdependent has not really been tested. They are also 
theoretically strongly related through the two fundamental agency conflicts in a firm. The 
10 11
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effect of ownership structure depends on the owner-manager conflict. The effect of 
deposit insurance coverage/creditor discipline, in turn, depends on the owner-creditor 
conflict. An explanation of this latter point might take its point of departure in the 
observation that it is not deposit insurance as such that is the source of the moral hazard 
problem, it is limited liability: the conflict of interest between owners and creditors and 
the incentive of owners for risk shifting at the expense of creditors exist even in the 
absence of deposit insurance. This is what the owner-creditor conflict is all about. What 
deposit insurance does is to take away the market’s spontaneous correction of it, by de-
incentivizing depositors (and possibly other creditors) to charge a risk premium (debt 
agency costs) as compensation for this moral hazard problem. Creditors’ response to 
deposit insurance will essentially be determined by the scope and the credibility of the 
insurance: the broader and more credible the insurance, the more creditors will expect to 
be bailed out in case of insolvency, and the less market discipline they will exert. 
 In summation, this paper studies primarily two governance factors – ownership 
structure and market discipline by holders of debt claims on the bank – as determinants of 
bank risk taking. The empirical part makes use of a panel data set covering several 
hundred banks worldwide, with observations between the years 1995 and 2005. This 
affords the opportunity to fully exploit variations in the institutional setting, both in terms 
of safety net characteristics and in terms of governance.  
 The paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 makes a review of the 
literature on deposit insurance, bank risk, and (debt) market discipline on the one hand, 
and ownership structure and banks’ risk taking on the other. Section 3 develops a simple 
model along the lines of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) model of the determination of 
12 13
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capital structure in the presence of equity and debt agency costs, sorts out the inter-
relationships among the main variables of interest in the context of this model, and 
derives a number of testable hypotheses. In Section 4, the data and empirical method is 
presented, whereas Section 5 contains the results. Section 6, finally, concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
The present section of the paper recaps previous literature on the relationship between 
deposit insurance, market discipline and banks’ risk-taking, and bank ownership structure 
and risk, respectively. 
 
2.1. Background 
It is worth noting, first, that the source of the moral hazard risk associated with deposit 
insurance lies in the conflict of interest between owners and creditors induced by limited 
liability (Barth et al, 2006): limited liability, not deposit insurance per se, gives 
shareholders the incentive to transfer wealth at the expense of creditors by increasing 
asset risk and leverage, and creates the option value of equity. Absent third party 
guarantees of the debt the spontaneous market solution is for creditors to charge a risk 
premium on the extended debt commensurate with their own costs of monitoring the 
borrower (and other agency-related costs; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Deposit insurance removes depositors’ (and possibly other bank creditors’) incentives 
to discipline the bank’s risk-taking and so gives free(r)1 play to the risk-shifting 
incentives of the shareholders. The value to shareholders of deposit insurance, as 
described by Merton (1977), Marcus and Shaked (1984), and several subsequent 
12 13
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contributions, is thus in a sense equivalent to the value of having creditor discipline lifted. 
The ‘victim’ of this moral hazard risk is now no longer the (insured) creditor, but the 
insurer (i.e., the deposit insurance fund). This is true as long as the insurance is not, or is 
only partially, funded by the insured banks themselves or – in the case where the banks 
collectively fund the deposit insurance scheme – as long as insurance premiums do not 
fully reflect the asset risk of each bank. 
The usual motivation for the imposition of deposit insurance is to protect the public 
from the effects of systemic banking crises; in particular, by removing the threat of 
contagious bank runs, it is perceived that deposit insurance reduces overall banking 
system fragility (see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). However, since deposit insurance 
unleashes the risk-increasing incentives of bank shareholders, it is clear that, unless these 
incentives can be otherwise sufficiently contained, the net effect on banking system 
stability is at best uncertain.2 
 
2.2. Market discipline 
In addition to minimum capital ratio requirements, a (partial) solution to the stability-
reducing potential of deposit insurance which has become part of ‘best practice’ is to 
limit the coverage of deposit insurance, and thereby ‘reinstituting’ a degree of market 
discipline by creditors (see, for instance, Bhattacharya et al, 1998; for evidence on the 
determinants of deposit insurance system design, see Laeven, 2004). 
The (yet rather few) extant studies that empirically exploit cross-country variations in 
deposit insurance coverage indicate that restricting deposit insurance coverage does 
indeed reduce its destabilizing potential (Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2005; Demirgüç-
14 15
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Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Hovakimian et al., 
2003). 
There is a related market discipline literature, concerned primarily with studying the 
extent to which bank risk is reflected in the yields on large certificates of deposit, 
subordinated notes and debentures, and other types of bank debt not formally covered by 
deposit insurance. Risk-pricing of uninsured bank debt is taken as evidence of market 
monitoring of banks’ risk behavior (if not necessarily disciplining). A key insight in this 
literature is that the extent to which non-insured bank creditors charge risk premiums 
corresponding to the bank’s asset risk critically depends on their beliefs regarding the 
prospects of being bailed out despite being formally uninsured (Angkinand and 
Wihlborg, 2005, 2006, call this the ‘credibility of non-insurance’). In other words, market 
discipline is exerted by creditors who do not perceive themselves to be covered by 
explicitly or implicitly issued guarantees. In other words, the extent of de facto market 
discipline by creditors is the ‘flip side’ of the expected (rather than the formal) coverage 
of such guarantees. 
Thus, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) find limited evidence of bank-specific risk 
measures reflected in the secondary market spreads of US banks’ subordinated notes and 
debentures (SNDs) over the eight-year period preceding the reform of the US federal 
deposit insurance system in 1991, which committed more credibly to a no-bailout policy 
as regards US banks’ subordinated debt.3 They conclude that “bank investors clearly 
impounded the value of conjectural government guarantees into debentures prices” (p. 
1373). Conversely, several later papers (Morgan and Stiroh, 2000; Jagtiani et al, 2002), 
14 15
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studying the post-reform period, do find evidence that the pricing of US banks’ sub-debt 
significantly depends on underlying credit risk, as traditionally measured. 
The pattern is far from consistent, however, with regard to the US experience of 
the effect of implicit creditor insurance. Hall et al. (2002) explicitly test the effect of the 
US deposit insurance reform on the risk sensitivity of average interest paid on uninsured 
deposits in a cross section of US banks, and find that the risk sensitivity did not 
significantly increase after 1991. Similar results are obtained by Covitz et al. (2004). On 
the other hand, some older papers do find cross-sectional links between spreads paid on 
large CDs and balance sheet risk in the pre-reform period (Baer and Brewer, 1986; 
Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; James, 1988, 1990; Keeley, 1990; and Ellis and Flannery, 
1992).  
Gropp and Vesala (2004) also make a point of distinguishing between explicit and 
implicit deposit insurance. They show theoretically that the adoption of an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme under reasonable assumptions can reduce moral hazard and risk 
taking in banks if the scheme effectively limits the scope of the safety net, thus providing 
space for ‘residual’ market discipline and reducing bailout expectations of formally 
uninsured creditors. They apply their model to a sample of European banks over the 
1990s, and obtain results largely consistent with their predictions (except for large, ‘too-
big-to-fail’ banks).4 
Angkinand and Wihlborg (2006), finally, test for market discipline using proxies 
for deposit insurance coverage in a large sample of banks in both developed and 
emerging-market countries. They posit, and find evidence of, a U-shaped relationship 
between bank risk-taking and deposit insurance coverage. The intuition is that zero or 
16 17
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very low formal coverage is not credible, and will tend to push up risk due to 
expectations of ad hoc bailouts in the event of failure; intermediate levels of coverage 
will effectively increase the scope for market discipline by reducing bailout expectations 
(as in Gropp and Vesala, 2004); higher levels of coverage, finally, will again drive up risk 
incentives, in line with the standard moral hazard view of deposit insurance (and 
consistent with the empirical results of, e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). 
 
2.3. Ownership structure 
The central message of the literature on bank ownership structure and risk is that the 
extent to which shareholders can exploit the ‘option value of deposit insurance’ depends 
on their ability to make the bank’s managers act in their interest. Therefore, the effects of 
deposit insurance on bank risk-taking depend not only on the extent of creditor discipline 
implied by effective limits on deposit insurance coverage, but also on the traditional 
owner-manager agency conflict. However, available empirical results extend only to the 
stand-alone effect of owner control on risk (rather than the interactive effect suggested by 
the above argument). 
Among the earliest widely quoted results on the relationship between banks’ 
ownership structure and their risk taking are those of Saunders et al (1990), who test 
different stock market measures of risk as a (linear) function of the fraction of managerial 
ownership, the capital-asset ratio, and a number of control variables. They hypothesize a 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and risk taking, which is motivated 
by the following: bank managers with zero or small ownership stakes in the bank are 
more risk averse than outside owners of the bank for the traditional reasons (they are 
16 17
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more concerned with enjoying the perks of office than with exploiting the option value of 
equity by increasing asset volatility, they have invested non-diversifiable human capital 
in the bank, etc.); Low managerial ownership should therefore imply lower risk taking. 
As managers’ ownership share in the bank increases, their interests (including their 
expected benefits of increased risk) become more aligned with those of outside equity 
holders, and so the bank’s asset risk should increase. Moreover, Saunders et al (1990) 
assume that changes in the regulatory environment toward more lax regulation strengthen 
the positive association between stockholder control of the bank and risk taking.5 Their 
empirical results for US banks over the 1978-1985 period are mixed but are somewhat 
supportive of a positive relationship between managerial ownership and risk taking in 
periods of lax regulation. 
Similar results are reached by Knopf and Teall (1996), who explicitly test the impact 
of the 1989 US bank reform on the relationship between risk and ownership structure. 
They find a positive association between several different measures of risk on the one 
hand and insider ownership on the other before the regime shift, but a negative one 
following it. They also find a strong negative relationship between risk and outside 
ownership throughout the sample period, possibly indicating that dispersed ownership 
makes it difficult for shareholders to enforce their interests of higher risk taking. 
Gorton and Rosen (1995) provided the first more elaborate analytic treatment of the 
issue – also fundamentally based on the insight that managers, not shareholders, control 
banks’ loan portfolios, and therefore their risk. They propose a game-theoretic model of 
the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, of which the main prediction 
is an inverse U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and risk. However, 
18 19
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they also open up for the possibility of a U-shaped relationship; first, because the model’s 
prediction of functional form is indeterminate short of an explicit assumption about the 
relative size of an exogenous ‘state of the industry’ parameter;6 second, based on the 
argument that under normal circumstances, outsiders’ chances of controlling managers 
may be best either at low levels or at high levels of managerial ownership. 
The empirical results of Gorton and Rosen (1995) for US bank holding companies do 
not unequivocally support either form, but the latter argument, in particular, has 
subsequently been used to motivate the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship between 
ownership and risk (Brewer and Saidenberg, 1996; Cebenoyan et al., 1999; Knopf and 
Dolde, 2006). The idea is that at intermediate levels of ownership, managers become 
‘entrenched’, and – while hard for outside owners to get rid of – are then best able to 
maximize their benefits of control by acting in a more risk-averse manner than the 
outsiders would like them to.7 
Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) find evidence of a weakly convex relationship 
between risk (measured as the standard deviation of stock returns) and insider ownership 
for a sample of US savings and loan institutions over the latter half of the 1980s. 
Extending the sample period to cover 1986-1995 and using other risk measures, 
Cebenoyan et al (1999) obtain similar results (except for an intermediate period of 
regulatory stringency in the late 1980s and early 1990s; cf. Knopf and Teall, 1996). 
Knopf and Dolde (2006) similarly hypothesize that increased insider (managerial) 
ownership will either linearly increase or have a U-shaped influence on bank risk taking. 
They use both market-based and accounting-based risk measures. The empirical results 
generated from their dataset on US thrift institutions from 1990 to 2003 are, again, 
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somewhat mixed, but do tend to lend some support to the idea of a U-shaped link from 
insider ownership to risk, whereas the effect of outsider ownership is indeterminate. 
The gist of these empirical results seems to be that the risk effects of increased 
shareholder control can be both positive and negative. In light of this, the argument that 
shareholder control strengthens the positive risk effects of more extensive deposit 
insurance may be too simplified. 
 
3. Analytics and hypotheses 
In this section, I first develop a simple model of bank capital, which links deposit 
insurance with risk taking through, on the one hand, equity ownership structure and, on 
the other hand, the effect of the insurance on creditor discipline. In the second sub-
section, I analyze the implications of the model, briefly consider minimum capital 
adequacy requirements, and derive testable hypotheses. 
 
3.1. A simple model 
Introduction to the model 
The risk incentives of banks in the presence of deposit insurance was, as previously 
indicated, first theoretically analyzed within an options-pricing framework by Merton 
(1977). Subsequent theoretical contributions primarily study factors which condition the 
risk effects of deposit insurance – in particular factors related to market structure and 
competition (e.g., Keeley, 1990; Boyd and Nicoló, 2005), or different regulatory 
measures (e.g., Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Boot and Thakor, 1993; Besanko and Kanatas,  
1996) – often using a game-theoretic/optimal-contracting approach. The conditioning 
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effect of ownership structure and market discipline on the risk incentives created by 
deposit insurance may be viewed as two additional such factors. Existing theoretical 
contributions on the role of these factors follow the contingency-claims-pricing 
(Levonian, 2001; Nivorozhkin, 2005) or game-theoretic (Gorton and Rosen, 1995) 
approaches. 
The various components featuring in the basic problem I have set out to analyze – 
ownership structure, the option value of equity, the owner-manager conflict, a reduction 
in the debt premium, etc. – suggested to me that the problem could be approached using a 
more corporate governance-oriented framework. As such, the primary inspiration of the 
model that follows comes not from within the banking literature, but in particular from 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), who, among other things, present an agency-cost-based 
framework for capital structure choice, especially for entrepreneurial firms. The 
following model is largely a formalization of their conceptual framework, applied to 
banks. 
In the model, I have used insights from the banking literature (empirical and 
theoretical), as reviewed in Section 2. The most important of these are as follows. First, 
the model incorporates the insight that the source of deposit-insurance-related moral 
hazard is identical to the source of the agency costs of debt in a traditional corporate 
governance sense, viz. the conflict of interest between owners and creditors (Barth et al., 
2006). From this also follows the interpretation of creditor discipline as the reverse of de 
facto deposit insurance coverage: market discipline is exerted by those creditors whose 
claims are not covered by guarantees. Second, the model ‘operationalizes’ the insight that 
the effect of deposit insurance on bank risk taking is conditioned by ownership structure. 
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This has, to my knowledge, been theoretically analyzed previously only by Gorton and 
Rosen (1995), but their model is very different from mine. The contribution of the model 
I present is, again, to demonstrate how the insight can be analyzed within a traditional 
corporate governance/agency cost framework. 
 
Safety net characteristics and capital structure choice 
Let EO denote outside equity and let D denote debt. Moreover, let lower-case letters 
indicate scaling by the total amount of external capital, so that d = D/(D+EO). Suppose, 
along the lines of Jensen and Meckling (1976)8, that for a firm the agency cost of equity 
is described by a function EA  on d such that (1) 0EA = , 
'( ) 0,  and ''( ) 0, [0,1]E EA d A d d< > ∀ ∈ . Similarly, let the agency costs of debt be 
represented by a function 
0D
A  on d such that 0)0(
0
=DA , 
0 0
'( ) 0,  and ''( ) 0, [0,1]D DA d A d d> > ∀ ∈ . Optimal capital structure, *0d , is determined by 
minimizing total agency costs,
0 0T E D
A A A= + . 
 I use the concept of agency costs as basically meaning a spread, or a premium, 
over the risk-free rate of return, charged by the providers of external finance as 
compensation for monitoring activities and agency-related risks (I will henceforth use 
‘agency cost’ and ‘risk premium’ synonymously). They are the market’s solution to the 
agency problem because outside investors will adjust the premium charged in accordance 
with their perception of monitoring needs and of the risks they incur by extending capital 
to the firm. The premium enters into the firm’s optimization problem, and the firm is 
thereby disciplined not to behave in a manner unwanted by outside investors. The 
concept of agency costs as just described corresponds exactly to that of market discipline 
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according to the generally accepted ‘monitoring-and-influence’ definition of this concept 
(see, e.g., Flannery, 2001; Bliss and Flannery, 2002). Thus, 
0D
A  can be interpreted as a 
manifestation of creditor discipline and AE as market discipline by outside shareholders. 
 The basic structure of the model is depicted in Figure 1. Leverage, d, runs along 
the horizontal axis, and can vary between 0 and 1. The vertical axis shows the premium 
charged by investors. The agency cost structure given by 
0 0
, , and D E TA A A , with the 
resulting optimal capital structure indicated by *0d , refers to any unregulated firm – it is 
the equilibrium solution for the general case. For simplicity, we might think of it as a 
bank before the introduction of deposit insurance. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
Now assume deposit insurance is introduced. (I effectively assume underpriced deposit 
insurance, possibly with a premium which is fixed-rate, or at least adjusts imperfectly to 
risk, and which can also be thought of as a limit on deposit insurance coverage, see 
below).9 Deposit insurance enters the model in the following way. The holders of 
credibly insured debt will no longer charge a premium as compensation for monitoring 
activities and other agency-related risks since they are now essentially holding a risk-free 
asset. The agency costs attached to insured debt thus drop to zero. It will prove 
convenient to name this function as well, even though it is always zero. Thus, the agency 
premium charged on debt covered by deposit insurance is 0)(
1
=dAD . It is not indicated 
in Figure 1, but would appear as a straight line along the horizontal axis. 
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The insurance can effectively be seen as an exogenously financed ‘risk subsidy’ 
on some bank debt.10 In the typical case of a bank benefitting from limited deposit 
insurance, there are thus two types of debt – uninsured debt, which carries the ‘normal’ 
debt agency premium 
0
( )DA d , and insured debt, which carries zero premium over the 
risk-free rate. Insured debt would typically be small deposits, uninsured debt would be 
large CDs, unsecured notes and bonds, etc. 
To make the model more realistic, and to make it applicable to countries without 
any formal deposit insurance system, I have chosen also to include uncertainty about 
actual deposit insurance coverage. There might be both expected losses for formally 
insured debt, and expected bailouts for formally uninsured debt. To model these different 
possibilities, three parameters need to be introduced. 
Let , ,φ γ κ  be fractions. φ  denotes the share of debt claims formally covered by 
deposit insurance, γ  denotes public confidence in the deposit insurance system (the 
extent to which insured depositors trust that they will be bailed out), and κ  indicates the 
credibility of non-insurance (the reverse probability of ad hoc bailouts of formally 
uninsured creditors). For simplicity, φ  enters here as an exogenous parameter, but may 
be viewed partly as a choice variable. It is trivially zero for countries with no explicit 
deposit insurance. For countries with explicit deposit insurance, it will typically be less 
than unity for several reasons, among which are regulatory limits on deposit insurance 
coverage, bank or bank-customer co-financing of the deposit insurance scheme, etc. All 
these reasons imply that the benefit of insurance comes to creditors at a cost so that the 
net of this benefit does not fully compensate for the premium 
0
( )DA d  that they would 
have charged if there were no deposit insurance. Such costly insurance is equivalent to 
24 25
 18 
1φ < .11 It also seems reasonable to assume that public confidence in the deposit 
insurance system is never so complete so as to make an unconditional cover-all deposit 
insurance fully credible at all times (for a motivation, see, e.g., Cook and Spellman, 
1994). Less than full credibility indicates 1γ < . Finally, the no-bailout credibility κ  is a 
probability and so by definition lies between 0 and 1 (as previously mentioned, 
expectations of ad hoc bailouts for formally uninsured debt have been documented by, 
e.g., Gropp and Vesala, 2004; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2006). 
This gives rise to four distinct theoretical agency cost structures. Formally and 
credibly insured debt carries the cost 
1
( ) 0DA dφγ = ; formally but non-credibly insured 
debt follows 
0
(1 ) ( ) 0DA dφ γ− ≥ ; formally and credibly uninsured debt costs 
0
(1 ) ( ) 0DA dφ κ− ≥ ; and, finally, formally but non-credibly uninsured debt (i.e., implicitly 
insured debt) carries the premium 
1
(1 )(1 ) ( ) 0DA dφ κ− − = . The agency costs of debt 
actually faced by the bank are the sum of the two non-zero cost structures above: 
0 0
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )D DDA d A d A dφ γ φ κ= − + −  0[ (1 ) (1 ) ] ( )DA dφ γ φ κ= − + − . DA  can be seen as 
a weighted average of the zero-agency-cost function 
1D
A and the non-zero function 
0D
A , 
with the weight on 
0D
A  given by the term 
[ (1 ) (1 ) ]φ γ φ κΛ = − + − .  (1) 
This term is a summary measure of the amount of market discipline exerted by creditors. 
In terms of the three component parameters, we can see that market discipline is exerted 
by holders of debt claims that are (a) formally but non-credibly insured, and (b) formally 
and credibly uninsured. It is easily ascertained that [ ]0,1 ,Λ∈  and that a higher Λ  
indicates more market discipline. 
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 Total agency costs are now 
1 0
( ) ( ) ( )T E DA d A d A d= + Λ , and the optimal capital 
structure is therefore: 
 }{ 0*1
[0,1]
arg min ( ) ( )E D
d
d A d A d
∈
= + Λ  (2) 
In Figure 1, the new situation brought about by deposit insurance is indicated by a flatter 
debt agency cost curve ( DA ), lower total agency costs ( 0TA ) for all levels of leverage (d), 
and a higher optimal leverage ( *1d ) as compared to the pre-deposit-insurance situation.  
The bearing idea here is thus that deposit insurance diminishes market discipline 
by the bank’s creditors. The effect is a reduction in the bank’s overall risk premium (total 
agency costs) and an accompanying change in capital structure. For the purposes of the 
empirical part of the paper, I shall assume that this subsidy on the bank’s total risk 
premium is a determinant of its risk taking as measured by some proxy for asset or 
default risk. The next step is therefore to find an analytic expression for this subsidy. 
The cost reduction on debt financing generated by deposit insurance (or the would-be 
‘risk neutral’ deposit insurance premium) is simply the drop in debt agency costs at 
optimal leverage, that is 
0
*
1(1 ) ( )DA d−Λ . But the reduction in the bank’s overall risk 
premium (total agency costs) is  
 
0 0
* * * *
0 0 1 1( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]T E D E DS A d A d A d A d= + − +Λ . (3) 
It is the difference between total agency costs at optimal leverage in the absence of 
deposit insurance, and total agency costs at optimal leverage in the presence of deposit 
insurance. Because total agency costs are always higher in the absence of deposit 
insurance, this subsidy is always positive. As suggested by equation (3), it depends both 
on debt and equity agency costs, leverage, and market discipline by creditors. In figure 1, 
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it appears as the vertical distance between the pre- and the post-deposit-insurance optima 
( * *0 1 and d d ). 
 
Cross-sectional variation and the determinants of agency costs 
Expression (3) describes the link between bank risk taking and governance factors. The 
governance factors, which are my primary interest, enter the equation through the agency 
cost functions and through the market discipline parameters (which in turn are 
determined by explicit and implicit deposit insurance coverage). Very generally, the 
sharper the average slope of the cost function over the leverage interval [0,1]d ∈ , the 
greater the agency problem, assuming owners and creditors price the problem adequately. 
But what determines the cross-sectional variation in these functions? 
The original Jensen and Meckling (1976) article assumes that the slopes of the 
agency cost functions EA  and 0DA  are mainly determined by the relationship between 
inside and outside financing of each individual firm (‘ownership structure’), and I shall 
do likewise. Note that I have kept assumptions regarding the functional form of the 
agency cost functions at a minimum: the only requirement I have imposed beyond those 
of Jensen and Meckling (where the requirement is implicit) is that they be convex, so that 
it is actually possible to minimize the sum of the two functions. Without loss of 
generality the agency cost functions can be written as 
0
( ) hDA d gd=  and 
( ) (1 )mEA d k d= − , where 0,  1,  0,  and 0 1g h k m> > > < < , in keeping with previous 
assumptions regarding first and second derivatives. 
By assumption, the main determinant of the slope coefficients g and k is the 
bank’s ownership structure (whereas h and m are best interpreted as risk aversion 
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parameters which should be constant across firms). If ω  denotes the share of inside to 
outside financing the agency cost functions can be written as: 
 
0
( ) ( ) hDA d g dω= , and (4) 
 ( ) ( )(1 )mEA d k dω= −  (5) 
Now plug in (4) and (5) into (3) to get the full picture of the effect of the governance 
factors on the deposit-insurance-induced risk subsidy: 
 * * * *0 0 1 1( )(1 ) ( ) [ ( )(1 ) ( ) ]
m h m h
TS k d g d k d g dω ω ω ω= − + − − + Λ  
 * * * *1 0 0 1( )( ) ( )( )
m m h hk d d g d dω ω= − + −Λ , (6) 
or, with the components of the creditor discipline parameter given in full: 
 * * * *1 0 0 1( )( ) ( )( [ (1 ) (1 ) ] )
m m h h
TS k d d g d dω ω φ γ φ κ= − + − − + −  (7) 
 
Equations (6) and (7) indicate that the size of the deposit-insurance-induced risk subsidy 
depends on equity ownership structure (in terms of the ratio of inside to outside capital), a 
leverage effect, and the extent of market discipline by creditors. 
 
3.2. Implications and hypotheses 
Evaluation of the individual effects of the governance factors on the risk subsidy is done 
by taking partial derivatives on equation (6) or (7). The effect of ownership structure is 
complex, and is given by: 
 * * * *1 0 0 1'( )( ) '( )( )
m m h hTS k d d g d dω ωω
∂ = − + −Λ
∂
 (8) 
It is now necessary to make some assumption regarding the relationship between the ratio 
of inside to outside financing on the one hand, and the steepness of the agency cost 
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curves on the other. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest both curves become less steep 
with increased insider ownership, i.e., '( ) 0 and '( ) 0k gω ω< < . In the case of equity 
agency costs, this is probably fairly unproblematic. The slope of the EA  function reflects 
the conflict of interest between outside shareholders and insiders/managers. It seems 
natural to assume that the conflict – and therefore the slope – increases as the share of 
insider financing drops, and vice versa, because as this share decreases (increases), the 
interests of insiders/managers and outside shareholders become less (more) aligned. For 
all cases except the trivial case of perfect creditor discipline (nothing happens), first-order 
conditions of the bank’s optimization problem (2) ensure that * *1 0( )
m md d− >0. With 
'( ) 0k ω <  this makes the first term on the right hand side in (8) negative. 
In the case of the debt agency cost curve, it is not equally clear that it should 
steepen with increased outside financing. The average slope of this curve reflects the 
conflict of interest between owners and creditors: owners benefit from higher leverage 
and higher asset risk, whereas the opposite is true for creditors. But financing and 
investment policy is determined by managers; thus, the shareholder-debtholder conflict is 
affected by the extent of shareholder control (in other words, debt agency costs are 
affected by equity agency costs, as emphasized by, e.g., Brander and Poitevin, 1992). The 
manager of a leveraged firm always has an opportunity to shift risk for the benefit of the 
shareholders. If the manager has no ownership stake he has no incentive to do so 
(particularly, but not only, if he is more risk averse than shareholders), which would 
indicate a flatter debt agency cost curve for low levels of insider ownership/shareholder 
control.12 As the ownership stake of the manager/insider increases, his incentives become 
more aligned with outside shareholders, effectively increasing shareholder control. This 
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should exacerbate the shareholder-creditor conflict. Since the ratio of inside to outside 
financing is a monotonic positive function of the share of insider equity ownership, this 
line of reasoning would suggest that the slope of 
0D
A  increases with the share of inside 
rather than outside financing. Therefore, my first guess is that '( ) 0g ω > .13 In that case, 
the sign of the second right hand side term of equation (8) depends on * *0 1( )
h hd d−Λ , 
which is more likely to be positive if creditor discipline is lax (Λ  is small). 
It is evident from (8) that a necessary condition for insider control to have a non-
linear effect on the risk subsidy (as suggested by the literature on ownership structure and 
risk, reviewed in subsection 2.3) is that the effect of insider ownership on the slope of the 
debt agency cost curve is non-constant (i.e., ''( ) 0g ω ≠ ), and/or that the marginal effect 
of insider ownership on the slope of the equity agency cost curve is increasing 
( ''( ) 0k ω > ). In the absence of g'' and k'' effects, insider ownership will affect risk 
positively only if the sensitivity of the slope of 
0D
A  to changes in ownership structure is 
higher than that of the slope of EA  (that is, if '( ) '( )g kω ω> ) and if creditor discipline is 
relatively low; short of these conditions, increased insider capital will affect risk 
negatively. 
In summation, this yields the following main predictions for the effect of 
ownership structure on risk: 
0TSω
∂ <
∂
 if the marginal sensitivity of equity agency costs to changes in ownership structure is relatively high, the leverage effect is 
large, and/or creditor discipline is strong; 
0TSω
∂ >
∂
 if the marginal sensitivity of debt agency costs to changes in ownership structure is relatively high, the leverage effect is 
small, and/or creditor discipline is weak; 
(9) 
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2
2 0
TS
ω
∂ ≠
∂
 
if the marginal effect of changes in ownership structure on either 
agency cost curve (or both) is non-constant; 
and, finally, 
2
0TSω
∂ <
∂ ∂Λ
. 
 
An intuitive explanation to the result that increased shareholder control may reduce risk 
is that shareholders will trade off the benefits of increasing asset risk and those of 
increased leverage. They may choose to decrease risk and instead increase leverage 
unless the marginal effect on debt agency costs curve is sufficiently great to make that 
relatively less beneficial.14 The final term in (9) suggests that the product of the partial 
derivatives of shareholder control and creditor discipline, respectively, is negative. The 
most straightforward interpretation of this result is that creditor discipline reduces the risk 
effect of owner control (whether this effect is primarily positive or negative). 
The effects on the subsidy of the creditor discipline/deposit-insurance-related 
parameters are less ambiguous. The composite measure of market discipline by creditors 
has a negative effect on risk: 
 *1( ) 0
hTS g dω∂ = − <
∂Λ
 (10) 
Expression (10) also shows that the negative effect of creditor discipline is greater for 
higher levels of leverage (i.e., when capitalization is poorer). Increasing the share of 
formally insured debt will (generally)15 increase risk by decreasing creditor discipline: 
 *1( 1) ( ) 0
hTS g dγ κ ωφ
∂ = + − >
∂
 (11) 
Similarly, confidence in the deposit insurance system increases risk by reducing 
uncertainty among insured depositors about the prospects of being bailed out: 
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 *1( ) 0
hTS g dφ ωγ
∂ = >
∂
 (12) 
The credibility of the no-bailout commitment for formally uninsured debtholders, finally, 
decreases risk taking by reducing implicit insurance: 
 *1( 1) ( ) 0
hTS g dφ ωκ
∂ = − <
∂
 (13) 
All the effects of the creditor discipline parameters are strengthened with increased 
leverage (as measured by the debt share of outside capital). 
Now briefly consider the effect of capital requirements. Let ς  be the minimum 
ratio of equity capital, as defined on the book value of total assets (VB). So long as the 
equity share of capital exceeds the required ratio, minimum capital requirements will 
have no effect on the bank’s capital structure choice or risk taking. In terms of the debt 
share of outside capital (which is how capitalization/leverage is defined in the model), the 
minimum capital regulation kicks in when *1( / ) /( ) 1I B B B IE V V V E dς − − > − , where EI is 
equity held by insiders. In that case, the optimization problem in equation (2) will be 
overridden by regulation, and *1d  will be replaced by 
1 ( / ) /( ) ( 1) /( )I B B B I B I BE V V V E V E Vς ς− − − = − −  in expression (3). Then, first-order 
conditions from the bank’s optimization problem can no longer be relied upon to sign 
partial derivatives, and the predictions of the model may not hold. In principle, this 
requires an assumption of effective and more or less immediate enforcement of capital 
requirements (no regulatory forbearance), which may or may not be a realistic 
assumption. However, this brief analysis of the effect of capital requirements does 
indicate that undercapitalization should be accounted for in the empirical testing of the 
model’s predictions. 
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3.3. Discussion 
In the model I have assumed that market discipline is exerted by the imposition of a 
premium on capital extended to the bank, which is set by claimants in accordance with 
their perception of the risk they incur by extending the capital. This premium was 
interpreted and analyzed along the lines of a standard agency cost model. Deposit 
insurance lowers the risk incurred by (some) creditors, and therefore lowers the debt 
service costs of the bank. The extent to which this occurs depends on the explicit and 
implicit coverage of the deposit insurance. Conversely, the extent of market discipline by 
creditors was defined in terms of the share of debt credibly exempt from insurance. The 
decrease in debt service costs will lower the overall risk premium faced by the bank (total 
agency costs) by some amount, i.e., risk becomes cheaper. This is why deposit insurance 
may increase banks’ risk taking. However, the reduction in total agency costs – which I 
have called the (total) ‘risk subsidy’, TS – is not just determined by the coverage of 
explicit and implicit deposit insurance, but also by equity ownership structure and by 
leverage. 
 The main contribution of the model – whose basic structure is simple enough, but 
whose predictions are in part rather complex – is twofold. First, it incorporates a number 
of insights from the banking literature in a standard corporate governance framework, as 
explained in the introduction to the model. Second, it highlights a few points that have 
not been systematically clarified in previous literature: (i) Leverage is a central 
conditioning variable for the effect of governance variables on risk taking. It both affects 
market discipline, and can be used to explain a non-monotonic effect of shareholder 
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control on risk (without having to invoke concepts like entrenchment). (ii) Previous 
literature basically suggests that the risk effect of deposit insurance – and therefore of 
creditor discipline – depends on shareholder control (more shareholder control leads to a 
greater risk effect and vice versa). But because the risk effect of shareholder control is a 
priori indeterminate, so is the overall effect of this interdependence between the 
governance variables. This finding is more easily interpreted in terms of market 
discipline as a conditioning variable to the risk effect of shareholder control (rather than 
the other way around). Therefore, the interpretation that I will use henceforth is the 
following: the reduced market discipline that follows from deposit insurance is what 
triggers the effect of shareholder control on risk (this effect can then be positive or 
negative). (iii) Predictions about the effect of ownership structure on risk presume an 
assumption about its effect on the agency costs of debt – an issue which is surprisingly 
little researched. 
For the purposes of the empirical section of the paper, I will assume that the 
determinants of the risk subsidy are also correlated with the overall risk of the bank (as 
measured by some suitable proxy for default risk). It may be worth pointing out that this 
does not follow directly from the model – it is a hypothesis. I here rely on the intuitive 
appeal of the suggestion that a reduction in the punitive costs of risk will generate higher 
risk taking. In that case, overall risk taking – when controlled for other determinants – 
should also be correlated with the determinants of the reduction in the risk premium. This 
is what I am effectively testing in the empirical section of the paper. 
 Moreover, insofar as a reduction in the overall risk premium induces more risk 
taking, it is not clear what the function projecting a reduction in the premium onto overall 
34 35
 28 
risk should look like. The hypothesis suggests not that we move along a (presumably) 
positive curve between risk and risk premium, but – on the contrary – that the curve shifts 
to allow higher risk at an equal (or lower) cost. 
 
4. Data and empirics 
4.1. Estimation 
Baseline regression 
The model presented in Section 3 suggests that banks’ risk taking (or, to be specific, the 
‘risk subsidy’ following from deposit insurance) is determined by the scale of inside to 
outside financing, by formal and informal deposit insurance coverage (which taken 
together determine the level of market discipline imposed by creditors), and the debt 
share of outside capital. The effect of ownership structure may be non-linear, and is 
partially determined by the level of creditor discipline; the effect of overall creditor 
discipline is negative, and this effect is strengthened by increased leverage. 
 Allowing for other factors to influence banks’ overall risk, a number of control 
variables are included in the empirical specifications. The choice of control variables at 
the bank level is largely made on the basis of previous literature. I thus follow Marcus 
(1984) and Keeley (1990), and include Tobin’s q as a measure of charter value, which 
should negatively affect risk. Like Gorton and Rosen (1995), Brewer and Saidenberg 
(1996), and Cebenoyan et al. (1999), for instance, I also add bank size and a measure of 
institutional or outside ownership (in this case, institutions’ share of outside equity). In 
parallel with Angkinand and Wihlborg (2006), I also include liquid assets over total 
assets. 
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The predictions of the model hinge on the bank’s basic optimization problem (2), 
which determines its optimal capitalization. However, capital requirements set an 
exogenous bound on leverage, which implies that at a certain leverage ratio, the 
predictions do not necessarily hold (as noted at the end of subsection 3.2). To account for 
the fact that predictions are unclear for undercapitalized banks, I include a dummy for 
banks whose share of equity capital is too low according to the applicable regulation. In 
addition, I include dummies for foreign ownership and government ownership, since 
these types of ownership arrangement may be well as important for bank governance as 
the relation between inside and outside ownership seen in a global perspective (see La 
Porta et al., 2002, and Caprio et al., 2004). 
Another effect of studying banks across a wide range of different countries is the 
necessity to consider country-level control variables. Most existing empirical results, 
including the ones just cited as sources for the choice of bank-level control variables, 
study US banks alone. An exception is Angkinand and Wihlborg (2006), and I follow 
them in controlling for income level (measured as the log of GDP/capita), real GDP 
growth, the real interest rate, and the inflation rate. An additional country-level control is 
a measure of overall regulatory stringency (see section 4.2 for details). Finally, a 
potentially complicating factor is the inclusion in the sample of observations for 
banks/countries severely hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. The sample also 
contains several other episodes of systemic financial turbulence (for instance, a number 
of Argentinean banks hit by crisis in 2001). If these observations are affected by factors 
outside the model, such as contagion, etc., it is conceivable that the inclusion of them will 
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affect estimation results in an unforeseen way. I therefore include a ‘crisis dummy’ to 
control for this possible effect.16 
Based on the model’s main implications and the above considerations regarding 
control variables the basic empirical specification is formulated as follows (where 
subscripts i, j and t denote bank, country and year): 
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 (14) 
Two of the right hand side variables in the above model are potentially endogenous: 
leverage and charter value. As for the leverage variable, it is obvious that it is partially 
determined within the model described in Section 3; as for charter value, the reasoning is 
that since risk shifting increases the option value of equity, riskier banks should be more 
highly valued – hence a higher Tobin’s q (see, e.g., Keeley, 1990). I use different 
measures of risk and of creditor discipline, and start by running a Hausman test to check 
for endogeneity of the charter-value and leverage variables for each combination of risk 
and market discipline measures. I then run model (14) for all banks in the dataset by 
either panel OLS or 2SLS, depending on the results of the Hausman tests. 
 
The effects of the individual components of the market discipline parameter 
Equation (14) is estimated with a composite measure of market discipline by creditors 
constructed in accordance with the model from proxies of the individual components (the 
share of formally insured debt, public confidence in the deposit insurance scheme, and 
the credibility of the deposit insurer’s no-bailout commitment for uninsured debt). The 
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variable ‘market discipline’ in the estimation equation (14) is thus a direct empirical 
counterpart to the theoretical model’s summary measure of market discipline, Λ, as 
defined by equation (1).  
Although the overall effect of creditor discipline is at the center of interest 
together with ownership structure, it may be of interest also to consider the effect of each 
individual component of the market discipline parameter. As is clear from partial 
derivatives (11) – (13) the direction of the effects of these components should be fairly 
unambiguous, but the size of the effect depends on interaction between the three 
components, interaction with ownership structure, and interaction with leverage. In order 
to keep the specification tractable in terms of interpretation, I estimate a simplified 
version of the implied estimation equation, where I drop the interaction between the 
creditor discipline components. This results in an equation which differs from (14) in that 
the individual components have been substituted for overall creditor discipline, the 
interaction variable between inside to outside capital and market discipline is replaced by 
three interaction variables (one for each creditor discipline component), and similarly for 
interaction with leverage. 
 
Alternative specifications 
In order further to test the general predictions of the model, I test a number of alternative 
specifications. First, there may be concern that the effect of the institutional setting 
(beyond characteristics of the deposit insurance system and banking regulation 
stringency) and other effects specific to each country are not sufficiently taken into 
account. This may be particularly important if the risk measure used is based on 
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accounting variables, in which case different accounting practices, definitions of 
particular financial statement items related to risk, etc., may impact on the variation in the 
dependent variable. For this reason, I test a model replacing the country-specific control 
variables with country fixed effects, which should soak up any systematic effects of the 
type just mentioned. 
 Second, market discipline may be measured by a composite of institutional 
variables, and – as explained above – I first construct the market discipline parameter 
from such variables directly in line with the model. However, market discipline may 
possibly also be inferred from some other characteristic of a bank if that characteristic is 
correlated with market discipline. It has been suggested in the literature (see, for instance, 
Calomiris, 1999; Evanoff and Wall, 2000; Sironi, 2001; Benink and Wihlborg, 2002) that 
requiring banks to carry a minimum portion of subordinated debt on their books (a 
‘mandatory subordinated debt policy’) could enhance market discipline (by creditors). In 
the spirit of this argument (and following Gropp and Vesala, 2004), I reestimate the basic 
specification (14) with the composite measure of market discipline replaced by the ratio 
of subordinated debt to total assets, as an alternative proxy for creditor discipline. 
 
4.2. Data 
The paper uses two main types of data: firm-level data on publicly traded banks all over 
the world, and country-level data related to bank safety net characteristics, institutions 
more generally, and macroeconomic conditions. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced 
panel covering a maximum of 331 banks in 47 countries over the period 1995-2005.  The 
total number of banks in the dataset is larger than 331, but as data availability varies 
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considerably for different variables, the exact number of banks covered depends on the 
combination of variables used in a particular regression specification. As for the 
distribution over time, coverage is fragmentary for the first three years, but relatively 
even between 1998 and 2005. The appendix provides more detailed information about the 
sample and its distribution across countries and over time. 
 Definitions of all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1, which 
also specifies the sources, and summary statistics appear in Table 2. Below follows a 
description of all variables, where some are explained more in detail. The description 
largely follows Table 1’s categorical division of the variables. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
[Table 2] 
 
Risk proxies 
The paper uses two measures of bank risk – one accounting-based and one market-based 
measure. The accounting-based measure used is the ratio of non-performing loans to 
equity capital as reported in BankScope’s balance sheet data. The market-based measure 
is a market version of the so-called Z-score, which is defined by 
 it itit
it
kZ µ σ
−= , (15) 
where  and it itµ σ  are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of bank i’s return on 
assets, and itk  is the average share of capital to total assets over the period t. The Z-score 
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is negatively related to the probability of default (and I therefore use it in the negative as 
a dependent variable for simplicity of comparison). The ‘market version’ Z-score is 
calculated using the return on equity and the standard deviation of stock returns.17 Stock 
market data for the included banks were collected from Datastream. 
 
Ownership variables 
Ownership data were collected from Reuters. The Reuters database distinguishes between 
ownership by three owner categories: insiders/stakeholders, institutions, and mutual 
funds. It contains percentages of ownership by the different categories and by individual 
shareholders. The Reuters figures were combined with BankScope balance-sheet data on 
equity capital and total assets to calculate the share of inside to outside capital (since the 
model focuses on inside to outside capital rather than shares of equity ownership), based 
on the total ownership share of all insiders. 
 All ownership data are originally time-invariant, but since I use balance sheet data 
to transform equity ownership shares to proxies for inside to outside capital, the resulting 
variables are time-variant. Reuters data was also used to obtain the measure of 
institutions’ share of outside equity, and the dummy variables for foreign and government 
ownership. The latter take on unit value if the largest insider/stakeholder is foreign or is 
the government, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
 
Market discipline/deposit insurance 
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Variables related to market discipline and bank safety-net characteristics were 
constructed using a combination of balance-sheet data and country-level institutional data 
collected from World Bank databases. 
 As a proxy for the share of formally insured debt (at the bank level), I use 
country-level data on the fraction of deposit value covered by explicit deposit insurance, 
net of the coinsurance ratio (available from Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005), and multiply it 
by the ratio of deposits to total debt for each bank and year.18 For countries where a 
specific coverage percentage is not available in the World Bank database, I use 
coverage limitmin 1,  coinsurance ratio
deposits/capita
 −  
 as a proxy (also from Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2005), and multiply by the ratio of deposits to total debt for each bank and year, as 
previously.19 The share of formally insured debt is always zero for countries/years with 
no explicit deposit insurance scheme (see Table A1 in the appendix for details on which 
countries and years did and did not have formal deposit insurance systems in place). 
 The proxy for public confidence in the deposit insurance system is the average 
1996-2005 scores on the ‘Government effectiveness’ index in Kaufmann et al. (2006). 
Confidence in the deposit insurance system obviously requires that such a system be in 
place; therefore, the confidence proxy is only assigned a positive value for the 
countries/years for which such is the case. 
 The preferred measure of non-insurance credibility for formally uninsured debt is 
the Fitch Support Rating, which is an index variable showing the probability that a bank 
will be bailed out in case of default. However, because of limitations in the number of 
banks in the dataset covered by these ratings, full reliance on this indicator alone would 
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result in the loss of a large number of observations (and possible bias toward larger, 
developed-country banks, which are more likely to be rated). 
 My alternate proxy is based on a combination of the Fitch rating and the bank’s 
share of all deposits in its home country – a measure intended to capture the role of a 
bank’s systemic importance for the credibility of non-insurance and the possibility to 
exert market discipline (in line with the results of, e.g., Gropp and Vesala, 2004, who 
document muted market discipline for ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks). The combination variable 
equals the Fitch rating for banks where such a rating is available; for all other banks, I 
take one less the bank’s share of total deposits in its country of origin. Balance-sheet data 
on deposits for each bank are from BankScope, as before, and data on total deposits in 
each country (or M2, depending on data availability) are from IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics. 
 The three proxies of the share of formally insured debt, public confidence in 
deposit insurance, and no-bailout credibility, are combined to form the proxy for overall 
market discipline used in the baseline regressions (the regression equation [14]). The 
empirical market-discipline proxy is constructed in direct correspondence with the 
definition of its theoretical counterpart (the variable called Λ in the model). Thus, the 
definition of the empirical proxy variables for market discipline in Table 1 corresponds 
exactly to the theoretical definition of Λ given by equation (1). This also means that the 
components of the summary market-discipline measure must conform to a common, 
theoretically accurate scale and assume values only between zero and unity. 
Transformations are made wherever necessary. If each component is in the interval [0,1], 
so, by definition, is overall market discipline (see Table 2). Again, one may think of this 
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variable as a weight determining what fraction of a bank’s outstanding debt is priced 
according to the ‘normal’ (pre-deposit-insurance) debt agency cost function. 
 
Capital structure 
Leverage is BankScope’s indications of debt to total assets transformed to correspond to 
the model’s focus on the debt share of outside (rather than total) capital. For banks, this 
share is typically very large (close to unity), so to be able to interact it with other 
variables it is standardized around the mean. 
 A dummy was constructed to identify undercapitalized banks. Capital adequacy 
requirements for each country in the sample were taken from Barth et al. (2001, 2006). A 
bank was considered undercapitalized if its ratio of tier-one capital (all equity) to total 
assets was less than 0.5 of the minimum regulatory requirement on total capital in the 
bank’s country of origin. I thus assume that 50 percent of the capital adequacy 
requirement must be covered by tier-one capital, otherwise the bank is technically 
undercapitalized. 
 A final variable related to capital structure is the ratio of subordinated debt to total 
assets. It is used in some specifications as an alternative measure of overall market 
discipline (cf., e.g., Gropp and Vesala, 2004), and is taken directly from the banks’ 
balance-sheet statements as reported by BankScope. 
 
Bank- and country-level control variables 
Bank-level control variables include the market to book value of assets (Tobin’s Q), 
which measures charter value (see Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990). I use the same definition 
44 45
 38 
as Keeley (1990) and many others: Q equals the sum of the market value of equity and 
the book value of liabilities, divided by the book value of total assets. I also use the size 
of the bank, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousands of USD), and 
liquid assets over total assets. The balance-sheet data and the stock-price data used for 
calculating these control variables are from BankScope and Datastream, respectively, as 
before. 
 Country-level control variables are real GDP growth, real interest rate, inflation 
rate, and the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (in thousands of USD) – all from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. I also use a summary measure of 
regulatory stringency, based on the sum of the index variables ‘Capital regulation’, 
‘Official supervisory power’, and ‘Prompt corrective power’ from Barth et al. (2001, 
2006). These indices are based on comprehensive surveys of banking regulation and 
supervision in countries around the world, and the summary measure takes on higher 
values for higher total levels of regulation, supervision and enforcement. 
 A dummy was also constructed to flag countries undergoing a systemic banking 
crisis. The identification of country-year observations with crises is based on Honohan 
and Laeven (2005). The source covers the period up to and including the year 2002. At 
that time, a number of countries were still affected by crises, according to the source (i.e., 
no ‘end date’ is available). For banks from these countries, I flag observations from the 
subsequent years as well, effectively assuming that the crisis was still ongoing between 
2003 and 2005. 
 
5. Results 
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Results from baseline regressions, with risk measured as either non-performing loans 
over equity capital or the negative market Z-score, and two different market discipline 
composite measures based on the two different proxies for no-bailout credibility, are 
presented in Table 3. All models use period fixed effects. Hausman tests showed that 
leverage was endogenous when the Z-score was used as dependent variable. 
Consequently,  these models are estimated by 2SLS, adding country dummy variables to 
the list of instruments. Coefficient standard errors for all models are White-type errors 
robust to time-varying residual variance and correlation over time within cross-sections. 
A priori, it is not evident which problem is worse – heteroscedasticity in the cross-section 
dimension, or in the period dimension with serial correlation within cross-sections – but 
the White period standard errors reported are ‘stricter’ (they are usually more than 60 
percent greater than normal standard errors), so I use them. 
 
Baseline regression results 
With the interpretation of market discipline used in this paper, weaker market discipline 
basically corresponds to more generous de facto deposit insurance (and vice versa). Since 
more generous deposit insurance should exacerbate the moral-hazard problems stemming 
from such insurance, it should also increase the bank’s risk. Conversely, stronger market 
discipline should be associated with lower risk. The empirical results of the baseline 
regression, as reported in Table 3, do not seem to support this hypothesis. Market 
discipline is not significant as a stand-alone variable in any of the specifications, i.e., 
regardless of which risk proxy is used as dependent variable, and regardless of which 
market-discipline measure is used. However, the theoretical analysis in this paper 
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suggests that a potentially important conditioning variable for the effect of market 
discipline is the bank’s leverage (cf. equation [10]): the higher the leverage, the stronger 
the negative effect of market discipline on risk. This implication of the model receives 
some, albeit limited, support in the empirical tests. Interacted with leverage, the 
coefficient for market discipline is, indeed, negative when risk is measured by the Z-
score, but it is (marginally) significant only in one of the specifications. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
As for the second main governance variable of interest, the argument ran as follows. 
Deposit insurance increases the incentive for shareholders to increase the bank’s risk, but 
because managers, not shareholders, determine the bank’s risk exposure, the extent to 
which this incentive materializes in higher risk depends on the level of shareholder 
control over the bank. However, as indicated both by the theoretical model in this paper 
and previous research, the risk effect of increased shareholder control for a given level of 
deposit insurance coverage (and therefore a given level of market discipline by 
creditors), is not unambiguous: it can be either positive or negative. In the model it 
depends – in simplified terms – primarily on how sensitive the pricing of equity and debt 
capital are to changes in ownership structure. The effect may also be non-linear. 
 The effect of shareholder control (for constant market discipline) turns up in 
Table 3 as the coefficients for the terms inside to outside capital, and inside to outside 
capital squared. The results seem to strongly suggest a convex relationship between 
shareholder control and risk, but whether the negative or the positive effect dominates 
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depends on which risk measure is used. When the (negative) Z-score is used, the negative 
effect is the dominant one for the vast majority of observations (the break-point comes 
only at around 40 percent of inside to outside capital). The ratio of non-performing loans 
to equity, on the other hand, typically drops slightly until about 3 percent of insider 
capital, then increases. The mean for the insider capital ratio is 3.6 percent, but the 
distribution is quite skewed, which suggests that a good portion of the observations are 
on the negatively sloping part of the estimated non-performing-loans functions as well. 
 Because of the quadratic effects, the coefficients are not entirely straightforward 
to interpret. To simplify interpretation, Figure 2 depicts the estimated effects of 
ownership structure on risk graphically. Panels A, B, C, and D in the figure correspond to 
specifications 1 through 4 in Table 3. The horizontal axes represent the ratio of inside to 
outside capital. I have cut the axes at the 95th percentile (which corresponds to 12 percent 
insider capital) to suppress the effect of outliers from the graphs. The vertical axes 
represent the relevant risk measure used. The scale for the vertical axes is zero 
plus/minus two standard deviations. The graphs clearly show the largely positive effect of 
shareholder control on the share of non-performing loans, and its predominantly negative 
effect on risk as measured by the negative Z-score. Panel C also highlights the 
comparatively weak effect of shareholder control on non-performing loans when the 
second composite measure of market discipline is used. Using this measure gives about 
50 percent more observations – an increase entirely consisting of observations on banks 
that do not have Fitch support ratings (cf. the description of these variables in subsection 
4.2). Smaller and/or emerging-market banks are overrepresented among the non-rated 
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banks, so the result seems to indicate that increased shareholder control is less likely to 
affect the share of non-performing loans in this type of bank. 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
A primary reason for studying the effect of ownership structure on risk is that it 
conditions the risk effect of market discipline/deposit insurance coverage. The 
documented non-monotonic effect of shareholder control could therefore explain the 
insignificant stand-alone effect of market discipline on risk. Conversely, if the effect on 
risk of increased shareholder control is primarily caused by the presence of deposit 
insurance, then less extensive deposit insurance – i.e., more market discipline – should 
diminish the effect. This, too, follows both from the basic argument for including 
ownership structure in the analysis (as laid out, e.g., in Gorton and Rosen, 1995), and 
from the theoretical part of this paper (see the last term in expression [9]). In the 
regression analyses it is accounted for by the interaction term between inside to outside 
capital and market discipline. As seen in Table 3, the coefficients of this interaction term 
are negative when the positive effect of insider ownership dominates, and positive when 
the negative effect of insider ownership dominates, in accordance with predictions. They 
are also relatively large and highly significant in three of four specifications. The sizes of 
the coefficients indicate that moving from zero to full market discipline (a unit increase in 
market discipline) diminishes the dominant effect of shareholder control on risk by 
between 40 and 100 percent. These results would tend to suggest that the relaxation of 
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creditor discipline caused by deposit insurance is a major factor behind the effect of 
ownership structure on bank risk taking, but it is not clear if it is the only factor. 
The individual effect of leverage is positive and highly significant when the Z-
score is the dependent variable, but small and insignificant for estimations on non-
performing loans. (This result for non-performing loans is perhaps a bit surprising, since 
lower capitalization would tend to increase the share of bad loans, ceteris paribus.) It is 
notable that coefficients for the interaction term between market discipline and leverage 
are significant only when the individual effect of leverage is large. 
As for the control variables, most of those at the bank level are small and 
insignificant. One exception is that undercapitalized banks have a systematically higher 
share of non-performing loans to equity (which is true almost by definition and may in 
part explain the insensitivity of the NPL/equity ratio to leverage). At the country level, 
banks from faster-growing countries have a significantly lower portion of bad loans, and 
banks from higher-income countries are less risky, regardless of risk measure used. 
Banks from countries undergoing a systemic financial crisis, finally, are also significantly 
riskier. 
 
Regressions on the individual components of market discipline 
Table 4 shows the results of regressions in which the components of the creditor 
discipline measure have been entered separately (rather than as a composite measure of 
market discipline). 
 
[Table 4] 
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Expectations on the individual market-discipline components are as follows: the share of 
formally insured debt and confidence in the deposit insurance system should increase risk 
(by discouraging market discipline), whereas higher credibility of the no-bailout 
commitment for non-insured debt should decrease risk (by encouraging market 
discipline). The share of formally insured debt significantly increases risk in three out of 
four specifications, and seems particularly to affect the share of non-performing loans. 
The effect also seems economically important: for example, a 10 percentage point 
increase in the reliance on insured deposits for funding would increase the ratio of non-
performing loans to equity by about 6 percentage points. The other two components 
(confidence in the deposit insurance system and no-bailout credibility) are either 
statistically insignificant or point in different directions depending on the specification. 
The effects are not clarified by conditioning them on leverage. 
To some extent, the mixed findings on the individual components of overall 
market discipline are of course consistent with the previous finding that the stand-alone 
impact of creditor discipline on risk is weak or absent. However, given the findings 
regarding the share of formally insured debt, it raises the question whether the previous 
weak results for overall market discipline was driven primarily by the poor empirical 
performance of the proxies for deposit-insurance confidence and no-bailout credibility. 
These components were designed to capture the effect of implicit (as opposed to formal, 
or de-jure) guarantees. Such effects are of course difficult to operationalize for empirical 
purposes. I see basically two possible interpretations of their inability to explain risk 
empirically: either, implicit effects (essentially the misalignment between the formal 
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design of the deposit insurance system and people’s expectations about how it will be 
applied) are relatively unimportant in practice, or the proxies I have used are too crude. 
Turning now to the effect of shareholder control, the altered specification with 
respect to the market discipline variables does not challenge the overall impression of the 
effect of insider capital share on risk given in Table 3. Coefficient signs and sizes are 
similar, indicating that the overall impression of the results remain robust to the 
difference in specification: increased shareholder control affects risk in a convex way, but 
the positive effect predominates when risk is measured as non-performing loans over 
equity, whereas the negative effect is dominant when risk is measured by the market Z-
score. 
Interacting the market discipline components with insiders’ share of capital, the 
basic expectation is that the share of formally insured debt and confidence in the deposit 
insurance system should reinforce the effect of increased shareholder control (since they 
imply more extensive guarantees), and vice versa for the credibility of non-insurance. I 
find only limited support for these expectations. Increased formal deposit insurance 
coverage seems, if anything, rather to counterbalance the dominant effect of insider 
capital on risk (coefficients for the interaction variables are negative for NPL/equity ratio 
and positive for Z-score models). Statistically speaking, however, the effect is weak 
(specifications 3 and 4) or completely insignificant. Nor can any statistically significant 
effects be found for the interaction variables between inside to outside capital and 
confidence in the deposit insurance system. Unlike the two first components, the no-
bailout credibility variable, finally, interacts with the insider capital share in accordance 
with expectations: higher credibility (implying more effective limits to deposit insurance 
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coverage) reduces the dominating effect of increased shareholder control on risk. The 
effect is statistically significant in all four specifications in Table 4, and are on a scale 
comparable to (but a bit smaller than) the corresponding effect of overall market 
discipline (as reported in Table 3). 
The estimated effects of the control variables do not differ dramatically form 
those reported in Table 3. The one notable exception is that both the real interest rate and 
inflation now turn out to significantly influence the market Z-score. 
 
Alternative specifications 
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of alternative specifications with respect to country 
effects and market-discipline proxy employed, respectively. Two differences between the 
baseline specifications and the country fixed effects specifications of Table 5 (estimated 
only on NPL/equity) stand out. 
 First, the convexity of the insider capital effect is reinforced. Whereas Table 3 
suggested that non-performing loans are only marginally negatively affected by an initial 
increase in the share of insider capital, and the effect turns positive at about 3 percent, the 
Table 5 specifications suggest a stronger initial negative effect, which turns positive only 
at around 15 percent. In this respect, the latter make the results on non-performing loans 
more aligned with those for the Z-score. 
 Second, the market discipline variable no longer significantly affects the insider 
capital effect. In fact, market discipline is insignificant both individually and in 
interactivity with ownership structure and leverage. 
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[Table 5] 
 
In light of the latter result, it may be of interest to see if the estimated effects of market 
discipline from the baseline regressions stand up to the use of a different proxy for 
creditor discipline. These results are reported in Table 6, where market discipline is 
proxied by the share of subordinated debt (sub-debt) to total assets, but the specifications 
in all other respects are as in Table 3. 
 The share of sub-debt works in a similar way as the composite measure of creditor 
discipline, when risk is proxied by the market Z-score: it is individually not significant, 
but significantly reduces risk when conditioned by leverage; it also reduces the (mainly 
negative) effect of insider ownership on risk. The coefficients for the interaction variables 
are large due to the typically very small shares of sub-debt on banks’ balance sheets, and 
suggest a potentially strong disciplining effect of relatively small changes in those shares. 
When risk is proxied by the bad-loans ratio, however, there is no discernible disciplinary 
effect of sub-debt. 
The individual effect of inside to outside capital on the Z-score remains similar to 
previous specifications. The estimated effect of the insider capital share on the non-
performing loans ratio, on the other hand, is in Table 6 much more similar to the results 
previously obtained for the Z-score. The negative effect now predominates and bottoms 
out only at about 42 percent of inside over outside capital. 
 
[Table 6] 
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Discussion 
Three main expectations on the empirical results sprang from previous research and the 
theoretical section of the paper: market discipline by creditors (which I have defined as 
the ‘reverse’ of de facto deposit insurance coverage) reduces bank risk; shareholder 
control has an a priori indeterminate, but quite likely non-linear effect on bank risk; 
finally, creditor discipline is a major determining factor for whether shareholder control 
affects risk at all. I found mixed empirical evidence of the first hypothesis, although there 
is some indication that market discipline reduces risk (as measured by the Z-score) if 
leverage is high (i.e., for poorly capitalized banks). I also found evidence that one of the 
components of the composite market-discipline measure used in the baseline regressions 
– the share of formally insured debt – has a significantly positive stand-alone impact on 
risk. 
Second, the U-shaped influence of insider control on bank risk found in previous 
research is confirmed, although the relative strengths of the negative and positive effects 
vary – not only depending on the risk measure used, as observed already in Table 3, but, 
when risk is proxied by the ratio of non-performing loans to equity, also on exactly how 
the regression equation is specified. 
Third, the baseline regression results are strongly confirmative of the hypothesis 
that the weakening market discipline that follows from deposit insurance is an important 
reason for the occurrence of a shareholder-control effect on bank risk (or, alternatively, 
that the risk effect of deposit insurance/market discipline is conditional on shareholder 
control). For alternative specifications, results on this point are more mixed. In particular, 
the only individual market-discipline component that significantly reduces the risk effects 
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of increased shareholder control is ‘no-bailout credibility’, the variable proxying effective 
limits to deposit insurance coverage. 
A possible explanation for the differences in test results across different risk 
measures (with similar specifications on the right-hand side) may be that the non-
performing loans ratio and the Z-score measure somewhat different aspects of risk. This 
explanation seems all the more plausible because the effects of control variables are 
generally consistent across specifications so long as the same risk measure is used, but 
not always otherwise. For example, undercapitalized banks always have a significantly 
higher ratio of non-performing loans to equity (as should be expected, since 
undercapitalized banks are low on equity), but undercapitalization never significantly 
impacts the Z-score. Moreover, GDP growth is also consistently negatively associated 
with non-performing loans, but has the opposite effect on risk measured as the Z-score. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The bearing idea in this paper was that governance variables, in the guise of ownership 
structure and market discipline by creditors, are major determinants of banks’ risk taking 
incentives in the presence of (partial) deposit insurance. The existence of deposit 
insurance reduces market discipline by the bank’s creditors, and introduces a subsidy on 
increased risk, but the size of this subsidy depends on the agency cost structure of the 
bank, and therefore on its ownership structure. The structure of equity ownership – 
insofar as it is related to the extent to which (outside) shareholders can enforce their 
interests –affect both equity and debt agency costs. The extent of market discipline by 
creditors depends not only on the formal coverage of deposit insurance, but also on the 
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credibility of the guarantees, and formally non-insured creditors’ expectations of ad hoc 
bailouts of in the event of default. 
 The interrelationships between the variables of interest were analyzed in a 
standard agency cost model, augmented in a simple way to account for partial deposit 
insurance. The model implies that market discipline by creditors should decrease risk, it 
demonstrates why insider ownership may have a non-monotonic influence on risk (a 
common empirical result in the literature), it shows how the risk effects of the two main 
governance variables of interest – market discipline and shareholder control – are 
interrelated, and how leverage partially determines the impact of the governance 
variables on risk. The effects of minimum capital requirements and regulatory 
forbearance on undercapitalized banks were also briefly considered in the model. 
 By exploiting a dataset with bank-level data for several hundred banks worldwide 
and the World Bank’s datasets on bank safety net characteristics at the country level, I 
was able to test the general predictions of the analysis. The results strongly suggest a 
convex effect of insider ownership on risk, but whether the negative or positive effect 
dominates depends on the measure of risk used. Creditor discipline has an insignificant 
effect on risk as a stand-alone variable, but interacted with ownership structure and/or 
leverage affects risk in the predicted way in several specifications. Of the individual 
components which together form the creditor discipline measure, the proxy for formal 
deposit insurance coverage is a significant determinant of bank risk, whereas proxies for 
implicit guarantees are not. 
 Although the results on market discipline are somewhat mixed, the empirical 
results overall are essentially consistent with the implications of the theoretical model. 
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The results on the effect of ownership structure on risk are relatively strong and 
consistent. On the other hand, the risk-decreasing effects of limiting deposit insurance 
(thereby strengthening market discipline) seem limited in general. The often-stated 
argument that the risk-increasing effects of discouraging creditor discipline (by 
introducing deposit insurance) is conditional on shareholder control – if by that one 
means that increased shareholder control strengthens the risk-increasing effect of deposit 
insurance – seems too simplistic. Shareholder control and creditor discipline are 
interdependent, but because the individual risk effect of increased shareholder control is 
ambiguous, so is the effect of interaction between these two variables. Therefore, it is 
possible that the relatively weak individual risk effect of creditor discipline is due to the 
fact that this effect is conditional on ownership structure, whose effect is – in turn – non-
monotonic. A ‘cleaner’ interpretation is to turn the argument around, and say that the risk 
effect of ownership structure is conditional on creditor discipline: the less market 
discipline by creditors, the stronger the effect of shareholder control on risk. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Aidyn Bibolov, Bill Emmons, John Knopf, and Clas Wihlborg for helpful 
comments on previous drafts of this paper. I also thank Penny Angkinand and Clas 
Wihlborg for their contributions in developing part of the dataset used in the paper.
58 59
 52 
References 
Alston, L. J., W. A. Grove, and D. C. Wheelock (1994), ‘Why Do Banks Fail? Evidence 
from the 1920s’, Explorations in Economic History 31: 409-431. 
Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. M. Reeb (2003), ‘Founding Family Ownership and 
the Agency Costs of Debt’, Journal of Financial Economics 68: 263-285. 
Angkinand, A. and C. Wihlborg (2005), ‘Deposit insurance coverage, credibility of non-
insurance, and banking crises’, Working Paper No. 2005-10 (December), Center 
for Law, Economics, and Financial Institutions, Copenhagen Business School. 
Angkinand, A. and C. Wihlborg (2006), ‘Credibility of Non-Insurance and Governance 
as Determinants of Market Discipline and Risk-Taking in Banking’, Paper 
presented at the FDIC Fall Workshop, Washington, DC, October. 
Baer, H. and E. Brewer (1986), ‘Uninsured deposits as a source of market discipline: 
Some new evidence’, Economic Perspectives (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) 
10(5): 23-32. 
Bagnani, E. S., N. T. Milonas, A. Saunders, and N. G. Travlos (1994), ‘Managers, 
Owners, and the Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of 
Finance 49(2): 453-477. 
Barth, J. R., G. Caprio Jr., and R. Levine (2001), ‘The Regulation and Supervision of 
Banks around the World: A New Database’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 
2588, Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Barth, J. R., G. Caprio Jr., and R. Levine (2006), Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till 
Angels Govern, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
58 59
 53 
Beck, T. and L. Laeven (2006), ‘Resolution of Failed Banks by Deposit Insurers – Cross-
Country Evidence’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3920 (May), 
Washington, DC: The World Bank 
Benink, H. and C. Wihlborg (2002), ‘The New Basel Capital Accord: Making it Effective 
with Stronger Market Discipline’, European Financial Management 8(1): 103-
115. 
Benston, G. J. and G. G. Kaufman (1997), ‘FDICIA after five years’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 11: 139-158. 
Besanko, D. and G. Kanatas (1996), ‘The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do Capital 
Standards Promote Bank Safety?’, Journal of Financial Intermediation 5(2): 160-
183. 
Bhattacharya, S., A. Boot, and A. V. Thakor (1998), ‘The Economics of Banking 
Regulation’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30(4): 745-770. 
Bliss, R. R. and M. J. Flannery (2002), ‘Market discipline in the governance of US bank 
holding companies: Monitoring vs. influencing’, European Finance Review 6(3): 
361-395. 
Boot, A. W. A. and A. V. Thakor (1993), ‘Self-Interested Bank Regulation’, American 
Economic Review 83(2): 206-212. 
Boyd, J. H., S. L. Graham, and S. Hewitt (1993), ‘Bank holding company mergers with 
nonbank financial firms: Effects on the risk of failure’, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 17: 43-63. 
Boyd, J. H. and G. De Nicoló (2005), ‘The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition 
Revisited’, Journal of Finance 60(3): 1329-1343. 
60 61
 54 
Brander, J. A. and M. Poitevin (1992), ‘Managerial Compensation and the Agency Costs 
of Debt’, Managerial and Decision Economics 13(1): 55-64. 
Brewer, E. and M. R. Saidenberg (1996), ‘Franchise Value, Ownership Structure, and 
Risk at Savings Institutions’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper 
No. 9632. 
Calomiris, C. W. (1990), ‘Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective’, 
Journal of Economic History 50(2): 283-295. 
Calomiris, C. W. (1999), ‘Building an incentive-compatible safety net’, Journal of 
Banking and Finance 23: 1499-1519. 
Calomiris, C. W. and C. M. Kahn (1991), ‘The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring 
Optimal Banking Arrangements’, American Economic Review 81(3): 497-514. 
Caprio, G., L. Laeven, and R. Levine (2004), ‘Governance and Bank Valuation’, Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3202 (February), Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. 
Cebenoyan, A. S., E. S. Cooperman, and C. A. Register (1999), ‘Ownership Structure, 
Charter Value, and Risk-Taking Behavior for Thrifts’, Financial Management 
28(1): 43-60. 
Cook, D. O. and L. J. Spellman (1994), ‘Repudiation Risk and Restitution Costs: Toward 
Understanding Premiums on Insured Deposits’, Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking 26(3): 439-59. 
Covitz, D. M., D. Hancock, & M. L. Kwast (2004), ‘A Reconsideration of the Risk 
Sensitivity of U.S. Banking Organization Subordinated Debt Spreads: A Sample 
60 61
 55 
Selection Approach’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy 
Review (September): 73-92. 
Cremers, M., V. B. Nair, and C. Wei (2006), ‘Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices’, 
Working Paper No. 06-30, International Center for Finance, Yale University. 
Crouzille, C., L. Lepetit, and A. Tarazi (2004), ‘Bank stock volatility, news, and 
asymmetric information in banking: An empirical investigation’, Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management 14: 443-461. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (2002), ’Does deposit insurance increase banking 
system stability? An empirical investigation’, Journal of Monetary Economics 49: 
1373-1406. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and H. Huizinga (2004), ‘Market discipline and deposit insurance’, 
Journal of Monetary Economics 51: 375-399. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., B. Karacaovali and L. Laeven (2005). ’Deposit insurance around the 
World: A comprehensive database’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3628, 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Diamond, D. W. and P. H. Dybvig (1983), ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity’, Journal of Political Economy 91(3): 401-420. 
Ellis, D. M. and M. J. Flannery (1992), ‘Does the debt market asses large banks’ risk?’, 
Journal of Monetary Economics 30: 481-502. 
Evanoff, D. D. & L. D. Wall (2000), ‘Subordinated debt and bank capital reform’, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2000-24 (November). 
Flannery, M. J. (2001), ‘The faces of Market Discipline’, Journal of Financial Services 
Research 20(2-3): 107-119. 
62 63
 56 
Flannery, M. J. and S. M. Sorescu (1996), ‘Evidence of market discipline in subordinated 
debenture yields: 1983-1991’, Journal of Finance 51(4): 1347-1377. 
Gorton, G. and R. Rosen (1995), ‘Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of 
Banking’, Journal of Finance 50(5): 1377-1420. 
Gropp, R. and J. Vesala (2004), ‘Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Market 
Monitoring’, Review of Finance 8: 571-602. 
Grossman, R. S. (1992), ‘Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift 
Industry: Evidence from the 1930s’, American Economic Review 82(4): 800-821. 
Hall, J. R., T. B. King, A. P. Meyer, and M. D. Vaughan (2002), ‘Did FDICIA Enhance 
Market Discipline? A Look at Evidence from the Jumbo-CD Market’, mimeo, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (http://ssrn.com/abstract=382101). 
Hannan, T. H. and G. A. Hanweck (1988), ‘Bank insolvency risk and the market for large 
certificates of deposit’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 20(2): 203-211. 
Honohan, P. and L. Laeven (2005), Systemic Financial Distress: Containment and 
Resolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Hovakimian, A., E. J. Kane, and L. Laeven (2003), ‘How Country and Safety-Net 
Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting’, Journal of Financial Services 
Research 23(3): 177-204. 
Jagtiani, J., G. Kaufman and C. Lemieux (2002), ’The effect of credit risk on bank and 
bank holding company bond yields: Evidence from the post-FDICIA period’, 
Journal of Financial Research XXV(4): 559-575. 
James, C. (1988), ‘The use of loan sales and standby letters of credit by commercial 
banks’, Journal of Monetary Economics 22: 395-422. 
62 63
 57 
James, C. (1990), ‘Heterogeneous creditors and the market value of bank LDC loan 
portfolios’, Journal of Monetary Economics 25: 325-346. 
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics 5(4): 
305-360. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kray, and M. Mastruzzi (2006), ‘Governance Matters V: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2005’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4012 
(September), Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Keeley, M. C. (1990), ‘Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking’, American 
Economic Review 80(5): 1183-1200. 
Kim, W. S. and E. H. Sorensen (1986), ‘Evidence on the Impact of the Agency Costs of 
Debt on Corporate Debt Policy’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
21(2): 131-144. 
Knopf, J. D. and W. Dolde (2006), ‘Impact of Corporate Ownership and Governance on 
Thrift Risk-Taking and Returns’, paper presented at the FMA Annual Meeting, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, October. 
Knopf, J. D. and J. L. Teall (1996), ‘Risk-taking behavior in the U.S. thrift industry: 
Ownership structure and regulatory changes’, Journal of Banking and Finance 20: 
1329-1350. 
Laeven, L. (2002), ‘Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance’, The World Bank Economic 
Review 16(1): 109-137. 
Laeven, L. (2004), ‘The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance’, Journal of Financial 
Services Research 26(3): 201-224. 
64 65
 58 
La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, (2002), ‘Government Ownership of 
Banks’ Journal of Finance 57(1): 265-301. 
Levonian, M. (2001), ‘Subordinated Debt and the Quality of Market Discipline in 
Banking’, mimeo (May), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
Marcus, A. (1984), ‘Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy’, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 8: 557-565. 
Marcus, A. and I. Shaked (1984), ‘The Valuation of FDIC Deposit Insurance Using 
Option-Pricing Estimates’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 16(4): 446-
460. 
Martinez Peria, M. S. and S. L. Schmukler (2001), ‘Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad 
behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises’, Journal of 
Finance 56(3): 1029-1051. 
Merton, R. C. (1977), ‘An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan 
guarantees’, Journal of Banking and Finance 1(1): 3-11. 
Morgan, D. P. & K. J. Stiroh (2000), ’Market discipline of banks: The asset test’, Journal 
of Financial Services Research 20(2-3): 195-208. 
Nivorozhkin, E. (2005), ‘Market discipline of subordinated debt in banking: The case of 
costly bankruptcy’, European Journal of Operational Research 161: 364-376. 
Saunders, A., E. Strock, and N. G. Travlos (1990), ‘Ownership Structure, deregulation, 
and Bank Risk Taking’, Journal of Finance 45(2): 643-654. 
Sironi, A. (2001), ‘An analysis of European banks’ SND issues and its implications for 
the design of a mandatory subordinated debt policy’, Journal of Financial Services 
Research 20(2-3): 233-266. 
64 65
 59 
 
66 67
 60 
Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Description Source 
   
1. Risk proxies   
a. Non-performing loans / 
equity 
Non-performing loans divided by equity 
capital 
BankScope 
b. Z-score (Average return on equity – equity capital 
over total assets) divided by standard 
deviation of equity returns 
Datastream, BankScope 
   
2. Ownership variables   
a. Inside to outside capital Equity held by all insiders/stakeholders 
divided by the sum of equity not held by 
insiders/stakeholders and total liabilities 
Reuters, BankScope 
b. Institutions’ share of 
outside equity 
Equity held by institutional investors 
divided by all equity not held by 
insider/stakeholders 
Reuters 
c. Government ownership Dummy variable indicating largest 
insider/stakeholder is the government 
Reuters 
d. Foreign ownership Dummy variable indicating largest 
insider/stakeholder is foreign 
Reuters 
   
3. Market discipline / deposit 
insurance 
  
a. Share of formally 
(explicitly) insured debta 
% country-wide deposit insurance 
coverage multiplied by each bank’s ratio 
of deposits to total debt 
BankScope, Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. (2005) 
b. Public confidence in the 
deposit insurance systema 
Index value of ‘government 
effectiveness’ 
Kaufmann et al. (2006) 
c. No-bailout credibility 1 The Fitch support index of probability of 
bailout 
Fitch/BankScope 
d. No-bailout credibility 2 The Fitch support index (c) wherever 
available, otherwise one minus the bank’s 
share of total deposits (alt. M2) in its 
country of residence 
BankScope + IMF 
International Financial 
Statistics 
e. Market discipline 1 a × (1-b)+(1-a) × c As above 
f. Market discipline 2 a × (1-b)+(1-a) × d As above 
   
4. Capital structure   
a. Leverage of outside capital Total liabilities divided by total non-
insider capital, standardized around the 
mean 
BankScope, Reuters 
b. Undercapitalization 
indicator 
Dummy variable indicating if equity 
divided by total assets < 50% of the total 
applicable capital requirements 
BankScope, Barth et al. 
(2001, 2006) 
c. Subdebt Subordinated debt divided by total assets BankScope 
   
5. Bank-level control 
variables 
  
a. Charter value (Tobin’s Q) The sum of market value of equity and 
book value of liabilities divided by the 
book value of total assets 
BankScope, Datastream 
b. Bank size The natural logarithm of total assets in 
thousands of USD 
BankScope 
c. Liquid assets Liquid assets divided by total assets BankScope 
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6. Country-level control 
variables 
  
a. Country income level The natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capita in thousands of USD (constant 
2000 prices) 
World Development 
Indicators 
b. Real interest rate Real interest rate World Development 
Indicators 
c. Inflation Inflation rate World Development 
Indicators 
d. Growth The growth rate of real USD GDP 
(constant 2000 prices) 
World Development 
Indicators 
e. Systemic financial crisis Dummy variable equal to one if the 
country was undergoing a systemic 
financial crisis, zero otherwise 
Honohan and Laeven (2005) 
   
7. Institutional variables   
a. Summary regulation Sum of Capital Regulation, Supervisory 
Power, and Prompt Corrective Power 
indices 
Barth et al. (2001, 2006) 
   
Note: a) For countries/years with explicit deposit insurance system in place. All other countries: entries 
equal zero.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (all banks/countries) 
Variable Mean Std.dev. Min Max Obs 
       
Risk measures      
Non-performing loans / equity 0.67 0.73 0.00 4.89 2534 
Z-score 5.35 5.28 0.35 40.3 2688 
      
Governance variables      
Inside to outside capital 0.036 0.056 0.00 0.75 2745 
Institutions’ share of outside 
equity 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.99 2755 
Leverage (debt share of outside 
capital, standardized) 0.00 1.00 -9.80 1.19 2720 
Share of formally insured debt 0.53 0.35 0.00 0.99 2881 
Public confidence in the deposit 
insurance system  0.55 0.30 0.00 0.96 
47 
countries 
No-bailout credibility 1 0.48 0.26 0.10 0.90 3444 
No-bailout credibility 2 0.61 0.29 0.10 0.90 5066 
Composite market discipline 1  0.43 0.18 0.076 0.90 1509 
Composite market discipline 2  0.53 0.22 0.04 0.90 2896 
      
Bank-level control variables      
Charter value 1.01 0.13 0.41 2.89 2669 
Bank size 15.1 2.10 6.94 21.2 3389 
Liquid assets / total assets 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.97 3388 
Subordinated debt / total assets 2.7 ×10-4 0.0016 0.00 0.055 2100 
      
Country-level control variables      
Country income level  
8.82 1.56 5.87 10.6 
47 
countries 
Growth 
0.033 0.031 -0.13 0.18 
47 
countries 
Inflation 
0.067 0.14 -0.039 1.55 
47 
countries 
Real interest rate  
0.060 0.091 -0.91 0.78 
47 
countries 
Summary regulation 
20.4 4.41 11.0 28.0 
47 
countries 
68 69
 63 
 Table 3. Results from estimation of the baseline regressions (equation [14]) 
Dependent variable 1. Non-
performing loans 
/ equity 
2. Negative 
market Z-score 
3. Non-
performing loans 
/ equity 
4. Negative 
market Z-score 
Estimation methoda OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Market discipline 1 .54 (1.17) .36 (.27)   
Market discipline 2   .12 (.37) 2.19 (1.18) 
(Market discipline 1) × 
Leverage 
.21 (.44) -4.06 (-1.89)*   
(Market discipline 2) × 
Leverage 
  .43 (1.35) -2.22 (-.54) 
Inside to outside capital -2.06 (-.65) -90.9 (-6.87)*** -.47 (-.30) -57.2 (-3.49)*** 
(Inside to outside 
capital)2 
39.5 (2.81)*** 105.5 (1.65)* 7.14 (2.10)** 68.77 (3.31)*** 
(Inside to outside capital) 
× (Market discipline 1) 
-16.6 (-2.89)*** 71.6 (2.28)**   
(Inside to outside capital) 
× (Market discipline 2) 
  -7.42 (-2.16)** 23.1 (.84) 
Leverage .21 (.44) 4.91 (4.48)*** -.027 (-.15) 5.13 (2.03)** 
Charter value (Q) -.26 (-1.39) -.41 (-.49) -.085 (-.59) .047 (.030) 
Bank size -.0033 (-.10) .0051 (.041) -.012 (-.54) .56 (3.21) 
Liquid assets / total 
assets 
-.20 (-.53) .71 (.83) -.39 (-1.38) -1.19 (-.95) 
Institutions’ share of 
outside equity 
-.34 (-1.64) -.069 (-.076) -.41 (-2.44)** 1.02 (.82) 
Foreign-owned .067 (.67) .33 (.97) .16 (1.97)** .040 (.056) 
Government-owned .21 (1.57) .96 (2.97)*** .18 (1.61) -.48 (-.76) 
Undercapitalized .44 (3.78)*** -.084 (-.32) .76 (6.93)*** .086 (.20) 
Growth -3.24 (-3.22)*** 4.91 (1.64) -3.66 (-3.19)*** 7.73 (2.24)** 
Inflation -.44 (-.89) 4.77 (3.44) -.68 (-1.57) 2.76 (1.30) 
Real interest rate -.30 (-.84) .82 (.75) -.065 (-.20) -1.04 (-.68) 
Income level -.15 (-2.25)** -.21 (-1.80)* -.13 (-2.96)*** -1.07 (6.21)*** 
Summary regulation -.018 (-1.31) .016 (.51) -.015 (-1.35) -.034 (-.79) 
Systemic financial crisis .40 (4.08)*** 1.30 (4.67)*** .44 (5.59)*** 2.01 (4.64)*** 
Period fixed effects (F-
statistic) 
5.09***  5.25***  
Regression F 22.3*** 40.4*** 38.9*** 53.7*** 
Adj. R2 .36 .56 .40 .46 
No of obs.  1001 1131 1556 1873 
No of banks 185 206 282 330 
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS/2SLS estimation with period fixed effects. T-
statistics in parentheses are based on White type standard errors robust to time-varying residual variance 
and correlation over time within cross-sections. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence 
level. 
Note: a) Estimation method was determined by Hausman tests of possible endogeneity of leverage and 
charter value. 2SLS uses country dummies as additional instruments. 
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Table 4. Results from estimation on individual market discipline components 
Dependent variable 1. Non-
performing loans 
/ equity 
2. Negative 
market Z-score 
3. Non-
performing loans 
/ equity 
4. Negative 
market Z-score 
Estimation methoda OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Share of formally insured 
debt 
.55 (2.58)** -.061 (-.13) .61 (3.47)*** 1.16 (1.68)* 
Confidence in deposit 
insurance 
-.33 (-1.24) 1.43 (2.13)** -.27 (-1.25) -1.95 (-1.96)** 
No-bailout credibility 1 .033 (.13) -.32 (-.41)   
No-bailout credibility 2   .46 (2.54)** -2.60 (-3.00)*** 
(Share of formally insured 
debt) × Leverage 
-.17 (-.46) .95 (.65) -.21 (-1.32) -6.35 (-5.24)*** 
(Confidence in deposit 
insurance) × Leverage 
.22 (.38) 1.63 (.79) .12 (.53) 13.1 (5.93)*** 
(No-bailout credibility 1) × 
Leverage 
-.12 (-.35) -1.10 (-.72)   
(No-bailout credibility 2) × 
Leverage 
  .18 (.65) -1.46 (-.86) 
Inside to outside capital -2.33 (-.57) -86.6 (-4.52)*** 2.77 (1.02) -97.0 (-7.18)*** 
(Inside to outside capital)2 38.2 (2.74)*** 122.9 (2.23)** 7.23 (1.72)* 135.1 (3.15)*** 
(Inside to outside capital) × 
(Share of formally insured 
debt) 
-4.68 (-1.47) 12.54 (1.48) -5.27 (-1.83)* 21.1 (1.76)* 
(Inside to outside capital) × 
(Confidence in deposit 
insurance) 
-4.22 (-.75) -13.0 (-.45) .65 (.17) -28.3 (-1.30) 
(Inside to outside capital) × 
(No-bailout credibility 1) 
-5.80 (-1.80)* 51.7 (4.44)***   
(Inside to outside capital) × 
(No-bailout credibility 2) 
  -6.59 (-2.77)*** 53.2 (4.22)*** 
Leverage .37 (.89) 2.49 (1.63) .090 (.36) 1.29 (.90) 
Charter value (Q) -.27 (-1.25) -.51 (-.74) -.079 (-.55) .67 (.67) 
Bank size -.023 (-.59) -.052 (-.38) .016 (.64) -.58 (-2.34)** 
Liquid assets / total assets -.40 (-.96) .17 (.19) -.46 (-1.57) -.015 (-.014) 
Institutions’ share of 
outside equity 
-.26 (-1.16) -.55 (-.61) -.31 (-1.72)* 1.83 (1.31) 
Foreign-owned -.010 (-.092) .51 (1.31) .096 (1.32) -1.01 (-2.03)** 
Government-owned .17 (1.10) .93 (2.76)*** .17 (1.49) .20 (.37) 
Undercapitalized .46 (4.20)*** -.27 (-.86) .72 (6.89)*** .12 (.35) 
Growth -2.65 (-2.61)*** 4.99 (1.72)* -3.33 (-2.80)*** 5.30 (1.60) 
Inflation -.11 (-.20) 4.78 (3.56)*** -.58 (-1.27) 4.50 (2.71)*** 
Real interest rate -.24 (-.64) 3.05 (2.74)*** -.24 (-.75) 3.77 (2.12)** 
Income level -.15 (-2.42)** -.30 (-2.51)** -.11 (-2.59)*** -.45 (-2.97)*** 
Summary regulation -.017 (-1.23) .0093 (.33) -.016 (-1.51) .0077 (.21) 
Systemic financial crisis .21 (3.08)*** .89 (3.75)*** .20 (3.22)*** 1.17 (3.08)*** 
Period fixed effects (F-
statistic) 
4.73***  5.96***  
Regression F 18.9*** 39.7*** 34.8*** 61.3*** 
Adj. R2 .37 .59 .42 .51 
No of obs.  993 1122 1535 1852 
No of banks 185 206 282 330 
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS/2SLS estimation with period fixed effects. T-
statistics in parentheses are based on White type standard errors robust to time-varying residual variance 
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and correlation over time within cross-sections. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence 
level. 
Note: a) Estimation method was determined by Hausman tests of possible endogeneity of leverage and 
charter value. 2SLS uses country dummies as additional instruments. 
72 73
 66 
Table 5. Results from estimation of country fixed effects modelsa 
Dependent variable 1. Non-performing loans / equity 2. Non-performing loans / equity 
Estimation method OLS OLS 
Market discipline 1 -.017 (-.045)  
Market discipline 2  .052 (.19) 
(Market discipline 1) × Leverage -.42 (-.98)  
(Market discipline 2) × Leverage  .027 (.079) 
Inside to outside capital -17.3 (-4.19)*** -4.41 (-1.84)* 
(Inside to outside capital)2 62.4 (4.12)*** 11.4 (2.14)** 
(Inside to outside capital) × 
(Market discipline 1) 
2.47 (.45)  
(Inside to outside capital) × 
(Market discipline 2) 
 -1.83 (-.40) 
Leverage .79 (3.26)*** .31 (1.58) 
Charter value (Q) -.047 (-.32) -.051 (-.39) 
Bank size -.027 (.71) -.019 (-.71) 
Liquid assets / total assets -.80 (-1.64) -.070 (-.23) 
Institutions’ share of outside 
equity 
-.19 (-.75) -.26 (-1.32) 
Foreign-owned -.13 (-1.29) .15 (2.31)** 
Undercapitalized .37 (3.59)*** .78 (7.28)*** 
Systemic financial crisis .27 (2.18)** .19 (2.06)** 
Country fixed effects (F-statistic) 39.9*** 65.6*** 
Period fixed effects (F-statistic) 9.65*** 8.30*** 
Regression F 24.9*** 31.0*** 
Adj. R2 .58 .52 
No of obs.  1034 1609 
No of banks 192 292 
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS estimation with country and period fixed effects. T-
statistics in parentheses are based on White type standard errors robust to time-varying residual variance 
and correlation over time within cross-sections. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence 
level. 
Note: a) The government ownership dummy variable had to be dropped from these specifications to 
accommodate fixed effects for all countries.
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Table 6. Results from estimation of the baseline regression with market discipline 
measured as subordinated debt/total assetsa 
Dependent variable 1. Non-performing loans / equity 2. Negative market Z-score 
Estimation methodb OLS 2SLS 
Subordinated debt/total assets 2.07 (.83) -43.5 (-1.39) 
(Subordinated debt/total assets) × 
Leverage 
.62 (.70) -60.0 (-2.09)** 
Inside to outside capital -3.52 (-2.59)*** -57.3 (-4.23)*** 
(Inside to outside capital)2 4.22 (1.35) 79.1 (1.96)* 
(Inside to outside capital) × 
(Subordinated debt/total assets) 
-28.9 (-.71) 879.5 (1.72)* 
Leverage .19 (2.22)** 5.76 (4.95)*** 
Charter value (Q) -.15 (-.91) -2.66 (-1.12) 
Bank size -.023 (-1.05) .50 (2.12)** 
Liquid assets / total assets -.36 (-1.11) .25 (.14) 
Institutions’ share of outside 
equity 
-.35 (-1.79)* -.16 (-.095) 
Foreign-owned .24 (2.40)** .53 (.54) 
Government-owned .24 (1.73)* -.46 (-1.00) 
Undercapitalized .67 (5.80)*** .33 (.62) 
Growth -4.89 (-3.24)*** .88 (.20) 
Inflation -2.42 (-3.14)*** 2.96 (.75) 
Real interest rate -.052 (-.15) -1.13 (-.71) 
Income level -.16 (-3.50)*** -.98 (-5.35)*** 
Summary regulation -.022 (-1.84)* -.015 (-.26) 
Systemic financial crisis .53 (4.95)*** 1.62 (4.08)*** 
Period fixed effects (F-statistic) 2.28**  
Regression F 30.8*** 64.4*** 
Adj. R2 .42 .33 
No of obs.  1120 1391 
No of banks 241 282 
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS/2SLS estimation with period fixed effects. T-
statistics in parentheses are based on White type standard errors robust to time-varying residual variance 
and correlation over time within cross-sections. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence 
level. 
Notes: 
a) Coefficients reported are for subordinated debt/total assets measured in percent (rather than as 
fractions as in Table 2. 
b) Estimation method was determined by Hausman tests of possible endogeneity of leverage and 
charter value. 2SLS uses country dummies as additional instruments. 
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Figure 1. Agency costs, creditor discipline, and the risk subsidy from deposit insurance 
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Figure 2. Estimated functions of the effect of ownership structure on risk 
 
 
  
A. Risk is measured as non-performing loans over equity; 
market discipline measure 1 is used; 1001 observations 
(corresponds to specification 1 in Table 13) 
B. Risk is measured as the negative market Z-score; market 
discipline measure 1 is used; 1131 observations 
(corresponds to specification 2 in Table 13) 
  
C. Risk is measured as non-performing loans over equity; 
market discipline measure 2 is used; 1556 observations 
(corresponds to specification 3 in Table 13) 
D. Risk is measured as the negative market Z-score; market 
discipline measure 2 is used; 1873 observations 
(corresponds to specification 4 in Table 13) 
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Appendix. Sample distribution across countries and over time 
 
Table A1. Distribution of banks and key institutional features by country 
Country Number 
of banks 
Average sizea of 
included banks in 
2005 
Formal deposit 
insurance in place 
Financial crisis 
during sample period 
Argentina 4 4,853 Yes 1995, 2001-2005 
Australia 9 55,698 No No 
Austria 4 18,625 Yes No 
Brazil 14 13,558 Yes 1995-1999 
Canada 9 90,587 Yes No 
Chile 5 14,229 Yes No 
Colombia 11 2,244 Yes No 
Czech Republic 1 20,942 Yes No 
Denmark 40 847 Yes No 
Egypt 20 978 No No 
Finland 2 8,201 Yes No 
France 11 22,495 Yes No 
Germany 16 11,632 Yes No 
Greece 10 13,638 Yes No 
Hong Kong 7 15,165 No No 
Hungary 2 5,265 Yes 1995 
India 37 13,051 Yes No 
Indonesia 22 4,154 Yes (from 1998) 1997-2002 
Ireland 5 127,953 Yes No 
Israel 8 16,406 No No 
Italy 19 28,383 Yes No 
Japan 86 19,092 Yes 1995-2005 
Kenya 7 575 Yes 1995 
South Korea 8 33,349 Yes (from 1996) 1997-2002 
Lithuania 4 955 Yes (from 1996) 1995-1996 
Malaysia 3 28,277 Yes (from 1998) 1997-2001 
Malta 4 1,425 No No 
Morocco 5 6,241 No No 
Netherlands 1 1,039,000 Yes No 
Pakistan 20 1,345 No No 
Peru 9 948 Yes No 
Philippines 15 1,626 Yes 1998-2005 
Poland 12 6,548 Yes 1995 
Portugal 3 73,289 Yes No 
Romania 3 1,472 Yes (from 1996) 1995-1996 
Singapore 2 71,652 No No 
South Africa 2 5,477b No No 
Spain 14 25,982 Yes No 
Sri Lanka 7 658 Yes No 
Sweden 2 217,181 Yes No 
Switzerland 6 6,780 Yes No 
Taiwan 15 11,636 Yes 1997-1998 
Thailand 13 7,679 Yes (from 1997) 1997-2002 
Turkey 12 8,183 Yes 2000-2005 
United Kingdom 3 18,409 Yes No 
United States 15 3,511 Yes No 
Venezuela 14 1,027 Yes 1995 
Notes: a) Total assets in millions of USD. b) Refers to average size in 2004 (no observations for 2005). 
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Table A2. Distribution of observations on the dependent variables over time 
Dependent variable, number of obs’s Year 
Non-performing 
loans over equity 
Market Z-score 
1995 0 1 
1996 2 1 
1997 19 23 
1998 207 227 
1999 271 273 
2000 306 301 
2001 325 321 
2002 340 341 
2003 345 357 
2004 380 433 
2005 339 410 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Some aspects of bank or banking system characteristics may counterbalance this effect – e.g., entry 
barriers caused by restrictive regulation or market concentration (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990), creating 
rents from valuable bank charters for ‘incumbent’ banks. 
2 At country-level, recent studies indicate that the existence of an explicit deposit insurance system 
increases the probability of systemic banking crises, and that such systems have a more detrimental effect 
on banking system stability in weak institutional environments, where effective prudential supervision and 
overall transparency and reliability of the legal system, etc., cannot easily counterbalance the moral hazard 
risk introduced by deposit insurance (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). These results parallel 
historical studies of bank failures in the US before and after the introduction of federal deposit insurance, 
which have found bank risk-taking and failure rates to correlate with the presence of deposit insurance. For 
instance, Calomiris (1990) and Alston et al (1994) found that US banks in the 1920s were on average 
riskier and more susceptible to failure in states where a deposit insurance system was present than in states 
without such a system. Grossman (1992) found that the introduction of federal deposit insurance in the 
1930s initially lowered banks’ risk taking, but that once insured, banks increased risk beyond pre-deposit-
insurance levels. The effect was particularly pronounced in states with comparatively lax supervision. 
3 Benston and Kaufman (1997) report that formally uninsured deposit holders incurred losses in only 17 
percent of bank failures in 1991, and that the deposit insurance reform pushed that figure up to 54 percent 
in the following year. 
4 One weakness with their results, however, may be that they are not necessarily particularly representative 
out of sample. Clearly, their results imply comprehensive implicit guarantees in European countries before 
the introduction of formal deposit insurance systems. However, several European countries introduced such 
systems, if not as a direct consequence of, then very shortly after having experienced major banking crises, 
involving massive bailouts. Crises were particularly prevalent in smaller, highly concentrated banking 
markets centered around a small number of systemic banks (Finland, Norway, Sweden) – a factor which 
contributed to the extensive bailouts. It is not clear that post-crisis, pre-deposit-insurance risk behavior in 
these countries’ banks reflects average ex ante bailout expectations for countries without explicit deposit 
insurance in general. If the authors’ observations on ‘no deposit insurance’ are unbalanced toward such 
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countries and such circumstances, they will overestimate the risk-reducing potential of explicit deposit 
insurance. 
5 This is consistent with the predictions of, e.g., Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990) that deregulation will 
tend to erode the value of incumbent banks’ charters that otherwise serves to counterbalance the risk-
increasing incentives of deposit insurance. 
6 The ‘state of the industry’ parameter takes on a role similar to that of charter value in other studies: an 
exogenous conditioning variable representing investment opportunities, the regulatory climate, the level of 
competition, etc. 
7 To my knowledge, the entrenchment hypothesis has never been operationalized and directly tested, but is 
only used to explain certain empirical results. 
8 Jensen and Meckling (1976) make agency costs a function of capitalization rather than, as here, of 
leverage, d, which makes my model a ‘mirror image’ of theirs. It has no bearing on the model’s 
implications. The explicit assumptions about the functional form of agency costs that I make here are 
largely implicit in Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
9 Whether the assumption of underpriced deposit insurance is a realistic one is open to debate. Laeven 
(2002) finds that the difference between average ‘fair’ (option-value) premia and average official premia 
over the 1990s in a number of countries with explicit deposit insurance was not significantly different from 
zero (although official premia were substantially lower for some countries). However, this non-significance 
is hardly surprising: given the large variance in option-implied premia over the cross-section of banks a 
null hypothesis of equality would be difficult to reject. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), on the other 
hand, find that explicit deposit insurance does indeed provide a subsidy, in terms of a reduction in average 
debt-service rates net of deposit insurance premia, for a larger sample of countries over the same time 
period as that studied by Laeven. The assumption of imperfect risk adjustment of insurance premia is 
probably less controversial than that of underpricing, given that during the period covered here, the vast 
majority of countries did not risk-adjust premia at all. Exceptions were Finland, Peru, Sweden, and the US 
(again, see Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). 
10 Note that a necessary condition for deposit insurance to shift the agency cost curve is that disciplining by 
the ‘exogenous’ insurer – i.e., in practice government supervision – is less effective than disciplining by 
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holders of risky debt. This is a less dramatic assumption than it might seem at first, since the supervisory 
authorities’ main disciplinary tool is a more or less discrete capital adequacy requirement (the effect of 
which is considered in the model). Moreover, I don’t make any a priori assumption about the effectiveness 
of market discipline by creditors, and the effect of bank co-financing of the deposit insurance scheme, 
finally, has already been mentioned. 
11 I also assume that outside financing purely by (insured) deposits is not possible because of a number of 
‘institutional’ constraints related to equity: for instance (though, perhaps, rather trivially), the included 
banks are all listed on a stock exchange, and maintaining that listing presumes that a certain share of the 
equity capital be tradable (which would imply that at least some outside equity capital is maintained). 
However, the assumptions on the deposit-insurance-related parameters are what most generally prevent 
optimal capital structure from simply turning to 1d φ= =  within the model. 
12 This does not mean that the shareholders’ moral hazard incentive is not there, only that it is not exploited, 
and that the creditors know about the shareholders’ weak position and price the debt accordingly. 
13 Previous research provides surprisingly few clues as to the effect of equity ownership structure on debt 
agency costs, as noted by Anderson et al. (2003): “little, if any, work examines the relation between 
ownership structure and the shareholder-bondholder conflict” (p. 264). The work that does exist is 
somewhat contradictory. Kim and Sorensen (1986) find that firms with more insider ownership have higher 
debt ratios, but cannot distinguish between the effect of equity and debt agency costs. Bagnani et al. (1994) 
argue for a non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and bondholder returns, but only 
find evidence of a positive association at intermediate levels of managerial ownership. Anderson et al. 
(2003) also find evidence that equity ownership structure affects debt costs, but they focus on a particular 
aspect of ownership structure – ownership by founding families – which makes the results difficult to 
generalize. Cremers et al. (2006) conclude that the net impact of shareholder control on bondholders is 
theoretically unclear, and produce results where the effect of shareholder control on credit risk premia 
depends on takeover vulnerability. 
14 In option-pricing-based analyses of the value to shareholders of deposit insurance, value can be created 
both by increasing asset risk and by increasing leverage (defined as the ratio of insured debt to total assets) 
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– see, e.g., Merton (1977). The ‘tradeoff’ between asset risk and leverage is unclear. In this paper, it is 
determined by ownership structure. 
15 The condition is that the sum of  and γ κ , confidence in the deposit insurance scheme and the received 
probability that uninsured creditors will not be bailed out, exceeds unity. 
16 See, e.g., Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001, for evidence on bank risk and depositor discipline during 
banking crises. 
17 The Z-score is widely used as a risk measure in the banking literature, see, e.g., Hannan and Hanweck 
(1988), Boyd et al. (1993), Beck and Laeven (2006); the market-based version is used by, e.g., Crouzille et 
al. (2004). 
18 A potential weakness with this proxy of deposit insurance coverage is that it assumes that banks within a 
country generally have similar portions of insured and uninsured deposits; that is, that no individual bank, 
for instance, has an unusually large share of very large (and hence uninsured) deposits. 
19 This proxy is equivalent to the share of deposit value covered under the assumption of one deposit per 
capita, and may overstate coverage, particularly in rich countries where the deposit count can reasonably be 
expected to well exceed the population count; it may be less of an overestimation for developing countries 
where the average number of bank accounts per capita is lower. 
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Abstract 
Using market forces to discipline banks’ risk taking is high on the agenda for regulators, as 
manifested, e.g., by the inclusion of a pillar for ‘market discipline’ in the Basle II framework. 
Market monitoring of bank risk has typically been tested by regressing market-based risk in-
dicators on various benchmark indicators (such as accounting ratios and credit ratings) to de-
tect whether the market tracks bank risk. This approach overlooks the methodological ‘unob-
servability’ problem that testing one against another (group of) imperfect proxy indicator(s) of 
an unknown true value must yield limited conclusions as to the appropriateness of either 
measure – particularly in the event of failure to establish a significant association. This paper 
uses an unobserved-variables approach to associate the divergence between different risk in-
dicators on the one hand, with proxies of the conditions for market discipline to function on 
the other, and identifies implied functional relationships of differences in relative information 
content in the included risk measures. Empirical results for a large panel of banks worldwide 
suggest that market-based measures are less accurate than accounting indicators for most lev-
els of institutional quality, but that spreads on subordinated debt may be more informative 
than either equity-based or accounting-based measures if the conditions for market discipline 
are well satisfied. A combination measure incorporating both accounting and market data, 
finally, has superior accuracy regardless of the level of institutional quality, indicating that 
market data may contain complementary information on risk. This result confirms previous 
results on the relative information content of different risk indicators. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks’ risk behavior is a matter of considerable interest because of the potential systemic 
consequences of excessive risk taking in banks, and because of the particular incentive struc-
ture facing banks (especially bank shareholders) as a consequence of their typical financing 
pattern, which is in large part insured debt. In the debate and research on bank regulation and 
supervision, there has been an increased interest of late, among academics and representatives 
of regulatory bodies alike, in the idea of creating supervisory structures which offer the possi-
bility to employ, to a greater extent, market forces in the service of banking sector supervi-
sion. The goal is to make supervision more market driven and ‘incentive-compatible’ 
(Calomiris, 1999). Market discipline as a complementary mechanism (beside the traditional 
tools used by supervisory authorities) to ‘regulate’ banks’ risk behavior has long been an issue 
of study for academics, but has recently gained increasing attention with regulators, as mani-
fest, for instance, by the inclusion of the third pillar in the Basle II Accord. 
Market discipline (in banking) is commonly defined as a combination of monitoring 
and influence (see, e.g., Flannery, 2001; Bliss and Flannery, 2002), where ‘monitoring’ refers 
to the process whereby market participants (holders of various classes of bank capital) collect 
information on the bank’s financial condition and market prices on bank claims reflect this 
information, and ‘influence’ refers to the market’s capacity to actually get the bank to adjust 
its risk behavior in accordance with the signals generated by fluctuations in market prices. 
Most of the literature in this area has focused on the prospects for market discipline 
being exerted by holders of equity and, in particular, by holders of uninsured (subordinated) 
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debt. Specifically, the empirical literature has focused on the monitoring aspect (the extent to 
which equity prices or rates of interest paid on subordinated bonds adequately reflect variation 
in bank risk). The vast majority of papers testing the risk sensitivity of market prices perform 
(linear) regressions of some market-based measure of bank risk (e.g. the spreads on the bank’s 
subordinated debt) on a set of other risk measures – typically accounting information and/or 
ratings. The establishment of a significant relationship between the market-based measure and 
the benchmark measure(s) is interpreted as a sign that the market adequately prices risk, and 
thus that market discipline would be a useful mechanism to restrain excessive risk taking by 
banks. Equally importantly, failure to establish a significant relationship is interpreted as ab-
sence of market discipline. 
There are several methodological problems with this general approach (including, for 
instance, various specification problems related to functional form, omitted variables, etc. – 
see, e.g., Gorton and Santomero, 1990, and Pennachi, 2001). In this paper, I focus on the fact 
that this general approach (and thus much of the empirical literature in this field) overlooks an 
unobservability problem, which limits the scope for interpreting the results in terms of the 
prospects for market discipline in general. The problem essentially lies in benchmarking one 
imperfect proxy (based on market prices) on other imperfect proxies (based on accounting 
information, ratings, etc.) of an unknown fundamental variable, viz. ‘true’ risk. It is not possi-
ble to know a priori which proxy contains the more accurate information on risk, and there-
fore – in the event of failure to establish a statistically significant association between the left-
hand side variable and the right-hand side variable(s) – it is not possible to infer which side of 
the equation that is ‘wrong’. Using accounting information, ratings, and other commonly used 
risk proxies as benchmarks effectively entails restricting the definition of ‘success’ to corre-
spondence with another, already available and imperfect measure. The implication is that (i) 
market prices can never contain more (useful) information than the benchmark measures (and 
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whenever market prices do not correspond with the benchmark measures they are irrelevant), 
and (ii) therefore, indirect market discipline as a supervisory tool is superfluous, because all 
the information we need or could possibly hope to extract is already incorporated in already 
available measures. In a manner of speaking, market information is then not ‘allowed’ to con-
tain any more information than we already have. 
The purpose of this paper is to devise and implement a simple methodology which ad-
dresses this unobservability problem, and by which it is possible to identify if, which, and 
under what circumstances, market-based measures may contain more information than certain 
common benchmark measures. This is an important question for assessing the potential merits 
of market discipline, because although it may be relatively uncontroversial to suggest that 
market-based risk indicators contain complementary information, one of the points with mar-
ket discipline is that the indicators are observed continuously (whereas, e.g., financial state-
ment data are only observed at an annual or quarterly basis). It is therefore of interest to assess 
the informativeness of market-based indicators individually. 
The paper uses an unobserved-variables approach to associate the divergence between 
different risk indicators on the one hand, with proxies of the conditions for market discipline 
to function on the other, and identifies implied functional relationships of differences in rela-
tive information content in the included risk measures. The approach is essentially a systema-
tization of the simple idea that if the disconnection between a market-based risk indicator and 
some benchmark indicator is greater when the conditions for market discipline are well satis-
fied, then it may be the benchmark indicator, rather than the market-based indicator, that is 
relatively less informative. 
The methodology is implemented empirically on a panel of several hundred banks 
worldwide between the years 1994 and 2005. The results suggest that market-based risk 
measures are less informative than accounting indicators of risk for most levels of institutional 
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quality, but that some market-based indicators are more informative if the conditions for mar-
ket discipline are well satisfied. Specifically, stock return volatility proves to be less informa-
tive than the accounting indicators for all observed levels of institutional quality, whereas 
spreads on subordinated debt are more informative for the highest level of institutional qual-
ity. A combination measure incorporating both accounting and market data, finally, has supe-
rior accuracy regardless of the level of institutional quality, indicating that market data always 
contains complementary information on risk. 
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 contains a selective review of 
literature addressing the conditions for market discipline and a brief run-down of empirical 
literature testing market monitoring in banking. Section 3 describes the methodology and de-
velops the hypotheses, whereas Section 4 presents the estimation methods and the data. In 
Section 5, the empirical results are reported, and Section 6, finally, concludes. 
 
2. Market discipline and bank risk – concepts, results, and methodological problems 
 
A. Market discipline 
In principle, any holder of a risky claim on the bank which is tradable on a market could in-
still market discipline on banks. Holders and prospective buyers of the claim would have an 
incentive to monitor the bank’s risk taking, and would therefore discipline banks’ risk-taking 
− directly, by (incrementally) influencing the bank’s cost of capital, and indirectly, by provid-
ing a signal (in the form of the market price of the claim) to the bank itself, to the supervisory 
authority, and to other stakeholders, of the market’s assessment of the bank’s risk behavior. 
Indirect market discipline could be imposed, e.g., by using such price signals as triggers for 
prompt corrective action (PCA) or for on-site examinations by the supervisory authority, or as 
basis for setting risk-adjusted deposit insurance premia. 
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The indirect and direct dimensions of market discipline are captured by the widely 
used definition of market discipline as a combination of monitoring and influence (see, e.g., 
Flannery, 2001; Bliss and Flannery, 2002). Monitoring captures the information aspect of 
market discipline: current and prospective claimants on the bank inform themselves of the 
bank’s condition and set prices on their claims accordingly. Influence refers to the mechanism 
by which banks, in order to avoid the adverse consequences of stronger discipline (such as 
higher financing costs, closer monitoring by market participants as well as regulators, and, 
ultimately, liquidity problems as a consequence of some sources of financing being cut off) 
decrease their risk exposure (or, indeed, avoid increasing it in the first place). 
The literature on market discipline in banking is mostly empirical (see next sub-
section), but more or less implicit in the empirical applications  are assumptions on a couple 
of underlying questions, which have received some – but rather limited – treatment elsewhere. 
The first relates to the conditions under which market discipline can be expected to ‘work’ – 
i.e., a systematization of the basic requirements on the institutional setting that need to be sat-
isfied for the market to (be able to) fulfill its task as disciplinarian. The second is related to the 
first: are the market prices of some classes of bank capital better able to produce useful sig-
nals of bank risk – or, differently put, can market discipline be better imposed by sharehold-
ers or by debtholders? This second question is related to the first one insofar as its answer 
may depend on differences in the extent to which the conditions for market discipline are sat-
isfied for different classes of claims on the bank. 
As a general treatment of the first question, Lane (1993) sets up four conditions for 
market discipline to work:1 (i) open capital markets; (ii) good information about a borrower’s 
existing liabilities2; (iii) no prospect of a bailout (the supplier of financing must not benefit 
from third-party guarantees issued on the claim); and (iv) responsiveness of the borrower to 
                                                   
1 Lane presumes a debt claim, but these conditions for market discipline should hold more generally for any type 
of risky claim. 
2 Presumably, one would add to this information about the borrower’s assets and/or income streams. 
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market signals. Of these four conditions for market discipline in general, the first three con-
cern primarily the monitoring aspect, whereas the fourth directly reflects the influence aspect. 
The monitoring aspect of market discipline is equivalent to the requirement that market sig-
nals accurately reflect risk; if they do, then the conditions for market monitoring of risk are 
satisfied. Therefore, market monitoring (the extent to which risk information is impounded in 
market prices) is conditioned on the openness of capital markets, the quality of the available 
information about the issuer of the security, and the de facto riskiness of the claim. However, 
if monitoring is costly, it is unlikely that market participants will expend costs for monitoring 
banks that are unresponsive to market signals (Llewellyn, 2005); thus, the monitoring aspect 
of market discipline is somewhat conditional on the influence aspect, so that the expectation 
of finding risk-relevant information in market prices becomes conditional on all four condi-
tions. I will rely on this general grouping of market-discipline conditions in the empirical part 
of the paper. 
The answer to the question whether shareholders or debtholders are more apt to exert 
market discipline is more ambiguous. One class of debtholders usually precluded from the 
discussion altogether, however, are (small) deposit holders. They are generally considered 
more or less immune to bank risk, since under deposit insurance, they have little incentive to 
monitor bank risk and instill market discipline. On the other hand, it is often considered that 
holders of risky debt (such as unsecured, or subordinated, bonds and notes) would act as better 
monitors of bank risk than equity holders (see, for instance, Calomiris, 1999; Evanoff and 
Wall, 2000; Sironi, 2001; Benink and Wihlborg, 2002). The argument largely rests on the 
notion that the risk-shifting incentives of shareholders resulting from the option value of eq-
uity in the presence of deposit insurance (Merton, 1977) make shareholders too inclined to-
ward risk to serve as effective disciplinarians. Conversely, the focus of bondholders on down-
side risk mean that their incentives are more or less in line with those of the supervi-
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sor/deposit insurer, and consequently that prices of uninsured debt would better reflect default 
risk (or at least be a more relevant risk meter for supervisors) than equity prices. 
It is not clear if this argument stands up to closer inspection. The relatively scant theo-
retical research that exists (Levonian, 2001; Nivorozhkin, 2005) suggests that spreads on sub-
ordinated debt would more accurately reflect default risk than equity prices only under certain 
conditions (associated with, inter alia, the relative shares of insured and uninsured debt, and 
the magnitude of bankruptcy costs). Some criticism voiced against the idea of relying on debt 
market discipline rests on the more mundane and practical point that stock markets are typi-
cally much more liquid than debt markets, and that bond spreads would be noisy signals of 
risk because the risk information is obfuscated by large liquidity premia (see, e.g., Saunders, 
2001). The question whether stock prices or bond spreads better reflect bank risk is therefore 
to some extent an empirical one. 
I next turn to a brief run-down of some main empirical results, and then turn to the 
particular methodological problem that is the focus of interest in this paper. 
 
B. Evidence on market monitoring of bank risk 
Tests of monitoring by holders of risky bank claims have typically been conducted by one of 
two main approaches. The first general method – which I will henceforth refer to as the ‘risk-
sensitivity’ approach – consists in regressing some market-based risk indicator on a set of 
benchmark risk measures (typically credit ratings and/or various accounting ratios) and con-
trol variables. If the benchmark risk measures are found to be significant determinants of the 
market signal, the result is taken as evidence of market self-regulation of bank risk; con-
versely, absence of significant associations between the market and the benchmark indica-
tor(s) is interpreted as a rejection of market monitoring. 
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In the other main approach – which may be termed the ‘early-warning’ approach – 
market-based risk measures are tested as predictors, or leading indicators of actual bank fail-
ure, of insolvency, or of general deterioration of financial status (defined in different ways). 
Both these general approaches have been applied to both equity- and debt-based risk indica-
tors with varying results. In what follows, I will focus on the risk-sensitivity approach (for a 
more comprehensive overview of results, and a methodological criticism against the early-
warning approach, see Appendix B). 
A number of early studies test the sensitivity of the interest cost of large (and hence 
uninsured) certificates of deposit (CDs) or of the spreads on subordinated notes and deben-
tures (SNDs) issued by US banks during the 1980s to various accounting measures of risk, 
using straightforward linear regression specifications. The results of these studies are, taken 
together, fairly inconclusive: whereas, for instance, Avery et al. (1988) and James (1990) find 
little evidence of accounting risk reflected in debt prices, other studies find that CD rates or 
SND spreads are significantly determined by at least some balance sheet items (Hannan and 
Hanweck, 1988; James, 1988; Keeley, 1990). Pointing out that theory predicts a non-linear 
relation between risk premia on debt and balance-sheet measures of risk, Gorton and San-
tomero (1990) derive implied asset volatilities from sub-debt spreads, and regress them on 
accounting indicators (using the same dataset as Avery et al., 1988), but do not find evidence 
in support of the market-monitoring hypothesis. Brewer and Mondschean (1994), on the other 
hand, find evidence that the quality of banks’ assets is reflected in both CD rates and in stock 
return volatilities. 
Several later studies report relatively consistent evidence in support of market moni-
toring by sub-debt holders, using credit ratings, or ratings changes, as benchmark risk meas-
ures (Jagtiani et al., 2002; Sironi, 2002, 2003; Pop, 2006). Hall et al. (2001) and Krishnan et 
al. (2006), on the other hand, are unable to produce evidence of ratings being reflected in 
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various equity-based risk measures or in bond spreads, respectively. Event studies on an-
nouncement effects of ratings changes further complicate the picture: Berger and Davies 
(1998) find no announcement effects on abnormal stock returns, whereas Gropp and Richards 
(2001) find significant effects on stock returns but not on bond returns. 
Considerations regarding the underlying conditions for market discipline often explic-
itly or implicitly factor into the research design of a large part of this literature (as previously 
noted). The ‘no-bailout’ condition, for example, is addressed by a number of papers. Thus, the 
conjectural government guarantees possibly associated with banks being ‘too big to fail’ are 
considered by Ellis and Flannery (1992) and Morgan and Stiroh (2001). Both papers find evi-
dence of a ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect. Accounting for possible differences in the extent of implic-
itly issued guarantees under different regulatory regimes, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and 
Hall et al. (2002) reach different results: whereas Flannery and Sorescu find that a more 
credible commitment to a no-bailout policy on the part of the deposit insurer leads to higher 
sensitivity of sub-debt yield spreads to underlying credit risk, Hall et al. find no such effect. 
The condition that markets must have good information about the borrower is also addressed 
by Morgan and Stiroh (2001). Their findings indicate that the market is tougher on more 
opaque banks, in terms of the sensitivity of sub-debt spreads to variations in asset quality. 
A number of studies address various methodological problems associated with the 
standard risk-sensitivity approach to testing market monitoring.3 At the focus of interest for 
the remainder of this paper is the unobservability problem described in the introduction.4 The 
                                                   
3 The issue of non-linearity between bond spreads and standard accounting-based risk indicators, as addressed by 
Gorton and Santomero (1990), has already been mentioned. This and other potential specification errors inherent 
in the standard risk-sensitivity approach, including possible omitted-variables problems, are addressed by 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Pennachi (2001). Other contributions, for instance Covitz et al. (2004) and 
Goyal (2005), argue that the association between spreads on risky debt and standard benchmark risk measures 
may be underestimated unless it is taken into account that riskier banks may avoid issuing sub-debt in the first 
place (in order to avoid being disciplined), or that they may be forced to accept a higher number of restrictive 
covenants being included in the debt contracts. Covitz et al. (2004) find limited evidence in support of the former 
hypothesis, whereas Goyal (2005) finds that risk significantly determines covenants included in sub-debt issues. 
4 I have not seen this problem explicitly addressed in any of the empirical literature, although the problem is 
implicit in, e.g., Evanoff and Wall (2001) and Gropp and Richards (2001); already Gorton and Santomero (1990) 
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problem is this: If the existing benchmark risk indicators against which the market-based 
measure is tested are a priori ‘better’ measures, what is the point of having supervisors paying 
more attention to the market and imposing indirect market discipline by using market indica-
tors as triggers for prompt corrective action, etc.? On the other hand, if the benchmark indica-
tors are unsatisfactory gauges of risk, what can possibly be learnt from a test where ‘success’ 
is defined in terms of a close association between the tested market indicator and the unsatis-
factory benchmark measures? Presumably, if markets can track risk as well as accounting 
ratios or rating agencies do, they can also do it better. If so, failure to uncover any significant 
relation between the market-based and the benchmark measures is consistent both with the 
hypothesis that market prices incorporate more information and with the hypothesis that they 
incorporate less information than the benchmark indicators. Event-study-type tests suffer from 
a similar type of problem, as illustrated by the results of Gropp and Richards (2001), for ex-
ample. 
As should be evident from the brief literature review above, improvements of risk-
sensitivity tests have often consisted in controlling for factors thought to influence the extent 
to which markets can be expected to monitor risk. This reflects a de facto recognition that 
market discipline is conditioned on a number of parameters, such as the institutional setting. 
However, simply controlling for these factors does not remedy the unobservability problem. 
In the following section, I outline a method which makes use of the fact that the informative-
ness of market-based risk indicators is dependent on the conditions for market discipline, as 
laid out in Section 2A, whereas typical benchmark measures are not (or at least less so). Al-
though the informativeness of different measures cannot be directly observed, observations on 
the institutional setting can provide a point of reference for inferring the relative informative-
ness of different risk indicators. 
                                                                                                                                                               
recognize that the validity of this type of tests is conditional on the auxiliary hypothesis that the independent 
variables are accurate proxies of true risk; a similar criticism against the approach is raised in Saunders (2001). 
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3. Method and hypotheses 
3.1. Basic concepts and conjectures 
Suppose a bank’s ‘true’ risk equals the probability of default P (with mean P  and constant 
variance). True risk is unknown and can only be observed by proxy. There are two approxi-
mate indicators of P: a market-based indicator, M, and a benchmark indicator, B. From the 
hypothetical regressions 
 M MP M uα β= + +  (1) 
and  
 B BP B vα β= + + , (2) 
 
define the informativeness of M and B, respectively, as 2 var( )1
var( )M
uR
P
= − , and 2 var( )1
var( )B
vR
P
= − . 
Because P is unknown, 2MR  and 
2
BR  are also unknown, and therefore it is not possible to ob-
serve directly whether M or B is the more informative indicator of P (i.e., if 2 2M BR R<  or 
2 2
M BR R> ). 
Following the above notation, a standard ‘risk-sensitivity’ regression on the market-
based risk indicator takes the (simplified) form 
 0 1M B wγ γ= + + , (3) 
which by (1) and (2) can be rewritten as 
 0 1M B
M B
P u P u wα αγ γβ β
 − − − −= + +  
. (4) 
Rearranging and simplifying yields 
 1 2 3w p u vδ δ δ= + + , (5) 
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where the lower-case p denotes deviations from the mean, 11
1
M B
γδ β β= − , 2
1
M
δ β= − , and 
1
3
B
γδ β= . Squaring both sides of (5) and taking expectations generates 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 3
2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( )
          var( ) var( ) var( ) 2 cov( ) 2 cov( ) 2 cov( ).
E w E p E u E v E pu E pv E uv
P u v pu pv uv
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ
= + + + + +
= + + + + +
(6) 
One way to describe the unobservability problem is in terms of the relative contributions of 
var( )u  and var( )v  to 2( )E w  (or, equivalently, to var( )w ). We can run the risk-sensitivity 
regression and observe 2( )E w  (or, strictly speaking, we observe 2wˆ ), but it is not possible to 
determine the relative contributions of its components. If we observe a ‘large’ 2wˆ , it could be 
due to a large contribution of var( )u  relative to var( )v , or vice versa. Rejecting the market 
discipline hypothesis on the basis that M explains B poorly effectively entails presuming that 
var( )u  is larger than var( )v . 
 But 2( )E w  indicates how well M measures B. A small 2( )E w  would suggest that M is 
a good proxy of B; conversely, a large 2( )E w  would suggest the opposite. In the latter case, 
M could be a poor proxy of B either because it is a less informative proxy of P, or because it 
is more informative. 
 Now assume that the informativeness of the market-based indicator depends positively 
on the extent to which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied, as measured by some 
variable MDC , whereas the benchmark indicator is invariant to these conditions.
5 In other 
words, more liquid financial markets, better information, lower bailout probability, etc., will 
result in a higher 2MR , but will not affect 
2
BR . 
                                                   
5 I will henceforth refer to these conditions as ‘conditions for market discipline’, ‘MD conditions’, or sometimes 
more loosely as ‘institutional quality’. The assumption that market-based risk indicators are sensitive to these 
conditions, whereas common benchmark indicators are not, is qualified and discussed more in detail in subsec-
tion 3.3. 
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 Suppose further that from a regression of the type represented by equation (3) over a 
large sample for which there is ‘sufficient’ variation in MDC , we retrieve the individual 
2ˆ iw ’s. 
I will call this a measure of the divergence between M and B. In line with the above argument, 
2ˆ iw  could be large either because iM  is less informative of iP  than iB  is, or because it is more 
informative. But we know that the informativeness of M is increasing in MDC  (whereas B is 
invariant to MDC ). Now matching each 
2ˆ iw  against the corresponding observation on MD 
conditions, MDiC , it would make intuitive sense to suggest, for example, that if large 
2ˆ iw ’s 
were observed when conditions for market discipline are poorly satisfied ( MDiC  is ‘small’), it 
is more likely to be because iM  is less informative of iP  than iB . In fact, it is possible to infer 
more than that. Suppose that over the entire sample we observe that the 2ˆ iw ’s consistently 
decrease as the MDiC ’s increase. Such an observation is only consistent with M being an ‘ini-
tially’ less informative indicator of P; as MDC  increases, so does 
2
MR , thereby successively 
closing the gap to 2BR , and by so doing also decreasing the ‘divergence’ between M and B. 
Coversely, if 2wˆ  consistently increases in MDC , then that would suggest that M becomes a 
poorer and poorer indicator of B – not because it becomes less informative about P (since we 
know that 2MR  increases in MDC ), but because it becomes increasingly more informative than 
B about P (the gap between 2MR  and 
2
BR  opens up more and more. The main possible out-
comes of a test of the divergence between M and B against the conditions for market disci-
pline are as follows. 
If M is on average more informative than B (over the entire sample), then the diver-
gence between M and B (defined as 2wˆ ) will be increasing in the conditions for market disci-
pline; if M is on average less informative than B, then the divergence between M and B will be 
decreasing in the conditions for market discipline; if no significant correlation can be estab-
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lished, then the difference in informativeness between M and B is random, implying that the 
market-based measure and the benchmark measure are about equally informative on average 
(regardless of the quality of institutional features fostering market discipline). These three 
main possibilities are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
3.2. Implementation and hypotheses 
The discussion in the previous subsection suggests a two-step methodology, where the overall 
objective is to infer the difference in informativeness between some market-based and some 
benchmark indicators of bank risk. The steps are: 
1) Run a standard risk-sensitivity regression of a market-based risk indicator M on one or 
several benchmark indicators B. Retrieve the residuals wˆ , and use them (squared) as a 
measure of the ‘divergence’ between M and B. 
2) Run a regression of 2wˆ  against some proxy of MDC , and infer the relative informa-
tiveness of M and B from the sign of the slope coefficients. 
The overall approach can be described in terms of an unobserved variables methodology. 
Switching to lower-case, let m be a market-based measure of firm (bank) risk, b a vector of 
benchmark risk measures, and z a vector of control variables accounting for known (and ob-
served) differences in variation between m and b that are unrelated to the conditions for mar-
ket discipline. Market and non-market measures do not contain exactly the same amount of 
information, so that E[ , ]m qα| = + + +b z b zβ γ , where q captures the difference in informa-
tiveness between m and b. Because this difference is unknown, q is unobserved. In this 
framework, a ‘risk-sensitivity’ regression can be formulated as: 
 m wα= + +b zβ + γ , w q ε≡ +  (7) 
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where ε  is the random error term. If q is strictly additive and uncorrelated with b, z, a regular 
OLS regression on the above equation will produce consistent estimates of β and γ . By the 
inclusion of the intercept term, nothing of the information contained in q is lost, but it does 
normalize q so that E[ ] E[ ] E[ ] 0q wε= = = . 
With q still unobserved, it can be proxied by wˆ , since the only other component of wˆ  
is a random error, but because wˆ  varies around zero, the actual values – positive or negative –
do not reveal which measure is more informative, m or b. However, as argued in subsection 
3.1, the size of the ‘divergence’ between m and b, measured as 2wˆ 6, may vary systematically 
with the extent to which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied. Thus, the second 
step is to regress 2wˆ  on some proxy for MDC : 
 2 0 1ˆ MDw Cτ τ υ= + +  (8) 
Again, in accordance with the arguments advanced in subsection 3.1 (as summarized in Table 
1), the following hypotheses can be formulated on the slope coefficient 1τ  in this regression: 
 
H1. If the market-based indicator m is on average less informative about the true probabil-
ity of default than the benchmark indicators b, the divergence between m and b will be 
a negative function of MD conditions ( 1τ  will be negative); this will be more likely in 
an institutional setting where the conditions for market discipline are poorly satisfied. 
H2. If the market-based indicator m is on average equally informative as the benchmark 
indicators b, the divergence between m and b will be a zero-slope function of the con-
ditions for market discipline ( 1τ  will be small and insignificant); this will (possibly) be 
more likely in an average-quality institutional setting. 
                                                   
6 In order to make the divergence measure comparable for different market-based measures (i.e., comparable for 
different regressions of the type represented by equation 7, above), the squared standardized residuals will be 
used as divergence measure in this paper. 
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H3. If m is on average more informative than b about the true probability of default, the 
divergence between m and b will be a positive function of MD conditions ( 1τ  will be 
positive). This will be more likely for an institutional setting where the conditions for 
market discipline are well satisfied. 
 
In practice, it is likely that for a large enough sample (sufficient variation in institutional con-
ditions), the relationship between 2wˆ  and MDC  may not be monotonic. In particular, if institu-
tional conditions are bad enough, market prices will not reflect risk as well as other, less ‘in-
stitution-sensitive’ measures do, implying a relatively large divergence; as institutional condi-
tions improve, the gap in informativeness successively closes; ultimately, when institutional 
conditions are good enough, market prices may increasingly incorporate more information 
than the benchmark measures, implying that divergence again starts to increase. Therefore, if 
the benchmark measures are more informative for adverse institutional conditions, but mar-
ket-based measures are more informative for benevolent institutional conditions, then a non-
linear (U-shaped) function should be expected 
To round off this subsection, it is useful to consider more explicitly what testing these 
hypotheses might actually tell us? First, testing these hypotheses for a sample with a wide 
enough distribution in MD conditions, the test may inform as to whether market-based risk 
measures are more informative for some (high) ranges of institutional quality, or, conversely, 
whether non-market risk measures are more informative for some (low) ranges of institutional 
quality. By so doing, the test provides a point of reference for assessing the outcome of risk-
sensitivity tests of market-based risk indicators in light of the unobservability problem. Sec-
ond, insofar as the test is devised in a way which allows repeating it for different market-
based risk measures and comparing the results, it may inform on the relative informativeness 
of equity-based risk measures and risk measures based on uninsured debt. Third, the test in-
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forms on the relative sensitivity of different market-based measures to MD conditions. These 
two last issues can contribute to a better understanding of the relative merits of shareholder 
vs. creditor discipline (for a given institutional setting). All these three aspects contribute to 
understanding the viability of market discipline in general, and may help to answer questions 
such as, for example: Is a sub-debt policy a viable alternative to shareholder discipline? Could 
market discipline (whether by shareholders or creditors) be relied on as a complementary su-
pervisory mechanism even in environments where institutional conditions are relatively poor? 
Etc. 
 
3.3. Discussion 
At this point, a few comments on the main assumptions of the methodology described in this 
section may be warranted. In what follows, I address three key assumptions, point out poten-
tial weaknesses, and provide further motivation. 
The first discussion relates to the assumption that the benchmark risk measures are in-
variant to the conditions for market discipline. In theory, these conditions can easily be ‘iso-
lated’ and defined as distinct vis-à-vis any factors conditioning the informativeness of the 
benchmark risk measures; in practice, however, the assumption is unlikely to fully hold. To 
illustrate with an obvious example, the availability of ‘good information’ should affect the 
informativeness of market-based risk measures, but is conceivably also strongly correlated 
with disclosure quality, and therefore with the informativeness of accounting-based bench-
mark measures. A similar argument could possibly be advanced for other dimensions of MD 
conditions: factors related to overall financial-system transparency and institutional integrity 
are likely to positively influence the informativeness of both market-based and benchmark 
measures of risk. 
100 101 19 
However, a sufficient condition for the methodology to still be valid is that the market-
based measures are more responsive to overall MD conditions than the benchmark measures. 
This is the softer version of the assumption that I effectively rely on in the empirical imple-
mentation of the methodology, and it can be motivated by again considering each of the four 
conditions for market discipline, and their likely impact on the informativeness of market 
prices on the one hand, and accounting variables on the other.7 
(i) Open capital markets: This condition relates to general financial-market efficiency, li-
quidity, absence of price-distorting restrictions, etc. Almost by definition, it should in-
fluence the accuracy of market prices more than the informativeness of accounting 
variables. It could have an effect on accounting variables as well if financial market 
development increases the demand for information, and this demand positively affects 
the quality of financial statements, but if so, the effect is indirect. 
(ii) Markets’ access to good information could, in principle, refer to information from any 
source, but provided financial statements are an important source of information for 
financial markets,8 it is clear that – as indicated above – this particular condition for 
market discipline also measures the informativeness of accounting variables. 
(iii) No prospects of bailout: this condition directly measures the propensity of an investor 
to incorporate risk in the price of a financial claim, but it is difficult to see how it 
should be in any way correlated with disclosure quality. 
(iv) Responsiveness to market signals: this condition directly measures the ‘influence’ as-
pect of market discipline, and could therefore be a determinant of the amount of moni-
toring effort investors are prepared to expend. Again, it is difficult to see how it should 
                                                   
7 I focus on accounting variables as benchmark indicators here, since that is what I will use in the empirical part 
of the paper. It is not certain that all arguments are equally applicable to all conceivable kinds of benchmark 
indicators (e.g. credit ratings). 
8 Yu (2005) finds that accounting transparency significantly affects spreads on corporate bonds – i.e., that bond 
holders charge an ‘opacity premium’; this result would imply that financial statements are an important source of 
information for investors, and – more indirectly – that the informativeness of (debt) market-based risk indicators 
and that of accounting-based benchmark indicators are correlated. See also Morgan and Stiroh (2001) for results 
on the effect of opacity on the risk sensitivity of banks’ sub-debt spreads. 
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be associated with the informativeness of accounting variables (other than, possibly, 
via an indirect mechanism related to the information condition [ii]: investors’ ability to 
enforce their interests depends to some extent on the quality of corporate governance, 
which is in turn associated with the availability of good information). 
These considerations seem to suggest that the validity of the assumption that market-based 
risk indicators are more sensitive to the conditions for market discipline hinges on finding a 
proxy for these conditions that does not primarily measure condition (ii), but which factors in 
all four dimensions (or, indeed, focuses on one or all three of the other conditions). 
The second assumption up for discussion relates to the possible specification errors in 
linear risk-sensitivity tests of market-based risk indicators (as mentioned briefly earlier on in 
the paper). The assumption is that these errors are small and unimportant. Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996) provide a good overview of possible specification problems for linear bond-
spread regressions, but also conclude that the problem of non-linearity is probably small in 
practice. I effectively rely on this conclusion when specifying the first-stage regressions line-
arly. The risk I run is that the residuals from these regressions capture a non-linear relation-
ship rather than (or in addition to) differences in informativeness. It is not likely, however, 
that this would systematically affect the results in the stage-2 regressions. If it does not bias 
the stage-2 results in any particular direction (which appears difficult to argue), it would sim-
ply appear as additional noise which renders estimates somewhat less precise. 
A third assumption lies in that the hypotheses developed, and interpretation of the sec-
ond-stage regression results along the lines I have suggested, presume that the market-based 
indicator and the benchmark indicators are ex ante expected to measure more or less the same 
thing. It is of course possible that as the conditions for market-based indicators to be informa-
tive improve, the disconnection between those indicators and the benchmarks could increase 
because they reflect different information better (rather than more or less information about 
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the same underlying ‘true’ variable). On the margin, this will probably be the case, to some 
extent, but I will assume that the effect is not powerful enough to ‘crowd out’ the effect of 
differences in informativeness of true risk.9 
 
4. Estimation and data 
4.1. Estimation 
4.1.1. First-stage regressions 
I extract divergence measures between three different market-based risk indicators (sub-debt 
spreads, stock return volatility, and a market version of the so-called Z-score), and account-
ing-based risk measures, for a large panel of banks with annual observations over 12 years 
(see subsection 4.2 for details). As regards the first-step regressions (as specified in equation 
7), the (unbalanced) panel structure of the data introduces some minor issues that need to be 
addressed. In order not to lose information, the unobserved variable q should be allowed to 
vary both over time and across firms, but should not be correlated with b, z. Period effects 
need to be added to account for changes over time that affect all firms equally, but they must 
be fixed in the cross-section dimension. Adding firm-specific effects, on the other hand, might 
pick up a significant amount of the information I hope to extract from wˆ  (insofar as variation 
in MD conditions is observed at firm-level), so cross-section effects should not be used. Cor-
recting only for a (fixed) time effect will result in serial correlation in wˆ , which is ‘desirable’ 
to the extent that q is expected to be serially correlated and contain firm-specific information 
which is more or less time-invariant. Since inference on β and γ is not the primary objective, 
inference-related issues could, in principle, be left aside so long as they are of no direct con-
sequence for producing consistent estimates of β and γ and thus a wˆ  which is as informative 
and as good a proxy of q as possible. Nonetheless, since inference at least on β may be of 
                                                   
9 Assuming anything else would, in fact, imply that most of the empirical literature on market discipline is mis-
specified from beginning to end. 
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(secondary)10 interest in itself, standard errors should be corrected for within-cross-section 
serial correlation. 
 Including the period fixed effects in the specification, the risk-sensitivity regression 
can be reformulated as: 
 0 1 12 ...it t T t it it itm D DT wα α α −= + + + + + +b zβ γ . (9) 
The αk’s represent separate intercepts for each time period between period 1 and period T. 
This model is estimated by panel least squares on the different market-based risk indicators, 
and the squared standardized residuals from these regressions are used as divergence meas-
ures. There is thus one divergence measure corresponding to each market-based risk measure 
tested. 
 
4.1.2. Second-stage regressions 
The second step consists in running regression of the divergence measures obtained in step 1 
on a proxy for MD conditions. As the primary proxy I use the first principal component of a 
large number of institutional features (again, see subsection 4.2 for details), denoted PC1. In 
practice, it is not possible to know a priori whether the relationship between the divergence 
measure and the proxy for MD conditions is monotonic or not. Conceivably, for a dataset 
where the dispersion of observations on the independent variable is sufficiently wide, it would 
not be – unless, of course, market-based risk measures are not more informative than the 
benchmark measures for any levels of institutional quality actually observed (or, conversely – 
but perhaps less likely – if market-based risk measures are always more informative). Given 
that a major objective of the paper is to explore this very question – whether market-based 
risk measures are sometimes ‘better’ – and given the heterogeneity of the dataset at hand, it is 
                                                   
10 The conclusions one can draw from inference on these regressions are limited, since factors known to influ-
ence the relationship between the market-based measure and the benchmark measures – in particular, any num-
ber of proxies for the extent to which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied – are deliberately left out, 
in order to lose as little information as possible in the ‘divergence’ measure. 
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clearly warranted to at least open up for the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship. In 
order to cover for all eventualities, I will test three different specifications. The first is a sim-
ple bivariate linear regression (cf. eqution 8): 
 2ˆ itw 0 1 1it itPCτ τ υ= + + , (10) 
where 2ˆ itw  is the squared standardized residual for the i’th bank at time t, obtained from a re-
gression of equation (9) on one of the considered market-based risk measures, 1itPC  is the 
corresponding observation on the first principal component of MD conditions, and itυ  is a 
random error. The second specification is a non-linear version of equation (10): 
 2ˆ itw
2
0 1 21 1it it itPC PCτ τ τ υ= + + +  (11) 
with notation and variable definitions as above. In some regressions, I will add control vari-
ables to the two basic specifications above. Finally, I will run piecewise linear regressions 
according to the following specification: 
 2ˆ itw 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 41 1 1 1it it it it it it it it itD PC D PC D PC D PCτ τ τ τ τ υ= + + + + + , (12) 
where the Dj’s are dummy variables taking on unit value for the first, second, third and fourth 
quarters, respectively, of the observations on PC1, and zero for all other ranges of PC1. 
 The expectations on the coefficient signs, in line with the hypotheses advanced in sub-
section 3.2, are as follows. For equation (10), 1τ  will be positive if, on average over the entire 
sample, the market-based risk measure corresponding to the divergence measure used as de-
pendent variable in the regression is more informative than the benchmark measures (the b’s) 
from equation (9). Conversely, 1τ  will be negative if the benchmark risk measures are more 
informative on average for the present sample. The final possibility is that 1τ  is insignificantly 
different from zero, which could have two reasons: first, market and non-market measures 
may be about equally informative regardless of MD conditions; second, the linear specifica-
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tion is inadequate because the slope coefficient depends on the value of PC1 (and positive and 
negative slopes are more or less symmetrically distributed over PC1). 
For equation (11), the basic expectation is a convex relationship, implying that 2τ  
should be positive, regardless of whether the slope is positive or negative on average. If the 
relationship is U-shaped, or if a negative effect of mostly inferior market-based measures 
dominates, then 1τ  should be negative. The perhaps more far-fetched possibility that market-
based risk measures are always superior – and increasingly so over the entire range of obser-
vations on MD conditions – would imply a positive 1τ . 
Finally, the jτ ’s from equation (12) can be interpreted in analogy with the 1τ  in equa-
tion (10), except now the interpretation is valid only for the sub-sample of PC1 corresponding 
to the jτ  in question. A negative coefficient value would be most expected for 1τ , and a posi-
tive value most expected for 4τ . 
 Equations (10)-(12) are estimated as before by panel OLS. While for the estimations 
producing the divergence measures, the necessary panel adjustments were more or less given 
by the underlying assumptions and the objectives of the regressions, for these second-stage 
regressions, they are more of an open issue. Because (fixed) time effects were accounted for 
in the first-stage regressions, I expect they are of little importance in the residuals obtained 
from these regressions. Cross-section effects, on the other hand, were considered inappropri-
ate given the small number of observations over time relative to the number of cross-section 
units (I actually have a single observation for several banks, especially for the divergence 
measure of sub-debt spreads, for which I have the smallest number of observations). While 
using cross-section effects would push up the overall explanatory value of the second-stage 
regressions, interpretation of the coefficients on the principal component(s) of MD conditions 
would be made difficult with a large portion of the cross-sectional variation being picked up 
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by the cross-section effects. I thus estimate the equations without either period or cross-
section effects, but correct standard errors for contemporaneous correlation and cross-section 
heteroscedasticity. 
 A final econometric note pertains to the use of residuals measured with error as vari-
ables in the second-stage regressions, and its possible implications for errors-in-variables 
(EIV) problems. EIV correction is necessary when using a variable known to contain meas-
urement errors (for example because it is obtained from a prior regression) as independent 
variable in a regression. Here, however, I use the (transformed) residuals from a first regres-
sion as dependent variable in a second regression. In order for this not to necessitate correc-
tion in the second stage, it is required that the measurement errors are assumed to be random. 
They can then be considered as part of the random error term ε in equation (7). Their effect on 
the informational content of w will thereby also be random, and they will be picked up in the 
second-stage residuals, implying that they will have no effect on second-stage parameter es-
timates.11 
 
4.2. Data 
The empirical methodology described in the previous section is applied to a panel dataset 
comprising several hundred banks worldwide. The banks are publicly traded banks with an-
nual financial statement data available in the BankScope database between 1994 and 2005. As 
data availability varies considerably for different bank-level variables, the exact number of 
banks covered depends on the combination of variables used in a particular regression specifi-
cation, but coverage is typically around 300 banks. The bank-specific data is supplemented by 
country-specific data characterizing various aspects of the institutional setting in the banks’ 
countries of origin (47 countries in all). Appendix A (Tables A1 – A3) provides more detailed 
                                                   
11 For general treatments of EIV in panel data, see for instance Biørn (1992), and Griliches and Hausman (1986). 
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information about the sample (in terms of banks, countries, and years covered), and lists all 
variables used at different stages in the analysis, with brief definitions and sources. In what 
follows, I describe these variables, explain some of them in more detail, and provide summary 
statistics. 
 
4.2.1. Market-based risk measures 
I use three market-based risk measures, which were chosen on the basis that they were the 
most frequently used in the literature and/or represented different categories of risk measures 
(a comprehensive overview of different bank risk measures used in previous literature – 
whether market-based, accounting-based, or ratings-based – is given in Table B1 in Appendix 
B). 
 The first market-based risk measure is the spread over the risk-free interest rate on 
subordinated notes or bonds. Spreads on sub-debt, or other types of formally uninsured bank 
debt, have been widely subjected to risk-sensitivity tests of the type represented by equation 
(9), especially for US data (see the literature review). The spreads used here were observed at 
year-end and were collected directly from Datastream and Reuters, with comparable risk-free 
rates subtracted from the sub-debt yields at source. They are mostly secondary-market 
spreads, but in some cases primary-market spreads were used, depending on availability. A 
large portion of the banks included did not have any subordinated debt outstanding during the 
sample period; consequently, subordinated-debt spreads were completely unavailable for 
these banks. Spreads were also unavailable for a portion of the banks that did have subordi-
nated debt outstanding (according to the balance sheet). As shown in Table 2, the total num-
ber of observations on subordinated debt spreads was 637 – considerably less than for the 
other risk measures. In addition, because accounting data (and consequently benchmark risk 
measures) are often missing for the early part of the sample period (1994-97) and missing 
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values for sub-debt spreads and accounting variables only partially overlap, about 300 of 
these observations are lost for the risk-sensitivity regressions. 
 The second measure is the volatility of total equity returns, which is one of the most 
widely used equity-based risk measure in the literature.12 The return volatility is the standard 
deviation of daily equity returns, calculated separately for each year. Daily stock market 
prices for the included banks were collected from Datastream.  
 The third market-based measure is a market version of the so-called Z-score, which is 
one of the simpler examples of what I have called ‘combination measures’ in Table B1. The 
Z-score is originally defined on accounting variables as 
 it itit
it
kZ µ σ
−= , (13) 
where  and it itµ σ  are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of bank i’s return on 
assets, and itk  is the average share of capital to total assets over the period t. The ‘market ver-
sion’ Z-score is calculated using the return on equity and the standard deviation of equity re-
turns. It can be regarded as a combination measure (rather than as a ‘pure’ market-based 
measure), since it incorporates both accounting data and stock market data. The Z-score is 
negatively related to the probability of default (and I therefore use it in the negative as de-
pendent variable for simplicity of comparison).13 
 Summary statistics for the three market-based risk measures appear in Table 2 (panel 
A). The two equity-based risk measures were divided between bank/year observations where 
the bank had sub-debt outstanding14 and observations where it did not, and tested non-
                                                   
12 A theoretically ‘better’ alternative would possibly have been to use the volatility of abnormal equity returns, 
based on some version of the market model or CAPM. I ran several versions of one- and two-factor market mod-
els (using Datastream’s global general and bank stock price indices), and found that the volatilities of the result-
ing abnormal returns are correlated with total stock return volatility by a coefficient typically larger than 0.90. I 
conclude that using one or the other matters little. 
13 The Z-score is widely used as a risk measure in the banking literature, see, e.g., Hannan and Hanweck (1988), 
Boyd et al. (1993), Beck and Laeven (2006); the market-based version is used by, e.g., Crouzille et al. (2004). 
14 Either because the balance sheet reported a non-zero amount of outstanding subordinated debt, or because sub-
debt spreads were available for that bank/year observation. 
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parametrically for significant differences in distribution. The purpose of these tests was to 
provide an initial indication of whether riskier banks are less likely to rely on uninsured debt 
for financing (as suggested by Covitz et al., 2004), resulting in possible selection bias in risk-
sensitivity tests on sub-debt spreads. The results of the tests indicate that there are indeed sig-
nificant differences in risk between the two groups, although the differences are small. More-
over, the direction of the difference depends on the risk measure used: the stock return volatil-
ity measure indicates that banks with sub-debt outstanding are less risky, whereas the Z-score 
suggests the opposite. These results remain when instead applying a t-test to the sub-sample 
means (not reported). A possible explanation is of course that other factors need to be con-
trolled for; for example, if larger banks are both more likely to issue subordinated debt and 
more likely to enjoy conjectural government guarantees, then the ‘true’ relationship between 
risk and sub-debt issuance likelihood may be obscured in a simple sub-sample comparison. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
4.2.2. Benchmark risk indicators and control variables 
The benchmark risk measures used in this paper – as in most of the related literature – are 
various standard accounting ratios believed to be correlated with the bank’s overall risk. A 
wide range of accounting-based measures have been used, as indicated by Table B1. The 
categorization of these various measures and the exact choice of variables to be included in 
the regressions are to some extent a matter of discretion. The vast majority of studies use 
some measure of leverage, or capital adequacy. Similarly, different measures of asset struc-
ture and/or asset quality are typically included – particularly proxies related to the quality of 
extended loans and to the ease with which the bank can absorb temporary losses (such as dif-
ferent liquidity measures). Finally, it is common to control for profitability. Based on these 
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conventions, I include leverage (defined as one minus the ratio of equity to total assets), loan 
quality, (the ratio of non-performing loans to equity), liquidity (liquid assets over total assets), 
and the return on assets (ROA – defined as net earnings divided by total assets).15 
All these accounting-based benchmark measures are calculated from annual balance 
sheet and income statement data as reported in BankScope. Descriptive statistics are reported 
in panel B of Table 2. Again, the sample is divided into sub-samples based on whether the 
bank had subordinated debt outstanding or not. The table reinforces the impression given by 
the Z-score in the previous table that banks without any outstanding sub-debt are, in fact, less 
risky than other banks. Banks without outstanding sub-debt have significantly lower leverage, 
lower share of non-performing loans, higher share of liquid assets, and are significantly more 
profitable than other banks. Again, the conclusion would be that in a heterogeneous sample 
such as this one, any tendency for riskier banks to be discouraged to issue uninsured debt (if it 
exists) is obscured by other factors which are more important determinants of sub-debt issu-
ance. Such factors could be related to the size and main line of business of the bank, financial 
development and other local market conditions, etc.16 For example, sub-debt issuance is more 
likely by larger banks, which may benefit from conjectural ‘too-big-to-fail’ guarantees, and 
are therefore more risk prone. Another possibility is that subordinated debt is more likely to 
be issued by banks originating in financial systems that are more developed, less regulated, 
and more competitive, which could in turn indicate a weaker risk-reducing effect of charter 
values and lower profitability for these banks (see, e.g., Keeley, 1990; see Boyd and Nicoló, 
2005, for an alternative view). 
The choice of which control variables to include in the first-stage regressions is a deli-
cate balance, since I want to lose as little information as possible related to the conditions for 
                                                   
15 Cf., e.g., Sironi’s (2003) division into a leverage, a profitability, an asset quality, and a liquidity component of 
bank risk. 
16 Of course, it could also be that riskier banks are just inherently more likely to issue subordinated debt, al-
though it is difficult to envision an economically sensible rationale for that possibility. 
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market discipline, while at the same time controlling for factors unrelated to these conditions. 
Many of the strongest candidate control variables – such as bank size, ownership structure, 
home country income level, deposit insurance coverage, etc. (not to mention country dummy 
variables) – are conceivably strongly correlated with MD conditions. After much deliberation, 
and loosely following the few previous cross-country studies that exist (see for instance Ang-
kinand and Wihlborg, 2006), I include three bank-level and four country-level control vari-
ables. At the bank level, I include the deposit share of total assets, net interest margin, and the 
cost/income ratio.17 These variables are reasonable proxies for general bank characteristics 
without being too strongly correlated with the extent to which market discipline can be im-
posed. Moreover, they are fairly orthogonal in variation (a pairwise correlation matrix for the 
first-stage bank-level variables is shown in Appendix A, Table A4). The source for these, as 
for previous financial-statement variables, is BankScope. Sub-debt spreads are also controlled 
for time to maturity (in years) and the size of the issue (the natural logarithm of the issue 
amount in million USD), in accordance with most previous studies on subordinated debt 
spreads. This information was collected together with the spreads from the same sources (i.e., 
Reuters and Datastream). 
 
[Table 3] 
 
At the country level, control variables for general macroeconomic conditions are included in 
the form of the real interest rate, the inflation rate, and real GDP growth – all from the World 
                                                   
17 The one control variable that is included in almost all previous studies on bank risk is the size of the bank 
(typically measured as the log of total assets). Most of my deliberations revolved around whether to include this 
variable or not in the first-stage regressions. Absolute bank size would be correlated with the extent to which 
market discipline can be imposed insofar as it proxies for the existence of conjectural ’too-big-to-fail’ guaran-
tees, and for general liquidity of the bank’s stock and bonds. These aspects of MD conditions should obviously 
be (and are) accounted for in the second-stage regressions. Therefore, because of the substantial risk that ‘bank 
size’– in the absence of more direct proxies – would pick up a lot of these dimensions of MD conditions (with 
the effect that much information is lost for the second stage of the analysis), I decided in the end not to include 
bank size as a control variable. 
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Bank’s World Development Indicators. To control for the possibility that a systemic financial 
crisis (such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 or the Argentinean bank crisis in 2001) 
has an independent effect on the extent to which different risk measures diverge, I include a 
crisis dummy. The source for identifying countries/years where there was a systemic crisis 
was Honohan and Laeven (2005). The source covers the period up to and including the year 
2002. At that time, a number of countries were still affected by crises, according to the source 
(that is, no ‘end date’ is available). For these countries, I flag observations from subsequent 
years as well, effectively assuming that the crises were still ongoing between 2003 and 2005. 
 
4.2.3. Proxies of the conditions for market discipline 
As the primary measure of MD conditions I use the first principal component of a set of bank- 
and country-level variables – each of which proxy for one dimension or other of the extent to 
which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied. A relatively large number of bank-
level and firm-level variables were used to construct the composite measure. Variable defini-
tions are summarized in Table A3 (Panel B), with indicative categorizations according to 
which one of Lane’s (1993) four conditions for market discipline that they primarily capture, 
as well as brief descriptions where definitions are not obvious. Summary statistics are re-
ported in Table 4. The exact choice of variables contains an obvious discretionary element, 
but because the data are reduced, the choice is a matter of trading off tractability and compre-
hensiveness, rather than a matter of accuracy in capturing any one specific condition for mar-
ket discipline. 
The data reduction itself has advantages and drawbacks. The motive for using princi-
pal components analysis (and for focusing on the first principal component) in this paper is 
essentially three-fold. First, for ease of interpretation, it is preferable to focus on one proxy of 
CMD, which however by definition is a multi-dimensional concept. Reducing the data makes it 
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possible to capture several facets of the concept in a single measure. Second, the technique 
implies ‘efficient’ use of the variation in individual proxies of MD conditions, and avoidance 
of multicollinearity issues due to high correlation between (some of) these individual proxies. 
Third, the variation in the individual variables used to proxy CMD occurs at the bank-level for 
some variables, at the country level for others; combining them eliminates the need to deal 
with potential interpretation and error-correction problems associated with this partial ‘clus-
tering’ of the data. A potential drawback with the method is that one potentially loses sight of 
the contribution of specific dimensions of MD conditions, or specific market-discipline condi-
tions.18 A related problem is caused by the fact that the principal components are orthogonal 
to one another. This makes it increasingly difficult to interpret the (successively less impor-
tant) lower-order components in terms of what they have to say about the overall conditions 
for market discipline. 
Below follow a description by category of the variables that went into the principal 
components analysis. 
(i) Open capital markets: This condition for market discipline is primarily captured by 
a proxy of the liquidity of the bank’s securities (the average daily turnover rate of the bank’s 
stock), and various standard measures of financial development at country level. I used four 
measures suggested by Rajan and Zingales (2003) – total bank deposits (or M2, as available) 
over GDP, stock market capitalization over GDP, net equity issues over gross fixed capital 
formation, and the number of firms with stock traded on public exchanges per million of 
population; in addition, I used private sector credit over GDP (as suggested by La Porta et al., 
1997), and private-sector bond-market capitalization as a share of GDP. Sources for these 
variables were IMF International Financial Statistics or the World Bank’s World Develop-
                                                   
18 Suppose, for instance, we are particularly interested in analyzing the extent to which deposit insurance cover-
age contributes to making spreads on subordinated bonds a more or less informative measure of bank risk. Inso-
far as the proxy for deposit insurance coverage is decomposed according to its (partial) covariation with other 
measures of MD conditions, and the principal components are aggregations of different measures, this contribu-
tion may be difficult to assess. 
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ment Indicators (GDP, investment, bank deposits, and credit); Eurostat (stock market capitali-
zation for most European countries) or Datastream (all other stock market data); and the Bank 
for International Settlements (bond market capitalization). Net equity issues were proxied as 
the year-on-year change in stock market capitalization, corrected for the change in stock 
prices as measured by Datastream’s overall market price index for each country. Net issues 
were calculated for each of the years 1994-2005, and then averaged. To capture the interna-
tional dimension of capital market openness, finally, I used an index of foreign-investment 
openness, based on the presence of restrictions on capital-account transactions as reported in 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, and taken 
from Brune et al. (2001). 
(ii) Quality of information: The availability of bank-specific information is proxied by 
a single country-level index variable. The variable equals CIFAR’s index of overall financial-
reporting transparency (see Bushman et al., 2004) for all countries where this index is avail-
able, and Barth et al.’s (2001, 2006) private monitoring index (recalculated to the CIFAR 
scale) for all other countries.19 
(iii) No prospects of being bailed out: The probability that claimants on the bank will 
be bailed out depends primarily on explicit and implicit deposit insurance coverage. As a 
proxy for the share of formally insured debt (at the bank level), I use country-level data on the 
fraction of deposit value covered by explicit deposit insurance (net of the coinsurance ratio; 
available from Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005), and multiply it by the ratio of deposits to total 
debt for each bank and year. For countries where a specific coverage percentage is not avail-
                                                   
19 It is clear that the focus on accounting transparency in this condition for market discipline makes it question-
able whether market-based risk measures are more responsive to the condition than the accounting-based 
benchmark measures. However, as argued in Section 3, a sufficient condition for the paper’s main hypotheses to 
hold is that market-based measures are more responsive to the overall conditions for market discipline than the 
benchmarks; if the market-based measure and the accounting-based measure are about equally responsive to 
financial-statement transparency (as seems plausible), the inclusion of this variable neither adds nor subtracts 
anything from the end results. Conceivable alternative measures of quality of information typically make use of 
the market variables themselves (as in Morck et al., 2000, and Durnev et al., 2003, for instance). 
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able, I use coverage limitmin 1,  coinsurance ratio
deposits/capita
  −  
 as a proxy (also from Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al., 2005), and multiply by the ratio of deposits to total debt for each bank and year, as pre-
viously. The share of formally insured debt is always zero for countries/years with no explicit 
deposit insurance scheme. 
Implicit guarantees are proxied by a variable called ‘no-bailout credibility’ in Table 
A3. It equals the Fitch Support Rating (which is an index variable showing the probability 
that a bank will be bailed out in case of default) for banks where such a rating is available; for 
all other banks, I take one less the bank’s share of total deposits in its country of origin and 
transform the result to the Fitch scale. Balance-sheet data on deposits for each bank and data 
on total deposits (or M2) in each country are from BankScope and IMF’s International Fi-
nancial Statistics, respectively, as before. Finally, I use the Reuters ownership data (see under 
condition [iv], below) to construct a government-ownership dummy, to account for the possi-
bility that government-owned banks may be more likely to be bailed out in the event of fail-
ure. 
 (iv) Responsiveness to market signals: The last condition for market discipline is 
summarized at the bank level by a number of corporate governance variables (in the absence 
of more direct proxies for responsiveness). Ownership data were collected from Reuters. The 
Reuters database distinguishes between ownership by three types of owner: insid-
ers/stakeholders, institutions, and mutual funds. It contains percentages of ownership by the 
different categories and by individual shareholders within the three groups. Both insider own-
ership and outsider ownership (as proxied by the ownership share of institutional investors) 
were used. In addition, responsiveness to market signals may depend on how well capitalized 
the bank is. To measure this in a simple way, the minimum Tier-1 capital requirement (as-
sumed to be 50% of the home country’s total capital requirement, as reported by Barth et al., 
2001, 2006) is subtracted from each bank’s equity-to-assets ratio; the result gives the proxy 
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for ‘excess capital’. At the country level, bank claimants’ possibilities to exert influence are 
proxied by the widely used creditor and shareholder rights indices (originally from La Porta et 
al., 1997, 1998; with additional country scores from Allen et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2005, 
2006; and Pistor et al., 2000), and the International Country Risk Guide’s index of legal sys-
tem integrity. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
Table 5 reports a summary of the outcome of the principal components analysis on all the 
variables described above. The (linear) decomposition can be summarized as: 
 
1 1
1 1
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= +∑ ∑ , (14) 
where PCn is the nth principal component, the X’s are K different bank-level proxies of MD 
conditions, the Y’s are S different country-level proxies of MD conditions, and the subscripts 
i, j and t denote bank, country and year. The decomposition is based on the correlation matrix 
of the included variables. 
I have only included the first six principal components in Table 5 (as well as in the 
stage-two regressions), as lower-order components account for less than five percent each of 
the variation in the proxies for MD conditions. The proportion of the total variance accounted 
for by each of components 1-6 is shown in Panel A in the table. The first component – that on 
which I mainly rely – explains about 28 percent of the variation. This indicates that using it as 
a single explanatory variable, almost three quarters of the potential explanatory power of the 
proxies for MD conditions will be lost in the second-stage regressions. On the other hand, it 
also illustrates one of the advantages with using principal components analysis: the first prin-
cipal component incorporates in a single variable much more of the overall variation in the 
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proxies than any one individual proxy. The first six components together account for about 70 
percent of the variation in the variables described previously in this sub-section. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the coefficients on the individual market discipline condi-
tions for principal components 1-6 (i.e., the a’s and the b’s in expression [14]). It shows that 
PC1 puts most weight on the indicators of financial system development, but is also strongly 
positively correlated with the quality of information (the transparency index), and general 
legal-system integrity (as proxied by the rule-of-law index). The one dimension of MD condi-
tions that is not well reflected in PC1 is the no-bailout condition. This dimension is instead an 
important element in PC2 – as indicated by the positive coefficient on ‘no-bailout credibility’ 
and the negative (though relatively small) weights on the share of formally insured debt and 
government ownership. PC2 seems however to be negatively related to the responsiveness 
dimension of MD conditions (as indicated by the positive coefficient on ‘excess capital’ and 
the negative one on the shareholder rights index). This illustrates the point made earlier that 
lower-order principal components become increasingly more difficult to interpret in terms of 
their overall impact on the conditions for market discipline. This point is further reinforced by 
looking at coefficients for PC3-PC6. It is not always clear whether the ‘net’ impact of these 
components on general MD conditions is positive or negative. Due to this difficulty of inter-
pretation, PC2-PC6 will only be used as control variables in the regressions on the divergence 
measures to check the stability of the estimates on the first principal component (rather than 
as explanatory variables in their own right). 
 
[Table 5] 
 
5. Results 
5.1. First-stage regressions 
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Table 6 reports the results of the first-stage regressions on all three market-based indicators. 
Coefficient columns 1 and 2 report the results for two specifications of the regressions on sub-
debt spreads, where the only difference is that model (2) includes a correction term for possi-
ble selection bias (which was constructed because the summary statistics suggested a signifi-
cant difference in risk distribution for the sub-sample of banks that had issued sub-debt vis-à-
vis those banks that had not). I followed Covitz et al. (2004), Birchler and Hancock (2004), 
and Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004), and adopted the Heckman (1979) two-step approach to se-
lection-bias correction, where the correction term is the inverse Mills ratio from a probit re-
gression on a dummy variable indicating whether or not a bank had issued sub-debt for each 
period. To preserve space, and because they are of secondary interest for the main analysis, 
the specification and results of this regression are reported in Appendix A (Table A6). As 
evident from Table 6, selection bias seems to be a minor issue here, and the inclusion of the 
correction term does not affect the overall results. (I therefore use the squared standardized 
residuals from model [1] as the sub-debt spread divergence measure in the second-stage re-
gressions.) 
 All benchmark risk measures except leverage significantly influence sub-debt spreads, 
whereas the common control variables have little effect. In terms of coefficient signs, the 
(negative) market Z-score responds in a similar way as the sub-debt spread, whereas return 
volatility coefficients on both leverage and ROA are negative (but indistinguishable from 
zero). Both equity-based measures are much more sensitive to variation in the macroeconomy 
(except to real interest rates). 
 In line with the implications of the unobservability problem and the fact that the re-
gressions deliberately leave out variables believed to influence the estimated relationships, I 
do not want to draw too far-reaching conclusions from these first-stage results. I just observe 
that they seem, overall, fully reconcilable with results reached in previous studies using simi-
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lar approaches and specifications (e.g., Sironi, 2003, for a cross-country sample of sub-debt 
spreads, and Hall et al., 2002, for various stock-market measures of risk, using US data). 
 
[Table 6] 
 
5.2. Second-stage regressions 
5.2.1. Sub-debt spread divergence 
Table 7 reports the stage-two results for sub-debt spread divergence (i.e., the squared stan-
dardized residuals from the stage-one regressions on sub-debt spreads). Five different specifi-
cations are estimated, all using different combinations of the first six principal components of 
MD conditions as independent variables. The first coefficient column shows sub-debt spread 
divergence regressed on an intercept and the first principal component of MD conditions only. 
It indicates a positive average relationship, but the right-hand-side variables are jointly insig-
nificant, as indicated by the regression F-statistic. Controlling for principal components 2 
through 6, the slope coefficient on the first component proves to be negative on average for 
the whole sample (specification [2]). 
 Models (3) and (4) are specified to reflect the hypothesis of a possible non-monotonic 
relationship between divergence and MD conditions. They allow for a second-degree poly-
nomial relationship between the divergence measure and the first principal component of MD 
conditions – with or without controlling (linearly) for components 2-6. These specifications – 
especially model (4) – seem to strongly suggest a U-shaped relationship between divergence 
in information content and institutional quality, very much in accordance with the advanced 
hypotheses. In other words, as the institutional conditions for market discipline move from 
poor to average, the disconnection between sub-debt spreads and the accounting-based risk 
measures becomes successively smaller (indicating that accounting-based indicators are ini-
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tially ‘better’ when conditions are poor); but as conditions continue to improve, divergence 
starts to increase again (suggesting that the informativeness of sub-debt spreads is higher than 
that of accounting variables when conditions are good). The piecewise specification, finally, 
strongly supports the results of the non-linear specifications. The slope on the independent 
variable is significantly negative for the first two quarters of PC1, zero for the third, and sig-
nificantly positive for the top quarter. 
In line with what has been said earlier about the composition of lower-order principal 
components, I have made no attempt to interpret the coefficients on PC2-PC6 in specifica-
tions (2) and (4). They are entered only as a means to check the stability of the estimates on 
PC1. Overall, these seem reasonably stable qualitatively, in the sense that they are consistent 
with a convex relationship between sub-debt spread divergence and PC1, which is negative on 
average over the full sample distribution of PC1, but turns positive toward the end of this dis-
tribution. 
 
 [Table 7] 
 
Although the overall explanatory power is fairly low for these regressions (as expected), these 
results would suggest that the unobservability problem cannot be ignored in risk-sensitivity 
tests of sub-debt spreads in relatively mature markets with limited implicit guarantees of for-
mally uninsured bank liabilities. This result seems to open up for an alternative interpretation 
of the ‘non-results’ of, e.g., Hall et al. (2002), Covitz et al. (2004), and Krishnan et al. (2006). 
They all find, by and large, that standard benchmark measures of banks’ default risk are not 
significantly reflected in the spreads of risky debt, and interpret the results in terms of a lack 
of risk-sensitivity on the part of the market-based measure. The point of the unobservability 
problem is that this interpretation cannot be made, unless we are certain that the benchmark 
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indicator is always more informative (which, in turn, disqualifies much of the idea with mar-
ket discipline in the first place). The results reported here on the relationship between sub-
debt spread divergence and the conditions for market discipline suggest that the lack of risk-
sensitivity may be on the part of the benchmark measures, rather than on sub-debt spreads. 
 
5.2.2. Stock return volatility divergence 
Table 8 shows the results of estimation of stock return volatility divergence as a function of 
the principal components of MD conditions. Here, too, the results support the supposition of 
an initially negative but convex function. The slope coefficients on the first principal compo-
nent are consistently negative. Allowing for a non-linear relationship, the coefficient for the 
quadratic term turns out significantly positive (but small). Controlling for successively less 
important principal components (again, PC2-PC6 enter only linearly for ease of exposition) 
does little to boost explanatory power, and does not affect the coefficients of PC1 and PC12. 
Finally, the results of the piecewise specification, as reported in coefficient column 
(5), support the results of the non-linear specifications (3) and (4) for all but the bottom 25 
percent of MD conditions. For quarters 2-4, the coefficients on the first principal component 
are all negative and significant, but decrease in magnitude as conditions for market discipline 
improve. For the top quarter, the coefficient is close to zero, indicating that the divergence 
between stock return volatility and the accounting benchmark measures is relatively insensi-
tive to improvements in MD conditions for this sub-sample; however, the coefficient is still 
significantly negative, so there is no basis for suggesting that stock-return volatility contain 
more information on bank risk for higher levels of institutional development (as was the case 
with sub-debt spreads). The coefficient for the bottom fourth of PC1 is insignificantly differ-
ent from zero. In line with the basic hypotheses and arguments advanced previously, this 
would suggest that the difference in information quality between the stock-market indicator 
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and the accounting indicators is random when market-discipline conditions are poorly satis-
fied. A tentative explanation for this finding is that both types of indicator are ‘just as bad’ 
when the institutional environment is sufficiently poor. This explanation conflicts somewhat 
with the assumption that the benchmark measures are invariant to MD conditions, but it 
would seem to be the most plausible explanation for this result. 
Notwithstanding the indeterminate result for the first quarter in specification (5), the 
overall impression from all regressions reported in Table 8 is that the divergence between 
stock return volatility and accounting risk is a negative function of the conditions for market 
discipline, but that the negative slope becomes increasingly flat as conditions improve. The 
implication is that accounting measures of risk are a priori more informative, but the differ-
ence in informativeness becomes successively less important. 
 
[Table 8] 
 
5.2.3. Z-score divergence 
The results from regressions of Z-score divergence on the conditions for market discipline 
(Table 9) impart the overall impression of a monotonically increasing divergence between the 
Z-score and the accounting-based benchmarks over the entire distribution of MD conditions. 
The first principal component of the conditions for market discipline has a consistently posi-
tive and highly significant coefficient for specifications (1)-(4). The quadratic PC1 terms in 
specifications (3) and (4), on the other hand, are small and statistically insignificant. The 
piecewise specification on the first principal component, finally, seems to suggest that diver-
gence increases the most over low-to-medium ranges of MD conditions, but the parameter 
estimates for this specification are jointly insignificant (as shown by the regression F). 
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The overall insignificance of specification (5), along with the very small R2’s in speci-
fications (1) and (3), suggests that the first principal component explains considerably less of 
the Z-score divergence than the divergence of stock return volatility and sub-debt spreads. 
The lower-order principal components (PC2-PC6), on the other hand, seem to add considera-
bly to the explanatory power of the regressions (without necessarily clarifying the relationship 
between Z-score divergence and overall MD conditions). 
 The implication of the results – in accordance with the hypotheses laid out in this pa-
per – would be that the Z-score is always more informative on bank risk than accounting-
based risk indicators. However, given the relatively low capacity of the most overall measure 
of MD conditions (viz. the first principal component) to explain this difference in informa-
tiveness, the message needs perhaps to be nuanced somewhat. 
One explanation could lie in the fact that the Z-score is a combination measure, incor-
porating both market and accounting data. Keeping this in mind, a possible implication of the 
result could run along the lines that combination measures capture information not contained 
in more one-dimensional measures of risk, and the market can always produce valuable com-
plementary information (regardless of the level of institutional quality). 
This line of interpretation would suggest that the results here obtained substantiate the 
results of previous research – by, e.g., Berger et al. (2000), Evanoff and Wall (2001), Gunther 
et al. (2001), and Gropp et al. (2006) – which has also concluded that information impounded 
in market measures of risk could provide an important complementary signal of banks’ finan-
cial health, and thus has pointed to the potential value of indirect market discipline in bank 
supervision. 
 
[Table 9] 
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5.2.4. Regressions on individual conditions for market discipline 
As an additional robustness test of the results, and as a means to clarify the results, I ran re-
gressions of the three divergence measures extracted from the stage-one regressions on an 
individual proxy of the conditions of market discipline. The proxy used as regressor in these 
additional stage-two regressions is the ‘no-bailout credibility’ variable. It was chosen on the 
grounds that it is a bank-level variable, has a low weight in the first principal component of 
MD conditions (and thus so far ‘untested’), and has a relatively ‘clean’ interpretation in terms 
of its impact on the viability of market-based measures of risk. I ran one linear and one quad-
ratic specification for each divergence measure (corresponding to equations [10] and [11], and 
equivalent to specifications [1] and [3] in Tables 7-9). The results are reported in Table 10. 
 
[Table 10] 
 
Sub-debt spread divergence displays a negative average relationship with no-bailout credibil-
ity, but when the quadratic term is introduced again proves to be a convex function, in accor-
dance both with the advanced hypotheses and with the results obtained earlier when the first 
principal component was used as regressor. The estimated relationship suggests that sub-debt 
spread divergence drops for the initial two thirds of the distribution of no-bailout credibility, 
but then bottoms out and turns positive for the top third of the distribution. The function hits 
its minimum at around 3.5, which is close to the mean value for no-bailout credibility. 
 Stock return volatility divergence instead shows a positive overall relationship with 
no-bailout credibility, but as indicated by the very low adjusted R2’s and the insignificance of 
all regressors in the quadratic specification, the association is relatively weak. The conclusion 
would be that this particular dimension of the conditions for market discipline is less impor-
tant than those dimensions captured in the first principal components. 
126 127 44 
Z-score divergence, finally, appears to be positively related to no-bailout credibility on 
average, but allowing for non-linearity, the posited convex relationship emerges. The esti-
mated coefficients in specification (2) for Z-score divergence are similar to those estimated 
for sub-debt spread divergence, although the function reaches its minimum somewhat earlier 
(which explains why the estimated relationship is positive on average). Comparing these re-
sults with those obtained with the first principal component of MD conditions as the primary 
explanatory variable, it is clear that the no-bailout condition has a higher power to explain the 
difference in informativeness between the Z-score and accounting variables than those proxies 
of MD conditions that have a high weight in PC1. 
Again, a possible explanation of the finding that the Z-score more often has a higher 
informativeness than the benchmark indicators is that it incorporates information contained in 
both market prices and accounting data. These two types of information could be complemen-
tary even when the institutional environment is not good enough to make market-based meas-
ures individually ‘better’ than accounting-based indicators of bank risk. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The potential merits of market discipline in banking have often been assessed empirically by 
focusing on the monitoring aspect of market discipline – that is, the extent to which prices on 
banks’ securities reflect the risk of the issuing banking organization. Two main approaches 
have been adopted: the ‘risk sensitivity’ approach (where various indicators of risk derived 
from market prices are regressed on benchmark risk measures, such as different accounting 
ratios, or credit ratings), and the ‘early warning’ approach (where market-based risk measures 
are tested as predictors, or leading indicators, of bank distress, defined in some way). The 
overall results are relatively inconclusive, and each approach has its methodological prob-
lems. I have focused on the former approach in this paper. In this approach, one previously 
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largely overlooked problem is that both market-based risk measures and the benchmark indi-
cators commonly used are imperfect proxies of ‘true’ risk. Therefore, absence of a significant 
association between a market signal and benchmark risk indicators could result either because 
market prices do not adequately reflect risk, or because market prices in fact incorporate the 
available information on banks’ risk better than other available measures. 
The problem is thus that it is not possible to observe which of the indicators that is 
more informative about the bank’s ‘true’ risk. What is possible to observe, though, is how 
well the institutional setting in a particular market is geared toward inducing market disci-
pline. In the paper, I suggested a simple measure of informativeness divergence between a 
market signal and benchmark risk measures, and showed that – although it cannot be observed 
directly – it is possible to infer from the function projecting this measure onto a proxy of the 
extent to which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied which one of the measures 
that is more informative. 
Applying the methodology to a panel of several hundred banks worldwide, with the 
divergence measure calculated on the basis of three common market-based risk indicators, I 
find that market-based measures as stand-alone variables are less informative than accounting 
indicators for most levels of institutional quality. Stock return volatility is never more infor-
mative than accounting measures, but spreads on subordinated debt may be more informative 
if the conditions for market discipline are well satisfied (for the top 25-30 percent of the ob-
served distribution). This finding raises the question if the failure to find significant associa-
tions between subordinated-debt spreads and accounting data in some studies using US data is 
driven by lower information content in accounting data than in spreads (rather than the other 
way around, which is the common interpretation). A combination measure incorporating both 
stock market data and accounting data, finally, is more informative than accounting variables 
alone for most levels of institutional quality (although the most overall measure of institu-
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tional quality used seems to be a relatively weak determinant of the difference in informative-
ness between the combination risk indicator and the benchmarks). This result is consistent 
with the results of some previous studies comparing the relative informativeness of different 
risk indicators, which have seem to imply that stock-market data contains information that is 
complementary to accounting data and other commonly used benchmark risk measures. It also 
makes intuitive sense that a measure incorporating information from different sources should 
be more informative overall than single-source indicators. 
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Table 1. Possible outcomes for the function relating divergence between market and 
non-market risk indicators to the conditions for market discipline 
Functional out-
come 
Interpretation Implication 
Divergence is 
increasing in the 
conditions for 
market discipline 
As conditions for market prices to reflect risk improve, the differ-
ence in informativeness between the market-based measure and the 
benchmark measure increases; since the benchmark measure is 
invariant to the conditions for market discipline, it implies that the 
increasing ‘divergence’ reflects that M becomes increasingly more 
informative. 
The market-based 
measure is on aver-
age more informa-
tive 
Divergence is 
decreasing in the 
conditions for 
market discipline 
As conditions for market prices to reflect risk improve, the diver-
gence between the market-based risk measure and the benchmark 
measure decreases; alternatively, as conditions for market prices to 
reflect risk deteriorate, the divergence between M and B increases; 
this means that the gap in informativeness successively closes 
(opens) as the conditions for market discipline improve (deterio-
rate). 
The benchmark 
measure is on aver-
age the more in-
formative risk 
measure 
No functional 
relationship can be 
established 
The divergence between the market-based and the benchmark 
measures shows no systematic relationship with the conditions for 
market discipline, indicating that on average, these variables carry 
about the same risk information content. 
Neither measure is 
a priori more in-
formative than the 
other 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, market-based and accounting-based risk measures 
The table reports summary statistics for the included market-based (Panel A) and bench-
mark/accounting-based (Panel B) risk measures. Summary statistics for the included measures 
(except sub-debt spreads) are reported separately for bank/year observations with subordi-
nated debt outstanding (sub outst.) and those without (no sub outst.), as well as for the full 
sample of observations (all). The ‘Test’ column reports the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney rank-
based test statistic for the null hypothesis that the ‘sub outst.’ and the ‘no sub outst.’ groups 
have equal distributions around the median. 
Panel A: Market-based risk measures 
 Group Mean Std 
dev 
Median Test Min Max Obs 
Sub-debt spread (bp’s) All 115 208 81.0  -370 988 637 
Stock return volatility All 0.0228 0.0171 0.0191  0.000 0.202 4964 
 Sub outst.   0.0184    1556 
 No sub 
outst. 
  0.0196 3.42***   3408 
Market Z-score All 5.35 5.28 3.55  0.350 40.3 2688 
 Sub outst.   3.20    1318 
 No sub 
outst. 
  3.94 8.40***   1370 
Panel B. Accounting-based risk measures 
 Group Mean Std 
dev 
Median Test Min Max Obs 
Leverage All 0.914 0.055 0.931  0.462 0.990 3322 
 Sub outst.   0.942    1510 
 No sub 
outst. 
  0.914 20.0***   1812 
Non-performing loans / 
equity 
All 0.666 0.726 0.458  0.000 4.89 2534 
 Sub outst.   0.505    1241 
 No sub 
outst. 
  0.404 4.74***   1293 
Liquid assets / total 
assets 
All 0.253 0.189 0.214  0.000 0.974 3388 
 Sub outst.   0.181    1523 
 No sub 
outst. 
  0.257 8.31***   1865 
ROA All 0.0081 0.0159 0.0077  0.0944 0.0708 3315 
 Sub outst.   0.0064    1501 
 No sub 
outst. 
  0.0090 7.32***   1814 
***  Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of equal medians at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, control variables included in first-stage regressions 
The table reports summary statistics for the included bank-level and country-level control 
variables included in the regressions of market-based risk measures on benchmark risk meas-
ures. 
 Mean Std dev Min Max Obs 
Bank-level control variables      
Deposits 0.82 0.12 0.16 0.95 2878 
Net interest margin 0.040 0.051 -0.63 0.48 3363 
Cost/income ratio 0.65 0.34 0.077 8.59 3318 
      
Country-level control variables 
(annual obs’s for 47 countries) 
     
Real interest rate 0.060 0.091 -0.91 0.78  
Inflation 0.067 0.14 -0.039 1.55  
Growth 0.033 0.031 -0.13 0.18  
 
140 141 58 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics, conditions for market discipline 
The table reports summary statistics for variables included in the composite measures of the 
extent to which the conditions for market discipline are satisfied (open capital markets, good 
information, no prospects of bailout, and responsiveness to market signals). 
 Mean Std dev Min Max Obs 
Bank-level variables      
Turnover rate 0.79 2.27 0.00 53.3 4564 
Share of formally insured debt 0.53 0.35 0.00 0.99 2881 
No-bailout credibility 3.56 1.45 1.00 5.00 5066 
Institutional ownership 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.98 5377 
Insider ownership 0.39 0.31 0.00 0.99 5377 
Excess capital 0.044 0.055 -0.030 0.49 3322 
      
Country-level variables (annual obs’s for 47 countries)      
Bank deposits/GDP 0.67 0.36 0.10 2.55  
Private-sector credit/GDP 0.84 0.63 0.072 2.60  
Equity issues/Gross Fixed Capital Formation 0.18 0.13 0.021 0.63  
Equity market capitalization/GDP 0.45 0.40 0.00 2.75  
Number of publicly traded firms/mn. population 23.3 28.5 1.13 194  
Corporate bond market capitalization/GDP 0.31 0.40 0.00 2.12  
Foreign-investment openness 3.51 2.71 0.00 9.00  
Corporate transparency/private monitoring index 67.2 8.74 32.7 85.0  
Shareholder rights index 3.16 1.25 1.00 5.00  
Creditor rights index 2.39 1.24 0.00 4.00  
Index of rule of law 4.15 1.38 1.00 6.00  
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Table 5. Principal components analysis of conditions for market discipline, summary 
Panel A reports eigenvalues and variance proportions of the first six principal components (of 
a total of 18 components) from a principal components analysis on the conditions for market 
discipline, based on the correlation matrix of the included variables. PC1 refers to the first 
principal component, PC2 to the second, etc. The bottom row in Panel A shows cumulative 
variance proportions. Panel B shows coefficients on the individual proxies of the conditions 
for market discipline (the parameter vectors a and b in equation [14]). The total number of 
included observations was 1862. 
Panel A. Eigenvalues and variance proportions 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
Eigenvalue 4.96 2.37 1.70 1.38 1.23 0.99 
Variance proportion 0.275 0.131 0.095 0.077 0.068 0.055 
Cumulative variance proportion 0.275 0.407 0.502 0.578 0.647 0.702 
Panel B. Coefficients on individual proxies of MD conditions 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
Open capital markets       
Turnover rate -0.08 0.04 -0.21 0.07 -0.49 0.42 
Bank deposits/GDP 0.29 -0.31 0.17 -0.04 0.04 0.35 
Private-sector credit/GDP 0.33 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.01 0.16 
Equity issues/Gross Fixed Capital Formation 0.24 -0.24 -0.27 -0.39 0.00 0.17 
Equity market capitalization/GDP 0.38 -0.06 -0.03 -0.25 0.04 0.13 
Number of publicly traded firms/mn. population 0.31 -0.15 -0.35 0.06 0.13 0.07 
Corporate bond market capitalization/GDP 0.24 0.45 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.03 
Foreign-investment openness 0.32 0.29 -0.05 -0.08 0.08 0.08 
       
Good information       
Corporate transparency/private monitoring index 0.33 0.08 -0.03 0.16 0.12 -0.11 
       
No prospects of bailout       
Share of formally insured debt -0.02 -0.07 0.64 -0.03 -0.28 0.23 
No-bailout credibility -0.04 0.38 -0.11 -0.03 0.27 0.00 
Government ownership -0.12 -0.19 -0.07 0.26 0.40 0.43 
       
Responsiveness to market signals       
Insider ownership -0.23 -0.07 0.01 -0.42 0.28 0.18 
Institutional ownership 0.14 -0.13 -0.27 0.22 -0.51 -0.08 
Excess capital -0.03 0.35 -0.26 -0.22 -0.18 0.23 
Shareholder rights index 0.10 -0.42 -0.04 0.21 0.11 -0.30 
Creditor rights index -0.14 0.07 -0.10 0.54 0.15 0.42 
Index of rule of law 0.34 0.13 0.08 0.22 0.02 -0.08 
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Table 6. Results of regressions of market-based risk measures on accounting-based risk 
measures 
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions with period fixed effects. 
T-statistics in parentheses are based on White type standard errors robust to time-varying re-
sidual variance and correlation over time within cross-sections. In the regressions on sub-debt 
spreads, accounting variables and macroeconomic variables are measured in percent (rather 
than fractions). Market Z-score is entered negatively in the regression (it decreases in risk) for 
ease of comparability. Squared standardized residuals from regressions 1, 3, and 4 are used as 
‘divergence’ measures (for sub-debt, stock return volatility, and Z-score, respectively) in the 
subsequent analysis. 
 Dependent variable 
 1. Sub-debt spread 2. Sub-debt spread 3. Stock return 
volatility 
4. Negative market 
Z-score 
Leverage 12.2 (1.08) 10.9 (0.96) -0.019 (-1.40) 48.9 (6.72)*** 
Non-performing 
loans 
1.20 (2.03)** 1.21 (2.02)** 0.004 (5.27)*** 0.76 (3.64)*** 
Liquid assets 3.00 (1.91)* 3.01 (1.91)* 0.024 (5.97)*** 3.98 (4.66)*** 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
60.9 (2.19)** 63.8 (2.27)** -0.028 (-0.55) 4.08 (0.33) 
     
Time to maturity -3.78 (-2.58)** -3.82 (-2.61)***   
Amount of issue -15.3 (-0.73) -16.8 (-0.78)   
Heckman ‘lambda’a  -22.1 (-0.68)   
     
Deposits 0.072 (0.054) 0.29 (0.22) -0.003 (-0.50) -0.91 (-0.73) 
Net interest margin -3.54 (-0.32) -3.89 (-0.34) -0.051 (-3.22)*** -21.5 (-2.69)*** 
Cost/income ratio -0.15 (-0.098) -0.27 (-0.18) 0.001 (0.28) -0.86 (-1.50) 
     
Real interest rate 2.14 (1.04) 2.15 (1.06) 0.013 (1.62) 5.75 (3.79)*** 
Inflation 15.7 (1.34) 15.3 (1.30) 0.047 (6.72)*** 12.4 (5.03)*** 
Growth 21.4 (1.87)* 19.14 (1.67)* 0.035 (2.71)*** 21.3 (5.08)*** 
Systemic financial 
crisis 
38.5 (0.87) 35.8 (0.79) 0.004 (3.12)*** 1.56 (4.73)*** 
     
Period fixed effects 
(F-statistic) 
5.18*** 5.28*** 9.32*** 4.80*** 
Adj. R2 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.33 
Regression F 7.55*** 7.26*** 35.5*** 47.7*** 
No. of observations 267 264 1831 1781 
No. of banks 97 96 349 347 
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level. 
Note: a) Correction for possible selection bias, based on the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure; the variable is 
the inverse Mills ratio calculated from a probit selection regression, as specified in Table A6.
142 143 61 
Table 7. Results of regressions of sub-debt spread divergence on conditions for market 
discipline 
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions of the squared standard-
ized residual from model 1 in Table 6 on various combinations of the first six principal com-
ponents of the conditions for market discipline (PC1-PC6). Model 5 reports coefficient esti-
mates from a piecewise linear regression on the first principal component, where the distribu-
tion of the independent variable is split into four even quarters. T-statistics in parentheses are 
based on White standard errors robust to contemporaneous correlation and cross-section het-
eroscedasticity. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 0.88 (4.90)*** 0.74 (4.51)*** 0.36 (2.29)** 0.31 (2.11)** 0.37 (2.02)** 
PC1 0.11 (4.60)*** -0.11 (-4.00)*** -0.005 (-0.17) -0.13 (-5.71)***  
PC12   0.11 (24.5)*** 0.10 (10.9)***  
PC2  -0.17 (-2.31)**  -0.11 (-1.57)  
PC3  -0.24 (-7.73)***  0.043 (1.13)  
PC4  0.080 (1.45)  0.13 (2.31)**  
PC5  -0.42 (-3.35)***  -0.41 (-3.36)***  
PC6  -0.17 (-1.98)**  -0.21 (-2.03)**  
      
PC1 – Q1     -0.25 (-3.55)*** 
PC1 – Q2     -0.38 (-3.83)*** 
PC1 – Q3     0.03 (0.31) 
PC1 – Q4     0.43 (12.14)*** 
      
Adj. R2 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06 
Regression F 2.40 3.71*** 8.87*** 4.36*** 4.66*** 
No. of obser-
vations 
239 239 239 239 239 
No. of banks 91 91 91 91 91 
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level. 
144 145 62 
Table 8. Results of regressions of stock return volatility divergence on conditions for 
market discipline 
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions of the squared standard-
ized residual from model 3 in Table 6 on various combinations of the first six principal com-
ponents of the conditions for market discipline (PC1-PC6). Model 5 reports coefficient esti-
mates from a piecewise linear regression on the first principal component, where the distribu-
tion of the independent variable is split into four even quarters. T-statistics in parentheses are 
based on White standard errors robust to contemporaneous correlation and cross-section het-
eroscedasticity. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 0.60 (7.80)*** 0.62 (7.23)*** 0.52 (7.20)*** 0.51 (6.29)*** 0.49 (5.09)*** 
PC1 -0.14 (-4.07)*** -0.13 (-4.04)*** -0.14 (-4.27)*** -0.13 (-4.34)***  
PC12   0.017 (4.42)*** 0.022 (2.42)**  
PC2  0.060 (2.56)**  0.074 (2.55)**  
PC3  -0.015 (-0.83)  0.035 (0.95)  
PC4  0.080 (1.45)  -0.039 (-2.12)**  
PC5  -0.053 (-2.34)**  0.050 (4.56)***  
PC6  0.10 (3.09)***  0.084 (2.41)**  
      
PC1 – Q1     -0.071 (-1.27) 
PC1 – Q2     -0.24 (-3.01)*** 
PC1 – Q3     -0.13 (-2.47)** 
PC1 – Q4     -0.043 
(-2.71)*** 
      
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Regression F 47.0*** 9.49*** 25.7*** 8.88*** 15.0*** 
No. of obser-
vations 
1489 1489 1489 1489 1489 
No. of banks 282 282 282 282 282 
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level. 
 
144 145 63 
Table 9. Results of regressions of market Z-score divergence on conditions for market 
discipline 
The table reports coefficient estimates from panel OLS regressions of the squared standard-
ized residual from model 4 in Table 6 on various combinations of the first six principal com-
ponents of the conditions for market discipline (PC1-PC6). Model 5 reports coefficient esti-
mates from a piecewise linear regression on the first principal component, where the distribu-
tion of the independent variable is split into four even quarters. T-statistics in parentheses are 
based on White standard errors robust to contemporaneous correlation and cross-section het-
eroscedasticity. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 0.78 (7.25)*** 0.96 (6.01)*** 0.85 (4.17)*** 0.95 (4.69)*** 0.82 (4.30)*** 
PC1 0.086 (2.90)*** 0.15 (3.21)*** 0.082 (2.25)** 0.15 (2.88)***  
PC12   -0.014 (-0.58) 0.001 (0.042)  
PC2  0.63 (3.58)***  0.63 (3.59)***  
PC3  -0.047 (-1.01)  -0.045 (-0.94)  
PC4  -0.041 (-0.39)  -0.040 (-0.41)  
PC5  0.13 (2.41)**  0.13 (2.15)**  
PC6  0.26 (6.48)***  0.26 (7.66)***  
      
PC1 – Q1     0.10 (2.11)** 
PC1 – Q2     0.13 (2.16)** 
PC1 – Q3     0.13 (0.80) 
PC1 – Q4     -0.000 (-0.002) 
      
Adj. R2 0.003 0.06 0.002 0.06 0.002 
Regression F 4.65** 17.7*** 2.75* 15.1*** 1.62 
No. of obser-
vations 
1483 1483 1483 1483 1483 
No. of banks 282 282 282 282 282 
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level. 
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Appendix A. Additional data tables 
Table A1. Distribution of banks by country 
Country Number of banks Average sizea of 
included banks in 
2005 
Number of banks 
with subordinated 
debt outstanding in 
2005 
Average MD condi-
tions of included 
banks in 2005b 
Argentina 4 4,853 2 -3.09 
Australia 9 55,698 9 2.84 
Austria 4 18,625 4 -0.68 
Brazil 14 13,558 6 -3.79 
Canada 9 90,587 8 4.41 
Chile 5 14,229 3 -1.14 
Colombia 11 2,244 1 -3.48 
Czech Republic 1 20,942 0 -2.60 
Denmark 40 847 25 2.11 
Egypt 20 978 1 -2.41 
Finland 2 8,201 2 2.06 
France 11 22,495 5 1.08 
Germany 16 11,632 8 -0.10 
Greece 10 13,638 5 -0.63 
Hong Kong 7 15,165 3 5.12 
Hungary 2 5,265 2 -2.64 
India 37 13,051 10 -2.73 
Indonesia 22 4,154 9 -3.28 
Ireland 5 127,953 5 2.30 
Israel 8 16,406 5 0.06 
Italy 19 28,383 13 -0.78 
Japan 87 19,133 54 0.91 
Kenya 7 575 0 -4.79 
South Korea 8 33,349 3 -1.31 
Lithuania 4 955 3 -1.70 
Malaysia 3 28,277 3 0.53 
Malta 4 1,425 1 -0.21 
Morocco 5 6,241 1 -2.79 
Netherlands 1 1,039,000 1 4.59 
Pakistan 20 1,345 8 -2.94 
Peru 9 948 3 -2.19 
Philippines 15 1,626 8 -2.11 
Poland 12 6,548 2 -2.96 
Portugal 3 73,289 3 0.28 
Romania 3 1,472 1 -3.43 
Singapore 2 71,652 2 3.33 
South Africa 2 5,477c 1 -1.66d 
Spain 14 25,982 9 1.78 
Sri Lanka 7 658 4 n.a. 
Sweden 2 217,181 2 2.92 
Switzerland 6 6,780 3 3.90 
Taiwan 15 11,636 5 -0.46 
Thailand 13 7,679 11 -1.48 
Turkey 12 8,183 3 -2.78 
United Kingdom 3 18,409 2 4.48 
United States 15 3,511 6 3.34 
Venezuela 14 1,027 0 -4.78 
n.a.: Not available 
Notes: a) Total assets in millions of USD. b) Index of the conditions for market discipline given by the first prin-
cipal component of variables listed in Table A3, Panel B. A higher value indicates better conditions for market 
discipline. Total sample observations on the index run between -6.69 and 5.78 and have zero mean. c) Refers to 
average size in 2004 (no observations for 2005). d) Refers to average MD conditions in 2002 (no observations 
for 2003-2005). 
148 149 66 
Table A2. Distribution of observations on market-based risk measures over time 
Risk measure, number of obs’s Year 
Sub-debt spreads Stock return volatility Market Z-score 
1994 10 299 0 
1995 10 333 1 
1996 14 344 1 
1997 23 375 23 
1998 34 395 227 
1999 38 415 273 
2000 51 431 301 
2001 61 448 321 
2002 70 461 341 
2003 89 475 357 
2004 103 489 433 
2005 134 499 410 
148 149 67 
 
Table A3, Panel A. Risk measures (market- and accounting-based) and control variables 
Variable Description Source 
Market-based risk measures   
Subordinated debt spreads Spread over equal-maturity riskfree rate 
of yields on the bank’s subordinated 
bonds or notes, in basis points 
Datastream, Reuters 
Stock return volatility Standard deviation of daily equity returns 
(calculated for each year) 
Datastream 
Z-score (Average return on equity – equity capital 
over total assets) divided by standard 
deviation of equity returns 
Datastream, BankScope 
   
Accounting-based risk meas-
ures 
  
Leverage One minus the equity share of total assets BankScope 
Non-performing loans Non-performing loans divided by equity 
capital 
As above 
Liquid assets Liquid assets divided by total assets As above 
Return on assets (ROA) Net earnings divided by total assets As above 
   
Bank-level control variables   
Deposits Deposits divided by total assets As above 
Net interest margin Interest income over interest expenditure As above 
Cost/income ratio Total costs divided by total income As above 
   
Country-level control vari-
ables 
  
Real interest rate Real interest rate World Development Indica-
tors 
Inflation Annual change in consumer prices As above 
Growth Real GDP growth As above 
Systemic financial crisis Dummy variable equal to one if the coun-
try was undergoing a systemic financial 
crisis, zero otherwise 
Honohan and Laeven (2005) 
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Table A4. Pairwise correlations, bank-level benchmark risk measures and control vari-
ables 
 Leverage Non-
performing 
loans 
Liquidity ROA Deposit share Net interest 
margin 
Non-
performing 
loans 
 0.375      
Liquidity -0.116 -0.089     
ROA -0.423 -0.463  0.185    
Deposit share  0.512  0.216 -0.124 -0.236   
Net interest 
margin 
-0.361 -0.219  0.149  0.385 -0.189  
Cost/income 
ratio 
 0.049  0.142  0.035 -0.412  0.004 -0.024 
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Table A5. Pairwise correlations, conditions for market discipline 
Panel A. Bank-level variables 
 Turnover rate 
Share of for-
mally insured 
debt 
No-bailout cre-
dibility 
Institutional 
ownership Inside ownership 
Share of formally in-
sured debt -0.024     
No-bailout credibility -0.049 -0.171    
Institutional ownership 0.140 -0.045 -0.273   
Inside ownership -0.060 -0.002 -0.032 -0.344  
Excess capital 0.088 -0.118 0.278 -0.003 0.067 
(Panel B shown on next page) 
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Table A6. Estimation results of the sub-debt sample selection model 
The table shows coefficient estimates from a pooled probit regression of the selection indica-
tor (a dummy variable indicating if the bank had sub-debt outstanding during the observation 
year) on bank- and country-level regressors.a T-statistics in parentheses are based on regular 
probit standard errors (and should therefore be interpreted with caution, given the panel struc-
ture of the dataset). Observation-specific estimates of the inverse Mills ratio from this model 
were used as an additional explanatory variable in Table 6’s model (2) to account for possible 
sample-selection bias. 
 Dependent variable: Sub-debt 
dummy 
Leverage 6.47 (5.89)*** 
Non-performing loans -0.12 (-1.98)** 
Liquid assets -0.43 (-1.73)* 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.064 (0.020) 
  
Real interest rate 0.90 (1.82)* 
Inflation -0.49 (-0.81) 
Growth 0.22 (0.17) 
  
(Sub-debt dummy)t-1 2.76 (32.7)*** 
  
Undercapitalization dummy 0.58 (4.15)*** 
  
Intercept -6.93 (-6.79)*** 
  
McFadden pseudo-R2 0.59 
Regression likelihood ratio 2030*** 
No. of observations (of which 
dep. var. = 1) 
2496 (1228) 
No. of banks 437 
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent confidence level. 
Note: a) To my knowledge, Covitz et al. (2004) were first to use the Heckman (1979) two-step approach to cor-
rect for sample-selection bias in the context of risk-sensitivity tests on sub-debt spreads. They estimate a model 
where the bank’s decision to issue sub-debt is a function of the bank’s own risk level, macroeconomic and mar-
ket conditions, firm-specific advantages, and the regulatory pressure to issue. I based the above model on that 
general structure, and variables are grouped accordingly in the table. Proxies for bank risk and macroeconomic 
variables need no explanation or motivation. Firm-specific advantages are summarized by the lagged sub-debt 
dummy (used also by Covitz et al., 2004) since it can reasonably be assumed that this variable is strongly serially 
correlated within cross-section units; Covitz et al. (2004) use examination ratings to measure regulatory pressure 
to issue capital (which could be at least in part sub-debt); such ratings are not available for cross-country sam-
ples, and I instead use the undercapitalization dummy to proxy for the pressure to issue. 
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Appendix B. Empirical evidence on market monitoring of bank risk 
 
The empirical market discipline literature has been primarily concerned with one or both of the follow-
ing closely related questions: first, whether market prices of bank claims are any good as gauges of the 
risk levels of banks − ‘do market-based risk indicators adequately reflect the risk levels of banks?’; 
second, whether putting the market meter on banks actually affects their risk-taking − ‘do banks adjust 
their risk behavior in accordance with fluctuations in the prices of their outstanding equity and debt?’. 
The questions posed in the literature thus essentially mirror the distinction between the monitoring and 
influence dimensions of market discipline. In practice, studies on the former question by far outnum-
ber those on the latter one. Below, empirical results primarily on market monitoring are surveyed by 
type of claim. Section B.1 focuses on monitoring by holders of risky debt, whereas Section B.2 con-
siders studies of equity-based risk indicators (or of both stock and bond prices). Section B.3, finally, 
discusses a methodological problem with ‘early-warning’-type tests of monitoring, and its connection 
with the methodological problems involved in empirically addressing the influence dimension of mar-
ket discipline. Table B1 at the end of the appendix contains a summary of different market-based and 
benchmark indicators used in the literature. 
 
B.1. Monitoring by holders of subordinated debt 
The evidence piled up over the years from studies using the risk-sensitivity approach paint a mixed 
picture as to the correlation between sub-debt spreads and other risk measures. Several factors come 
into play: the exact dataset tested (types of debt instrument, maturities, primary or secondary market 
spreads), characteristics of the banks included (size and charter value), benchmark risk measures used, 
and the time period investigated. As for the latter factor, most of the empirical tests are done on US 
data, and a common conclusion seems to be that correlations became stronger after the FDICIA20 re-
form of 1991, which committed more credibly to a no-bailout policy as regards US banks’ uninsured 
creditors.21 
Thus, Avery et al. (1988) and Flannery and Sorescu (1996) find mixed evidence of bank-
specific risk measures reflected in the secondary market spreads of US banks’ subordinated notes and 
debentures (SNDs) during the 1980s. The former paper finds that, controlling for various issue-related 
features of the sub-debt (issue size, maturity, and issue-rating dummies), the benchmark risk proxies 
used are insignificant determinants of sub-debt spreads almost without exception, both individually 
and jointly, and the authors conclude that “important differences apparently exist between the market’s 
assessment of default risk and the balance-sheet measures of risk” (p. 605). Flannery and Sorescu 
                                                   
20 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act. 
21 Benston and Kaufman (1997) report that formally uninsured deposit holders incurred losses in only 17 percent 
of bank failures in 1991, and that the FDICIA pushed that number up to 54 percent in the following year. 
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(1996) conclude from their qualitatively similar results that “bank investors clearly impounded the 
value of conjectural government guarantees into debentures prices” (p. 1373). 
Jagtiani et al. (2002), on the other hand, testing a panel of mostly long term subordinated 
bonds in the post-FDICIA period, do find evidence that the secondary market pricing of bank sub-debt 
significantly depends on underlying credit risk, as traditionally measured, and that this effect is 
stronger for poorly capitalized banks. Also testing long term bonds (average maturity is 8.6 years) in 
the post-FDICIA period, Morgan and Stiroh (2001) find a link between primary market spreads and 
the quality of the banks’ asset portfolios. According to expectation, they also find the link to be 
stronger for more opaque banking institutions, and weaker for larger institutions (i.e., that ‘too-big-to-
fail’ considerations cause the market to be softer on bigger banks). 
The pattern is far from consistent, however, with regard to the US experience of the effect of 
implicit insurance of sub-debt. Hall et al. (2002) explicitly test the effect of FDICIA on the risk sensi-
tivity of accounting-based yields (i.e., averages of interest expenditure over outstanding debt) on short-
term certificates of deposit (CDs) in a cross section of US banks, and find that the risk sensitivity did 
not significantly increase after FDICIA. Similar results are obtained by Covitz et al. (2004). Studying 
secondary-market spreads of sub-debt of various maturities (of which 12 percent is short term) over a 
sample period covering the second half of the 1990s, Krishnan et al. (2006) find only weak and incon-
clusive evidence of a link between spreads and other risk variables. On the other hand, some older 
papers do find cross-sectional links between spreads on large CDs and balance sheet risk in the pre-
FDICIA period (Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; James, 1988, 1990; Keeley, 1990; and Ellis and 
Flannery, 1992).  
Sironi (2002, 2003) and Pop (2006) are among the few sources so far studying the determi-
nants of the risk premium on non-US banks’ subordinated debt. Sironi (2002, 2003) finds that spreads 
reasonably well reflect ratings, that the pricing of bonds is similar in the US and Europe, but that the 
European bonds’ spreads contain a slightly higher liquidity premium. Pop (2006) regresses yield 
spreads on senior and junior bonds of European banks on credit ratings, controlling for various issue 
features, including subordination status. Results overall are consistent with the hypotheses that lower-
rated bonds trade at higher yields than higher-rated bonds, and that sub-debt trades at higher yields 
than senior bonds. 
As one step toward refining the basic risk-sensitivity approach, Covitz et al. (2004) make the 
observation that if riskier institutions avoid issuing sub-debt in the first place, in order to avoid being 
disciplined, then simply examining the relationship between risk profile and yield spreads may under-
estimate correlations because of sample selection bias. They use the standard Heckman (1979) two-
step approach to correct for possible sample selection bias, and although some risk measures are (mar-
ginally) significant determinants of the issuance decision, the sample-selection correction variable is 
consistently insignificant in the second-step regressions sub-debt spread. The same approach to sam-
ple-selection correction is used by Birchler and Hancock (2004) and Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004), with 
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qualitatively similar results. These results would suggest that explicit consideration of sample-
selection problems contribute little to the understanding of the association between sub-debt spreads 
and standard benchmark risk measures. 
Goyal (2005) focuses on the effect of banks’ risk incentives (measured as charter value) on 
both sub-debt spreads at issuance and the inclusion of restrictive covenants in the sub-debt contracts of 
150 of the largest US bank holding companies (BHCs) over the 1974-95 period. The paper corrects for 
selection bias along similar lines as Covitz et al. (2004), Birchler and Hancock (2004), and Evanoff 
and Jagtiani (2004), but the yield spread regressions correct for self-selection into the sample group of 
bonds that include covenants (rather than for self-selection into the sample group of banks that issued 
any sub-debt at all). The yield spread regressions also correct for other risk proxies in the form of 
credit ratings and capital ratios. The results indicate that several factors proxying for bank risk are 
significantly related to both sub-debt spreads and to the inclusion of restrictive covenants in the sub-
debt contracts, which is interpreted as evidence of market discipline – both through the pricing of un-
insured debt and through conditioning the extension of such debt on limitations as to how it may be 
used. 
A smaller number of studies make use of the time-series variation in sub-debt spreads to study 
the way in which new information is incorporated in different indicators. For instance, DeYoung et al. 
(2001) extract a proxy of the ‘private information’ contained in bank supervisors’ examination ratings, 
and find that this information has some (albeit limited) predictive power for subsequent sub-debt 
spreads (at least if that information is ‘bad news’). The result is interpreted along the lines that super-
visory agencies are quicker to acquire risk-relevant information about banks than bond markets. Direct 
application of the early-warning approach is made in Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002), who test secon-
dary-market sub-debt spreads as leading indicators of bank risk, as measured by subsequent supervi-
sory examination ratings (CAMEL/BOPEC). The predictive power of spreads is compared to that of 
various capital adequacy measures used by supervisors to trigger prompt corrective action (PCA). 
Results indicate that sub-debt yield spreads perform as well as, or better than, the capital-adequacy 
measures in terms of predicting one-quarter-ahead examination ratings (bifurcated into one high-
ratings and one low-ratings category), with the possible exception of the Tier-1 capital ratio. However, 
all the considered measures misclassify a large portion of the included banks. All things considered, 
the paper provides weak evidence that market-based measures of bank risk may contain information 
that accounting-based measures do not. 
In summation, the evidence on the informativeness of sub-debt yield spreads is mixed. Al-
though risk-sensitivity tests often reveal a statistically significant association between sub-debt spreads 
and some benchmark measures, these results may be difficult to interpret in the absence of associations 
with other benchmark indicators. Furthermore, many risk-sensitivity studies find only weak, or alto-
gether non-existent, correlations. Using somewhat different approaches, Evanoff and Wall (2001, 
2002), for example, find that sub-debt spreads may be more informative than some capital-adequacy 
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measures, whereas the results of DeYoung et al. (2001), on the other hand, would suggest that bond 
markets cannot tell bank supervisors anything that they do not already know. 
Tests along the lines just mentioned, that attempt more directly to compare the informative-
ness of different types of indicator, are in relatively short supply – especially for sub-debt spreads 
(although one might reasonably have expected that they should be at the center of attention, since the 
relative informativeness of market signals is really the be-all and end-all of market discipline). I next 
turn to the literature testing equity-based measures of bank risk, and to the few existing studies that 
test both equity-based measures and sub-debt spreads.  
 
B.2. Market monitoring by shareholders 
If the literature on sub-debt spreads is dominated by the ‘risk-sensitivity’ approach, the portion of the 
literature studying equity-based risk measures is methodologically more varied. Early studies testing 
stock-market reactions to changes in bank risk include Pettway (1976, 1980), who test if large US 
bank failures in the 1970s caused any structural shifts in required rates of return on the equity of non-
failed banks, and estimate abnormal equity returns as leading indicators of bank failure. The results 
suggest that the stock market was able early on to predict subsequent failures of a number of large 
banks, and that returns of non-failed banks were largely insensitive to the failure of other banks. 
Pettway and Sinkey (1980) build on these results to argue for an early-warning system for bank failure 
based on equity-price signals. 
The early-warning approach is also adopted by several later papers, for instance Gunther et al. 
(2001), Bongini et al. (2002), Krainer and Lopez (2004), and Gropp et al. (2006). Gunther et al. (2001) 
estimate the ability of an options-pricing-type measure based on equity prices (expected default fre-
quency, EDF) to predict supervisory examination ratings (levels and downgrades) next to past ratings 
and various standard accounting-based risk measures for about 900 ratings set on US banks in the 
period 1996-2000 (cf. Evanoff and Wall, 2001, 2002, testing sub-debt spreads in a similar manner). It 
is found that EDF makes only a marginal contribution to predicting subsequent examination ratings, 
whereas the contribution to predicting ratings downgrades is larger (unfortunately, no formal test is 
performed to ascertain whether this contribution is statistically significant or not). The Krainer and 
Lopez (2004) study is similar, and tests abnormal returns, EDFs, and a simpler equity-based proxy of 
asset volatility, along with various accounting measures and supervisory ratings for approximately 
1500 ratings of about 390 US BHCs between 1990 and 1999, in the context of an ordered logit model. 
Results indicate that among the equity-based indicators only stock returns are significant predictors of 
subsequent BOPEC scores (possibly proxying for the profitability component entering into these rat-
ings), whereas the more explicitly risk-related stock market indicators (EDF and asset volatility) have 
virtually no predictive power. 
Bongini et al. (2002) test different market and non-market indicators (specifically an index of 
balance-sheet indicators, credit ratings, and implicit deposit insurance premia) as predictors of finan-
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cial distress for a sample of 246 banks from four East Asian countries before and during the financial 
crisis around the years 1997-98. The authors find low power in all indicators to predict distress (i.e., to 
distinguish subsequently distressed banks from healthy ones); the equity-based measure (the ‘fair’ 
deposit insurance premium) did best, but the effect was still small and statistically insignificant. 
A slightly different approach to establish lead- and lag-structures among different risk indica-
tors is adopted by Berger et al. (2000). They apply Granger-causality techniques to a sample of 184 
US BHCs during 1989-92 (a problem period for banks) to test if market-based and supervisory as-
sessments of bank condition ‘cause’ one another. Results indicate that credit-rating agencies’ ratings 
and supervisors’ examination ratings ‘cause’ one another, but that there is weak or non-existing cau-
sality between supervisory ratings and stock-market measures of risk. The paper also investigates the 
power of these various indicators to predict future changes in (accounting-based) profitability, loan 
quality, and capital ratios. Results for these latter tests suggest that supervisory ratings are only useful 
as predictors of future performance for a very short period of time after the examination, whereas mar-
ket-based indicators are of some value for predicting future bank performance (except, perhaps, capital 
ratios). 
Hall et al. (2001) use the risk-sensitivity approach and regress several equity-based measures 
of risk and supervisory ratings for 98 US BHCs year by year over the 1988-93 period on the same set 
of accounting-based risk measures (proxies of loan quality, capital adequacy, liquidity, and credit 
commitments). Results suggest that equity-based risk measures respond primarily to variation in loan 
quality (as measured by the share of non-performing loans in total assets), whereas supervisory ratings 
are sensitive both to loan quality (in about the same extent as equity-based measures) and to capital 
ratios. No systematic attempt is made to assess the relative information content of the various meas-
ures employed. 
Berger and Davies (1998) use event-study methodology to estimate ‘announcement’ effects of 
supervisory examination ratings on abnormal returns for 390 examinations of US banks during the 
1985-89 period. As the authors stress, the results of these examinations are not actually announced to 
the public, so the test is on the joint hypothesis that the examinations produce information that signifi-
cantly affects bank value and that some of this information leaks out to the market. Results are some-
what mixed but suggest an asymmetric effect of ratings downgrades (except for banks whose examina-
tion ratings were already unsatisfactory), indicating that examinations reveal private information that 
the stock market does not already have. 
A few papers test both equity-based indicators and sub-debt spreads as risk measures. Brewer 
and Mondschean (1994) adopt the risk-sensitivity approach and estimate both stock return volatility 
and rates of interest paid on large CDs as functions of leverage, loan structure, and non-loan asset 
structure (such as junk-bond holdings and direct real-estate investments). Their results for 74 US sav-
ings and loans institutions during the latter half of the 1980s suggest a strong positive correlation be-
tween stock return volatility and both leverage and junk bond holdings, whereas evidence of equity-
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market responsiveness to other components of the asset structure is mixed. The results for CD rates 
indicate that better-capitalized banks pay lower interest on uninsured deposits; coefficient estimates 
for other risk measures also have the right sign and are generally significant. No systematic attempt to 
compare the informativeness of the different market-based measures is made. 
A methodological approach similar to that of Berger and Davies (1998) is adopted by Gropp 
and Richards (2001). They test announcement effects of credit ratings changes on abnormal returns on 
stocks and bonds. The sample covers a maximum of about 190 ratings changes for 32 EU-15 banks 
over the 1989-2000 period. Their results indicate small or non-existant announcement effects on bond 
prices. As the authors point out, this could be because (i) ratings changes do not convey any new in-
formation, or (ii) bond prices do not respond to the information contained in ratings changes.22 These 
two alternative explanations obviously yield opposite conclusions as to the effectiveness of bond 
yields as risk measures (i.e., the unobservability problem is the same for event-type studies as for risk-
sensitivity studies when failing to detect significant effects). The authors make additional tests to dis-
tinguish between these possibilities, and on the basis of these tests (although results are weak and rela-
tively inconclusive) lean toward the latter explanation. 
Results for stock returns indicate substantial announcement effects of both up- and down-
grades. Interestingly, when distinguishing between the effect of ratings changes motivated by changes 
in the earnings outlook and those motivated by changes in risk, it is found that profitability-related 
downgrades result in negative abnormal returns, whereas risk-related downgrades trigger positive ab-
normal stock returns. This finding lends some support to the notion that shareholders may not disci-
pline banks to decrease risk and/or leverage, due to risk-shifting incentives. 
Gropp et al. (2006), finally, test the equity-based ‘distance to default’ (DD) and sub-debt 
spreads as predictors of bank distress, as proxied by credit rating downgrades for about 100 European 
banks over 1991-2001. Controlling for previous ratings or a (small) set of accounting variables, both 
indicators show signs of predictive power outperforming that of both credit ratings and balance-sheet 
information. The authors also make one of the very few attempts in the literature to directly compare 
the equity-based and the bond-based measure, but the results can essentially be interpreted both in 
terms of complementarity and substitutability of the information contained in the respective measures. 
 
B.3. Market influence and early-warning tests of monitoring: a methodological note 
Early-warning-type tests have to some extent been devised in response to the insight that risk-
sensitivity tests are ill-equipped to inform on the relative accuracy of different indicators (see, e.g., the 
discussion in Evanoff and Wall, 2001). In principle, the early-warning approach can be used both to 
test the adequacy of market signals as forward-looking indicators of future risk/solvency (rather than 
                                                   
22 Non-responsiveness could have several explanations. The authors discuss the possibility that bond markets are 
simply too illiquid to incorporate new information in any measurable way; an equally plausible explanation, it 
seems to me, is that bondholders believed they were not at risk due to conjectural government guarantees. This 
seems particularly plausible for European banks during the 1990s. 
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just testing their correlation with some existing contemporaneous benchmark measures), and to assess 
whether market prices contain information beyond that contained in other existing indicators: control-
ling for such indicators, any remaining significant explanatory power of the market measure represents 
distinct information. This type of test could therefore potentially answer the question if market signals 
would be useful by furnishing supervisors with information they do not already have. 
Unfortunately, early-warning tests – like risk-sensitivity tests – are also problematic due to a 
type of ‘unobservability’ problem, which in this case stems from the impossibility to empirically iso-
late the monitoring and influence aspects of market discipline. Conceptually, the distinction between 
these two aspects of market discipline is quite clear. Empirically, however, it is difficult to separate 
them in any methodologically consistent and satisfactory way. The problem is that if the influence 
aspect of market discipline works, then banks will react to market signals by lowering their risk, which 
would, in turn, make the market indicator a poor predictor of bank risk − not because market disci-
pline does not work, but precisely because it does work (in both dimensions). Conversely, if some 
market-based indicator is a good predictor of financial distress, and proves to contain information on 
future asset quality not contained in other risk measures, then that would suggest that the monitoring 
aspect of market discipline works, but that the influence dimension does not, i.e., banks do not react to 
market signals. Thus, adopting the early-warning approach necessarily involves making a composite 
hypothesis − one about monitoring and one about influence. If assumptions about the second dimen-
sion are not made clear, then it is difficult to interpret the results in terms of the first dimension – par-
ticularly if those results reveal a low power to predict risk. 
The problem with the early-warning tests largely coincides with the difficulties of directly 
testing the influence aspect of market discipline. These difficulties are, in short, first to find an appro-
priate dependent variable (i.e., a measure of ‘discipline’, or influence), second, to get around the prob-
lem of counterfactuals − the inevitable ‘what if…’ questions that result from arguing that someone did 
or did not do something because of something: in this case arguing that banks changed their risk be-
havior in response to market signals, or, more troublesome, that banks kept their risk behavior on a 
steady level to avoid being disciplined. Evanoff and Wall (2000) make this distinction between ex post 
discipline and ex ante discipline, and express the problem in the following way: examining only ex 
post discipline is “analogous to saying that speed limit laws (or laws against robbing banks) are not 
effective in influencing behavior because speeders (bank robbers) are often repeat offenders [which] 
entirely ignores the influence these laws have on the behavior of the vast majority of people” (p. 18). 
This is the main criticism directed at Bliss and Flannery (2002), who use event study methodology to 
study the effect both of stock and bond prices on managerial decisions in US bank holding companies. 
The results do not provide support for any systematic effect (in terms of ex post discipline) of security 
prices on risk behavior, but – as follows from the above criticism – cannot be taken too far in terms of 
their general implications for market discipline, given the methodological problems. 
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Recognizing the difficulties of, particularly, accounting for ex ante discipline, Krishnan and al. 
(2006) attempt to get around them by asking whether banking firms’ risk characteristics change after a 
first issue of subordinated debt; in other words, they ask if banks’ risk behavior is different depending 
on whether sub-debt is outstanding or not. They find that it is not. However, given their extremely 
limited sample, certain timing issues, and − not least − the fact that one issue probably does not typi-
cally lead to banks having a sufficient amount of sub-debt on their balance sheet for it to engender any 
effective direct market discipline, their conclusions must be considered very tentative. 
The problem of what might be considered a sufficient amount is directly addressed by Jordan 
(2000), who tests whether a sample of subsequently failed US banks’ exposures to financing through 
large (jumbo) CDs affect the pricing of these CDs (and the pricing of smaller ones). Although this 
does not test the directly disciplining effect of sub-debt financing, the evidence produced support the 
hypothesis that the amount of subordinated debt on the balance sheet affects the potential for market 
discipline (both by a ‘mechanical’ cost of capital effect, and by virtue of the fact that CD pricing be-
comes more risk sensitive as the amount of CDs outstanding grows). 
To sum up, a considerable body of literature is concerned with testing for market discipline in 
banking in various ways. The majority of contributions are concerned with testing market monitoring 
(i.e., the extent to which market prices of banks’ securities reflect the bank’s risk exposure). However, 
both the main testing approaches found in this literature – the ‘risk-sensitivity’ approach and the 
‘early-warning’ approach – are fraught with methodological shortcomings which potentially make 
interpretation of the results difficult. For the risk-sensitivity approach, this difficulty essentially lies in 
knowing which measure of risk is a priori more informative. For the early-warning approach, the 
problem is the composite-hypothesis nature of the test. For both approaches, the problems are such 
that they preclude any substantive conclusions from the tests in the event of failure to establish signifi-
cant results, since such results are consistent both with the presence and with the absence of market 
discipline. For the early-warning approach, also establishing market-based indicators as significant 
predictors of distress is problematic (in terms of the more general implications for market discipline), 
since it corroborates the monitoring dimension of market discipline, but contradicts the influence di-
mension (direct market discipline). As for more direct tests of the influence dimension of market dis-
cipline, finally, results are few, and this issue has essentially been left open by the literature so far. 
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Table B1. Summary of risk indicators used in previous studies on market discipline in 
banking 
Market-based risk indicators   
Equity-based   
Equity return volatility (various 
definitions) 
 Brewer and Mondschean (1994); Hall et al. (2001); James (1988, 
1990) 
Abnormal equity returns (market 
model)a 
 Berger and Davies (1998); Berger et al. (2000); Birchler and 
Hancock (2004); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Gropp and Richards 
(2001); Krainer and Lopez (2004); Pettway (1976, 1980); 
Pettway and Sinkey (1980) 
Beta (CAPM or market model)  Gunther et al. (2001); Hall et al. (2001) 
Other, equity-based  Bliss and Flannery (2002); Ellis and Flannery (1992); Hall et al. 
(2001); Krainer and Lopez (2004) 
   
Debt-based   
Primary-market spreads on subor-
dinated notes and bonds 
 Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Goyal (2005); Morgan and Stiroh 
(2001); Sironi (2002, 2003) 
Secondary-market spreads on sub-
ordinated notes and bonds 
 Avery et al. (1988); Birchler and Hancock (2004); Covitz et al. 
(2004); DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); 
Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); 
Gorton and Santomero (1990); Gropp et al. (2006); Jagtiani et al. 
(2002); Krishnan et al. (2006); Pop (2006) 
Interest rate spreads on large cer-
tificates of deposit (CDs) 
 Brewer and Mondschean (1994); Ellis and Flannery (1992); Hall 
et al. (2002); Hannan and Hanweck (1988); James (1988, 1990); 
Jordan (2000); Keeley (1990) 
Other, debt-basedb  Birchler and Hancock (2004); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Gropp 
and Richards (2001); Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001); 
Park (1995); Park and Perestiani (1998); Pop (2006) 
   
Accounting-based risk indicators   
Capital-structure-based   
Leverage, or capital ratio (various 
definitions, e.g. equity/total assets, 
liabilities/market or book value of 
equity, etc.) 
 Avery et al. (1988); Berger et al. (2000); Birchler and Hancock 
(2004); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Brewer and Mondschean 
(1994); Covitz et al. (2004); DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff and 
Jagtiani (2004); Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002); Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996); Goyal (2005); Gropp et al. (2006); Gunther et 
al. (2001); Hall et al. (2001, 2002); Hannan and Hanweck 
(1988); Jagtiani et al. (2002); James (1988); Keeley (1990); 
Krainer and Lopez (2004); Krishnan et al. (2006); Martinez 
Peria and Schmukler (2001); Morgan and Stiroh (2001); Park 
and Peristiani (1998); Park (1995); Sironi (2003) 
Debt or deposit structurec  Bliss and Flannery (2002); Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Gunther 
et al. (2001); Hall et al. (2002); Jagtiani et al. (2002); Park 
(1995) 
   
Loan- or asset-structure-based   
Non-performing loans or similar 
(non-accruing loans, loans past due, 
etc)/total assets 
 Avery et al. (1988); Berger and Davies (1998); Berger et al. 
(2000); Birchler and Hancock (2004); Bliss and Flannery 
(2002); Covitz et al. (2004); DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff and 
Jagtiani (2004); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); Gorton and San-
tomero (1990); Gropp et al. (2006); Gunther et al. (2001); Hall et 
al. (2001, 2002); Jagtiani et al. (2002); Krainer and Lopez 
(2004); Krishnan et al. (2006); Martinez Peria and Schmukler 
(2001); Morgan and Stiroh (2001); Park and Peristiani (1998); 
Park (1995) 
(continued on next page) 
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(Table B1, continued from previous page)   
Loan-loss provisions or loan-loss 
reserves/total loans or total assets 
 Avery et al. (1988); Baumann and Nier (2003); Berger and Da-
vies (1998); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Bongini et al. (2002); 
Gunther et al. (2001); James (1988); Krainer and Lopez (2004); 
Krishnan et al. (2006); Sironi (2003) 
Other, loan structured  Avery et al. (1988); Bliss and Flannery (2002); Brewer and 
Mondschean (1994); Hall et al. (2002); James (1990); Krishnan 
et al. (2006); Martin (1977); Martinez Peria and Schmukler 
(2001); Morgan and Stiroh (2001); Park and Peristiani (1998) 
Non-loan asset structuree  Avery et al. (1988); Birchler and Hancock (2004); Bliss and 
Flannery (2002); Bongini et al. (2002); Brewer and Mondschean 
(1994); Covitz et al. (2004); DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff and 
Jagtiani (2004); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); Gunther et al. 
(2001); Hall et al. (2001, 2002); Krainer and Lopez (2004); 
Martin (1977); Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001); Morgan 
and Stiroh (2001); Park and Peristiani (1998); Park (1995); 
Saunders et al. (1990); Sironi (2003) 
   
Profitability-based   
Return on assetsf  Avery et al. (1988); Berger et al. (2000); Bliss and Flannery 
(2002); Bongini et al. (2002); DeYoung et al. (2001); Evanoff 
and Jagtiani (2004); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); Gropp et al. 
(2006); Gunther et al. (2001); Hall et al. (2001, 2002); Jagtiani et 
al. (2002); Krainer and Lopez (2004); Krishnan et al. (2006); 
Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001); Morgan and Stiroh 
(2001); Park and Peristiani (1998); Park (1995); Sironi (2003) 
Earnings volatility  Avery et al. (1988) 
   
Other, accounting-based  Birchler and Hancock (2004); Bongini et al. (2002); Covitz et al. 
(2004); DeYoung et al. (2001); Flannery and Sorescu (1996); 
Gorton and Santomero (1990); Gropp et al. (2006); Hall et al. 
(2001); James (1988); Morgan and Stiroh (2001)  
   
Combination measuresg  Bongini et al. (2002); Gorton and Santomero (1990); Gropp et 
al. (2006); Gunther et al. (2001); Hannan and Hanweck (1988); 
Krainer and Lopez (2004) 
   
Ratings   
Rating agencies’ bond issue ratings  Berger et al. (2000); DeYoung et al. (2001); Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996); Goyal (2005); Gropp and Richards (2001); 
Jagtiani et al. (2002); Krishnan et al. (2006); Morgan and Stiroh 
(2001); Sironi (2002, 2003) 
Rating agencies’ issuer (bank) 
ratings 
 Avery et al. (1988); Bongini et al. (2002); Evanoff and Jagtiani 
(2004); Gropp et al. (2006); Pop (2006); Sironi (2002, 2003) 
Examination/supervisory ratings 
(CAMEL/BOPEC)h 
 Berger and Davies (1998); Berger et al. (2000); DeYoung et al. 
(2001); Evanoff and Jagtiani (2004); Evanoff and Wall (2001, 
2002); Gunther et al. (2001); Hall et al. (2001); Jagtiani et al. 
(2002); Krainer and Lopez (2004); Krishnan et al. (2006) 
   
Notes: 
a) Used to detect market reactions to events or information that may signal changes in bank risk, rather 
than as an explicit risk indicator. 
b) Regular deposit interest rates, spreads on senior bonds, etc. 
c) Jumbo or brokered CDs/total assets, insured deposits/total assets, etc. 
d) Loan assets/total assets, commercial and industrial loans/total assets, residential real estate loans/total 
assets, renegotiated loans/total assets, etc. 
e) Liquid assets/total assets, fixed or tangible assets/total assets, trading assets or investment securi-
ties/total assets, repossessed assets/total assets, etc. 
f) Used mainly as a control variable. 
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g) These indicators use both market prices and accounting data; the category includes option-pricing-based 
measures (implied volatility, implicit deposit insurance premium, etc.) and the Z-score used in this pa-
per. 
h) These are composite ratings assigned by the US federal supervisory agencies following on-site exami-
nations of banking firms (CAMEL) or BHCs (BOPEC). They are thus only applicable to US datasets. 
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On the Link Between Exchange-
rate Regimes, Capital Controls
and Monetary Policy Autonomy
in Small European Countries,
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1. INTRODUCTION
THE changing climate for policy-making pursuant to the globalisation ofﬁnancial markets during the last few decades has fostered a widespread
belief that governments, particularly those of small economies, have essentially
lost the power to pursue independent and sovereign economic policies. It is still
widely held, however, that loss of the monetary-policy instrument is a major cost
for a country assuming a rigid ﬁxed exchange-rate regime – or, in the European
context, for countries joining the EMU. This paper addresses the contradictory
content of the two arguments, and informs the re-awoken debate about the role of
exchange-rate regimes for economic growth and for the possibility to pursue
independent stabilisation policies, which has in part been set in motion by the
recent enlargement of the EU to include ten new member states.
The traditional Mundell-Fleming paradigm posits that under capital mobility, a
country that wants to pursue an autonomous monetary policy, oriented toward the
domestic economy, must allow its exchange rate to ﬂoat. If, on the other hand,
the country ﬁxes its exchange rate, it must follow the monetary policy of the
The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions
of this paper.
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anchor country. Because monetary policy is determined abroad, the country has
in this case effectively lost monetary policy autonomy.
In this paper, we analyse if monetary policy in our focus economies was
‘determined’ abroad – that is, if it was dominated by the policies of the larger
benchmark countries – and whether the degree of dominance differed systematic-
ally depending on the exchange-rate regime pursued by the small country.
The motivation is, ﬁrst, that the exchange-rate regimes as such are by no
means clear-cut: the existence of intermediate regimes along a gradual scale
between ‘ﬁxed’ and ‘ﬂoat’, and the sometimes sharp discrepancy between ofﬁcial
and actual exchange-rate regimes, beg the question whether mainstream thinking
in this area attaches too much weight to exchange-rate regimes. It is also possible
to argue that short of monetary union, the exchange rate is always adjustable
enough to accommodate some policy autonomy (see, e.g., Svensson, 1994). Ar-
guments such as these have spurred a wave of recent literature on exchange-rate
regime classiﬁcation (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 2002;
and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2002), and on the link between ‘de facto’ exchange-
rate regimes and economic growth (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001 and
2003; Bailliu et al., 2003; and Eichengreen and Leblanc, 2003), which comple-
ments the more traditional literature on the relative merits of different exchange-
rate arrangements (for a survey, see Tavlas, 2003).
Second, in the trilemma described by the traditional Mundell-Fleming condi-
tions, monetary autonomy is essentially a residual product of capital mobility and
the choice to stabilise or not to stabilise the exchange rate. However, the link
between the exchange rate and other nominal variables runs both ways: price
stability induces exchange rate stability as much as pegging the exchange rate
induces low inﬂation. Over the medium and long run, then, it could be argued
that monetary autonomy is really a residual product of capital mobility and nomi-
nal variables in general. Increasing ﬁnancial integration in combination with
converging inﬂation rates and the pursuit of similar nominal stability targets in
most industrialised countries may, to all practical intents and purposes and for
any reasonable time horizon, constrain monetary policy as much as an explicit
exchange rate peg. Under perfect capital mobility, a ﬂexible exchange rate indeed
offers – almost by deﬁnition – full theoretical monetary autonomy, but in light of
the above arguments, there is reason to question the practical, empirical rel-
evance of such autonomy: the question of autonomy may be reduced to the
question of the potential presence of sharp asymmetric shocks to the real economy.
Third, if autonomy is the residual product of a nominal regime and capital
mobility, what happens if capital mobility is imperfect? Absence of capital con-
trols does not imply perfect capital mobility de facto: if anything, empirical
studies indicate poor performance of, e.g., uncovered interest parity (for some
recent results and references, see Chinn and Meredith, 2005). To the extent that
there is reason to question the monopoly rights of the exchange-rate regime
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(among alternative nominal stability targets) on determining monetary policy
autonomy, there is equal reason to question the empirical relevance of a strong
link between the two (i.e. between exchange-rate regime and autonomy) on the
grounds that capital mobility is in reality imperfect.
We thus hypothesise that there is no systematic empirical link between ex-
change-rate regime and monetary policy autonomy. We test this hypothesis using
a general methodology that has previously been used for similar purposes in the
literature on monetary transmission and asymmetry within the European Mon-
etary System (EMS).1 Most of that literature has been concerned speciﬁcally with
the so-called German-dominance hypothesis (GDH) and essentially attempted to
answer the question if the EMS was a ‘D-mark area’. The basic underlying
reasoning is very simple: in a two-country setting, assume that one country is
(very) small, and one country is (very) large; assume, further, that – in the case of
ﬁxed exchange rates – it is the small country that pegs the large country’s currency,
rather than vice versa, so that it is up to the small country to adjust monetary policy
to maintain the peg. From these assumptions follow that the relationship between
money-market conditions in the two countries is not symmetrical, but the small
country is then the potential policy-taker. We therefore hypothesise an asymmetric
relationship between the small and the large country: if there is international
monetary policy transmission (non-autonomy), then the small country’s monetary
policy will be inﬂuenced by that of the large country but not vice versa.
A number of studies focusing on the behaviour only of interest rates, and
covering primarily the 1980s (Karfakis and Moschos, 1990; and Gardner and
Perraudin, 1993), ﬁnd various degrees of support for the hypothesis of asymme-
try (German dominance), while others (Katsimbris and Miller, 1993) ﬁnd that the
EMS was essentially a symmetrically-working system. Some studies (Cohen and
Wyplosz, 1989; Fratianni and von Hagen, 1990; and Koedijk and Kool, 1992)
devise models to assess the degree of autonomy in terms of more than a single
variable (adding to interest rates primarily variables such as inﬂation rates and/or
money-supply growth). These studies tend generally to assert a ‘special role’,
though not strict dominance, to Germany. Among the more recent studies, which
cover developments in the 1990s, most have focused either solely on monetary
aggregates (Holmes, 1995), or on interest rates (Henry and Weidman, 1995;
Hassapis et al., 1999; Uctum, 1999; and Bajo-Rubio et al., 2001). The inferences
1 Providing a deﬁnitive estimation of the degree of monetary policy autonomy based on inter-
national transmission of monetary policy indicators would require information not only about
the outcome but also about the ex ante preferred path of policy. What we measure here is thus the
ex post, realised autonomy – in line with our intent to investigate the practical empirical relevance
of the conventional wisdom – rather than the potential for autonomy. Alternative approaches to
measuring monetary-policy autonomy are based on parity conditions (Oxelheim, 1990), central-
bank reaction functions, see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998 and 2000), or on target-zone models,
see Bertola and Svensson (1993), Svensson (1994) and Fratzscher (2002).
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drawn from the empirical analyses in terms of symmetry/asymmetry within the
EMS come out about ﬁfty-ﬁfty. Most of these studies analyse only the larger
EMS countries like France, Italy and the UK (beside Germany), sometimes add-
ing Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands.2 None of the studies include countries
outside the EMS on the receiving end of ‘dominance’.
Our case countries are basically just a complete list of the developed European
countries that ﬁt the small-size criterion (GDP) and had their own currencies in
the 1980s and 1990s – starting with Ireland (the smallest) and ranging up to the
Netherlands (the largest). After that, there is a jump up to the medium-sized
countries such as Spain. In addition to Ireland and the Netherlands, the focus
countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden and Switzerland. Apart from the fact that they are small, which means
that they can reasonably be expected to have a role of price-takers, or ‘policy-
takers’, in international markets, the choice of case countries is motivated by the
fact that these countries have, collectively and at various intervals during the
sample period (1979–2000), employed more or less every exchange-rate regime
imaginable, from free ﬂoat to full monetary union, with or without restrictions on
capital movements or other foreign-exchange transactions. The countries also
represent the full spectrum with regard to the level of ambition of exchange-rate
policy, and ‘reputation’ in monetary matters: from hard-currency, low-interest-
rate countries like Switzerland, the Netherlands and Austria, to countries which
during part of the period investigated here had a near-emerging-market status
(Greece and Portugal). The common foreign benchmarks are Germany and the
United States.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces a classiﬁcation system
of different exchange-rate regimes, based on an adapted version of the IMF’s
classiﬁcation scheme. The system is applied to each of the focus countries in
order to split up the whole sample period into sub-periods for each one.3 Section
3 is devoted to practical considerations, including a discussion of the data used in
the empirical tests. If the small countries’ policies really were ‘determined’ abroad,
then it is conceivable that a statistical causal relationship can be established, in
the sense that the path of ‘domestic’ monetary-policy variables can be predicted
by the ‘foreign’ counterparts. We use two different methods. In Section 4 we
calculate the cross-country elasticities of changes in policy interest rates, while
in Section 5 we extract the cross-country multipliers from bivariate Granger-
causality tests on short-term market interest rates. Section 6 concludes.
2 The exception to the rule is Bajo-Rubio et al. (2001), which includes also Spain and Portugal.
3 Exchange-rate ﬂexibility has generally not been taken explicitly into account in the literature
cited above. Of course, given that the principal aim of most of the contributions in the area has been
to ﬁnd out how the EMS worked, it is not surprising that the exchange-rate regime has been taken
for granted (although the de facto regimes pursued by participants in the system and the actual
degrees of exchange-rate variability differed widely; see Section 2).
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2. EXCHANGE-RATE REGIMES: CATEGORISATION,
CLASSIFICATION AND DISCUSSION
This section presents the classiﬁcation system used in the empirical analysis
later in the paper to examine the role of exchange-rate regimes in determining
monetary policy autonomy. The system captures the main choice between ﬁx and
ﬂoat, but also leaves room for some nuance. Because many of the countries have
been involved in the exchange-rate cooperation within the European Monetary
System (EMS), this in-between situation should be reﬂected in the classiﬁcation.
Moreover, to capture the capital mobility dimension (since monetary policy au-
tonomy, according to the general view, is the residual product of exchange-rate
regime and capital mobility), we let the imposition of capital controls be an
aspect of the formal institutional arrangements of exchange-rate management.
Based on these considerations, a framework for the classiﬁcation of exchange-
rate regimes is depicted in the matrix in Table 1.
The matrix categorises exchange-rate arrangements according to two dimen-
sions: what is the principal regime pursued for the exchange rate, and are restric-
tions on capital movements imposed to support the regime? The categorisation
matrix is based on the classiﬁcations made in the IMF’s Annual Report on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, and covers the main types of
arrangements that have been in place in the survey countries since March 1979,
when the European Monetary System was introduced.
At the time, some of the countries’ currencies were essentially ﬂoating (‘ﬂexible/
managed ﬂoat’) and, hence, belonging to our ﬁrst main regime type. The EMS is
categorised as a ‘cooperative, semi-ﬁxed’ regime. Central parity rates of each
currency within the system were adopted, but realignments of those parity rates
were possible – indeed, realignments were quite frequent in the early years of
the EMS. Several of the countries that were not in the EMS had pegged their
currencies to some anchor currency or weighted average of currencies. This third
category is called a ‘unilaterally inﬂexible’ regime.
TABLE 1
Exchange-rate Regimes
Exchange Rate
Flexible/Managed Cooperative/ Unilaterally Superﬁx
Float Semi-ﬁxed Inﬂexible (EMU)
Restrictions on Yes 1a 2a 3a –
Capital Movements No 1b 2b 3b 4
→
Degree of rigidity
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The difference between categories 2 and 3 is the cooperation component
of the EMS. Through this component all members of the exchange-rate mech-
anism (ERM) of the EMS automatically received help from the other members
to keep the exchange rate stable should it approach the outer margins of the
central parity rate. This was supposed to make the cooperative regime some-
what less of a strain to enforce than a unilateral peg. A particular, and com-
plicating, circumstance of this arrangement that needs to be considered already
at this stage is the widening of the ﬂuctuation margins within the EMS/ERM
to ±15 per cent, which took place in August 1993. After this point, it is highly
questionable whether it is useful to talk about the cooperation component as
an effective tool for exchange-rate management, as currencies are allowed to
ﬂuctuate so much. Countries within the EMS wanting to pursue greater nominal
exchange-rate stability must essentially do so by their own measures. Similarly,
the difference between post-1993 ERM and a traditional ﬂoat is marginal at
best. The odd conclusion is that although a majority of the countries covered
adhered to the ERM formally at some point or another, the system was only
effectively exploited (after the fact, leaving aside more or less immeasurable
factors such as possible credibility effects) by a few countries during limited
periods.
In 1999, ﬁnally, stage 3 of the European Economic and Monetary Union
went into force, by which the currencies of six of the eleven countries included in
the study were irrevocably ﬁxed with respect to one another and with respect to
the other currencies that partake in the union. This is the maximum degree of
inﬂexibility imaginable. The degree of rigidity, that is the degree of assumed
infraction on national monetary autonomy, of each regime thus increases left to
right. Under a ﬂoating exchange rate, monetary autonomy is, in principle, total.
Under EMU even formal monetary autonomy, or monetary sovereignty, has been
given up.
The second dimension of our classiﬁcation scheme concerns the degree of
capital mobility. In all the countries of our study – except Switzerland and to
some extent Belgium – capital-account liberalisation was initiated during the
1980s. None of the countries included in the study employ since the mid-1990s
capital controls in any meaningful sense of the word. Regulations concerning
exchange transactions may exist, but are mainly in the form of reporting require-
ments, prudential foreign-exchange-exposure rules, investment rules for insur-
ance and pension funds, or are related to ownership restrictions within protected
sectors.
To summarise, the classiﬁcation is based on the main consideration required to
generate our hypothesis of asymmetric monetary transmission: speciﬁcally, whether
the small countries’ exchange rates are ﬁxed or ﬂexible, the degree to which it is
up to the small country itself to enforce the exchange-rate peg (this is implicitly
considered by the use of an intermediate regime), and the degree of capital
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mobility (are capital controls imposed or not?).4 Below we will discuss in detail
the two dimensions of the classiﬁcation for each focus country.
a. Exchange-rate Regimes and Capital-account Liberalisation in the
Focus Countries5
The classiﬁcation of the different exchange-rate regimes involves some dis-
cretion while at the same time being critical for the results of the study. Hence,
below we will penetrate the classiﬁcation we use country by country.
In Austria, 1979 marked the breakthrough of the hard currency policy, with a
redesign of interest-rate policy and the adoption of an adjustable peg vis-à-vis the
currencies of the EMS cooperation, in March 1979. The ECU peg, however,
relatively instantaneously developed into a de facto DEM peg. After a number of
minor adjustments of the exchange rate in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
ATS/DEM relation stabilised in late 1981 – a situation which remained intact
even after Austria entered the ERM in January 1995 (the time of its entry into
membership of the European Union). Consequently, although Austria formally
switched currency regimes from ‘unilateral peg’ to ‘semi-ﬂexible cooperation’
for the period from 1995 to the introduction of the EMU in January 1999, main-
taining the strong D-Mark peg was in fact the overriding objective of Austrian
monetary policy during the entirety of the sample period preceding the EMU.
Austria applied a relatively comprehensive set of capital controls around 1980.
Liberalisation was initiated in the early-to-mid-1980s, intensiﬁed in 1989 and
completed in November 1991. Although not formally an EC member country at
this time, Austria essentially shadowed the deregulation process in the commu-
nity as part of its exchange-rate policy.
Belgium adhered to the EMS from 1979 until the introduction of the EMU in
1999. Until March 1990, however, Belgium applied a dual-exchange-rate system.
Under this system, there were two markets for foreign exchange: the ofﬁcial BEF
rate (the EMS rate) was determined in a regulated market, which was associated
with current account transactions; in the unregulated market, the franc was ﬂoating
freely, and this market was associated mainly with capital account transactions.
Because capital ﬂows went mainly through the unregulated market, it would be
difﬁcult to motivate using the regulated rate in attempting to measure capital
mobility. The de facto regime for the Belgian franc until early 1990 was thus, for
the purposes of this study, a free ﬂoat. After the abolition of the dual-rate system,
4 Cf. the categorisations made by Helpman (1981), who also distinguishes between a ﬂoat, a ﬁx
and a cooperative regime, and of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001 and 2003), who similarly
distinguish between ﬂoat, ﬁx and an intermediate regime.
5 A general reference for this sub-section on the formal (and to some extent the de facto) exchange
rate arrangements in the focus countries is the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions for the various years that the study covers.
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the BEF was (unilaterally) pegged to the DEM with the tight margins of ±0.5 per
cent. This peg was also maintained throughout the 1990s.
Belgium did not impose capital controls in the ordinary sense of the word to
any signiﬁcant degree during the period under investigation here, but its dual
exchange market has certain implications for the assessment. The appropriate
analytical approach for empirical investigations involving exchange-rate time
series for countries with dual exchange rates depends on the nature of the dual-
rate system and on which one of the exchange rates that is used.6 Since, in the
case of Belgium, a portion of the cross-border capital ﬂows were directed to a
regulated market, it seems reasonable to classify the two-tier system as a (moder-
ate) restriction on capital ﬂows: the basic point of the system is to control the
ofﬁcial exchange rate and protect the external reserves against capital ﬂows,
while still upholding free capital mobility in a sort of formal sense (dual
exchange-rate systems also fall into a separate category of exchange-control
measures according to the IMF’s classiﬁcations).
Denmark participated in the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS from March
1979, but in the period from the late 1970s and during the course of the 1980s,
devaluations of the krone were made eight times (each by an average of 1.4 per
cent vis-à-vis the ECU), in connection with general realignments of the EMS
parity rates (Holden and Vikøren, 1994 and 1996). The stability of the DKK vis-
à-vis the other participating currencies of the system increased gradually during
the 1980s. After the widening of the EMS intervention margins in 1993, the
central rate of the DKK was essentially kept within the previous narrow band by
unilateral action of the Nationalbank, and ﬂuctuated only marginally. Denmark
negotiated an opt-out from the EMU in the Maastricht Treaty, but the continua-
tion of a strict exchange-rate policy was formalised by the inception of ERM2 in
January 1999. The Danish krone has since shadowed the euro within ﬂuctuation
margins of ±2.25 per cent. Post-EMU, then, the regime for the DKK is once
again ‘cooperative, semi-ﬁxed’.
The liberalisation of the Danish capital account picked up speed in the early
1980s: the period of systematic abolition of capital controls can be said to have
begun in 1983, when the deregulation of outward cross-border direct investment
and portfolio ﬂows was initiated. In 1988, the last restrictions were lifted.
Finland. Finnish exchange-rate policy during the 1980s and up to the early
1990s was characterised mainly by frequently adjusted pegs. The markka was
pegged to a trade-weighted currency basket from 1973 until mid-1991 (the
Deutschemark and the Swedish krona were the heaviest components – one-ﬁfth
each), and then to the ECU in 1991–92. During the period 1979–92, three devalu-
ations (two in 1982, and one in 1991) and three revaluations (in 1979, 1980 and
6 Discussions of the analytical treatment of dual exchange rates more generally are provided in
Dornbusch (1986) and Obstfeld (1986).
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1989) were carried out. In September 1992 the markka was allowed to ﬂoat on a
more permanent basis. In February 1993, the Finnish central bank announced an
inﬂation target (of two per cent) as a new nominal anchor for monetary policy.
The ERM link-up in October 1996 theoretically did not change much in Finnish
monetary policy; however, notwithstanding the fact that the wide intervention
margins did not pose a signiﬁcant conﬂict with the inﬂation target (which was
also ofﬁcially maintained), the Finnish monetary authorities began at this point to
manage the exchange rate heavily and by its own accord – a shift to an exchange-
rate-oriented monetary policy which no doubt should be viewed in the light of
the projected euroisation of the markka a few years on.
Foreign-exchange regulations were in place in Finland during the whole post-
war period until the late 1980s. In 1986, however, the external-regulation system
began to be gradually dismantled. Most long-term, wholesale capital transactions
were free in September 1989, while the last restrictions on short-term capital
movements for households were lifted in November 1991.
In Greece, the drachma followed a regime of ‘managed ﬂoat’, which had taken
shape during the 1970s, during most of the period here studied. In June 1985,
Greece did formally join the EMS, but not the exchange-rate mechanism, and the
GRD continued to depreciate vis-à-vis the ECU. The conclusion of this is that
even after its adherence to the EMS, the managed ﬂoat continued. It did so until
February 1995, when the Bank of Greece went from continual discretionary
exchange-rate adjustments to announcing a target path for the devaluation of the
drachma vis-à-vis the other EMS currencies (that is, an announced crawling peg).
Since it is, conceptually speaking, equally constraining, in terms of latitude for
discretion, to announce a devaluation target path of X per cent whether X equals
one or two or zero (that is, in the latter case, a ﬁxed exchange rate), we will call
this a ‘unilaterally inﬂexible’ exchange-rate regime, according to the classiﬁca-
tions of Table 1 (cf. Portugal 1979–92). In March 1998, the drachma formally
entered into the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS, but ﬂuctuated quite
heavily (spanning in excess of 20 per cent in 1998 alone) within the wide mar-
gins of the post-crisis ERM. Greece stayed in the ERM (formally, it entered, with
Denmark, into ERM 2) as stage 3 of the monetary union was launched, then
joined the EMU as from January 2001 (outside the sample period covered here).
When Greece joined the European Community in 1981, it imposed strict regu-
lations on all cross-border payments. The liberalisation process began in 1988–
89, was intensiﬁed in 1990, and by June 1993, all cross-border capital transactions
(except transactions with original maturities of less than one year) were free.
Remaining controls on short-term capital ﬂows and derivatives were abolished as
of May 1994.
Ireland joined the EMS in March 1979, and the GBP peg was replaced by a
‘cooperative’ ECU peg as of the following month. Larger devaluations were then
made in 1986 and in 1993. In the intervals, exchange-rate developments were
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relatively undramatic, but continual realignments of the IEP were made through-
out the 1980s and up to the early 1990s. As a result of the exchange-rate crisis in
1992 (resulting in a devaluation of the IEP in early 1993), and the widening of
the ERM intervention margins in August 1993, the cooperative component of the
EMS effectively ceased to be a major determinant of the IEP exchange rate, and
the currency began to ﬂuctuate rather strongly vis-à-vis both the ECU central rate
and vis-à-vis the DEM. From this period, therefore, and up to the eve of the
EMU’s third stage (although the pound was surely managed to some extent
during this period), the IEP seems most appropriately labelled ‘ﬂexible’.
Ireland applied relatively strict regulations on capital outﬂows (but not on
inﬂows) vis-à-vis most of the world until the mid-1980s. During the course of the
1980s there were both some relaxation and some tightening of the rules. The ﬁrst
more unequivocal step towards liberalisation was taken in 1989, when most
restrictions on long- and medium-term portfolio transactions were lifted. The
process then went on to be completed by January 1993.
The Netherlands followed a consistent exchange-rate-oriented monetary policy
during the entire sample period: the value of the NLG was in practice kept constant
with respect to the DEM (with a self-imposed ﬂuctuation margin of ±0.5 per cent
of the mid-1980s), implying a gradual revaluation of the NLG vis-à-vis the theoret-
ical ECU through the realignments of EMS currencies. The de facto DEM peg
remained also through the turbulence of 1992–93, until the introduction of the
euro in 1999.
The Netherlands, together with Switzerland, pursued a somewhat more liberal
capital-account policy than the other countries considered in this study. Most
capital transactions were free already by the late 1970s, but nonetheless, various
types of restrictions were imposed on portfolio transactions until the early-to-
mid-1980s. The remaining restrictions on capital exports were removed in 1986.
Norway. From December 1978 until October 1990, the krone was pegged to a
basket of anchor currencies in a regular ﬁxed-exchange-rate regime with an an-
nounced ﬂuctuation band. In October 1990, the Norges Bank changed anchors
for the NOK and adopted a unilateral ECU peg, which lasted until December
1992, when the krone was ﬂoated. During this period, the Norwegian central
bank undertook six devaluations, each by an average of 3.4 per cent (Holden
and Vikøren, 1994 and 1996). Norwegian monetary policy between the 1992
ﬂoat and the end of our study period is not entirely straightforward to categorise.
Formally, the krone ﬂoated: there was no declared exchange-rate target and
no ﬂuctuation margins. At the same time, it is clear that Norges Bank used the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor (indeed, exchange-rate stability vis-à-vis
the most important European currencies was the only goal acknowledged for
monetary policy in the Bank’s reports), but it was apparently not prepared to
go out of its way to defend the stability of the exchange rate in case of a shock.
The arrangement might be characterised as a sort of ‘long-term peg’, applied with
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plenty of short-term pragmatism. For lack of a better alternative, and since the
NOK was formally (if this is understood as the absence of a declared parity and
ﬂuctuation margins) ﬂoating after 1992, we shall call it ‘ﬂexible’.
In Norway the aim of external regulations during the 1960s–80s was to isolate
the Norwegian interest level and allow autonomy in monetary policy. A number
of deregulatory measures in the early 1980s were followed by a temporary
tightening of capital controls in 1984–85. In 1987, however, a second wave of
deregulations was initiated, resulting in a total abolition of the remaining capital
controls by the spring of 1990.
Portugal. From the mid-1970s onward, the Portuguese escudo essentially fol-
lowed a crawling peg vis-à-vis a basket of currencies, which was revised and
reweighed at a number of occasions during the 1980s. The Banco de Portugal
announced a target depreciation rate for the escudo every six months, which was
gradually reduced (as the EMS was launched in March 1979, the target rate was
1.25 per cent/month). The PTE was also subject to a number of larger, discrete
devaluations, and one revaluation, in the early 1980s. In September 1989, the
escudo was included in the ECU basket, and Portugal formally joined the EMS
(but not the ERM) in October 1990. Until April 1992, the policy for the PTE was
to shadow a trade-weighted index of the leading EMS currencies. In April 1992,
the PTE entered the cooperative regime of the ERM, and remained within the
mechanism until it joined the EMU. The European currency crises in the early
1990s triggered three devaluations between November 1992 and August 1993.
Between the last of these devaluations and the launch of the EMU the Banco de
Portugal was essentially left to its own devices when it came to keeping the
escudo stable (considering the widened intervention margins), but did so (save a
minor devaluation in spring 1995). This unilaterally inﬂexible regime was term-
inated when the PTE became part of the euro from 1999.
By the 1970s, the policies surrounding international economic transactions
into and out of Portugal had developed into a very complex system of exchange
controls, encompassing more or less all transaction types – capital as well as
current account. The purpose of capital controls, in the form applied in the late
1970s and up to about 1986, was to maintain foreign-exchange reserves at an
adequate level and to hinder capital ﬂight. Toward the end of the 1980s, however,
the situation was reversed as Portugal began to experience the effects of massive
inward investment (partly as a consequence of the EC membership in 1986), and
the focus had to be shifted toward the management of capital inﬂows. Throughout
the 1980s, capital controls were considered a vital instrument of exchange-rate
and monetary policy (see Larre and Torres, 1991; and Pinto, 1996). The process
of liberalisation of the control system began after Portugal’s EC accession; after
1988 the process was managed according to the conditions stipulated in the EC’s
capital-liberalisation Directive (and the transitory exemptions granted to Portugal
therein). In 1989, restrictions on portfolio ﬂows began to be gradually lifted, and
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the capital-account liberalisation process was completed between August and
December 1992.
In Sweden, the krona was pegged to a trade-weighted currency basket (in
which the weight for the US dollar was doubled and accounted for about 20 per
cent) from August 1977 until 1991. Two major devaluations of the krona were
made in this period: in 1981 (ten per cent) and in 1982 (16 per cent). In May
1991, the krona was unilaterally pegged to the ECU (cf. Finland and Norway),
but was ﬂoated in November the following year. The ﬂoating-rate regime has
remained since 1992, and the Riksbank applies an explicit inﬂation target of two
per cent since 1995.
In Sweden, regulations on capital movements were gradually, and slowly,
abolished from the mid-1970s onward. Interest-rate deregulation and the emer-
gence of an efﬁcient domestic money market in the early 1980s are likely to have
substantially undermined the effectiveness of the foreign-exchange regulations.
A (reluctant) commitment to capital-control liberalisation emerged toward the
mid-to-late 1980s. The bulk of liberalisation measures were taken between 1987
and July 1989, when capital controls were completely abolished.
Switzerland has not pursued an explicit exchange-rate policy during any part
of the period here studied. Instead, other nominal targets have been applied. The
Swiss National Bank readopted targeting the monetary base in the course of
1979, after a series of more or less explicit targets during the years preceding.
This policy was then pursued consistently – at least in theory – until 1999,
although in practice the central bank has sometimes been forced to counteract
excessive movements in the exchange rate, and thus accept undesired ﬂuctuations
in the monetary base in the face of large capital inﬂows.
Switzerland has to a lesser degree than the other case countries employed
controls on cross-border capital transactions in the period since 1979. Various
restrictions have indeed been in force at intervals – notably on short-term capital.
These, however, have been almost exclusively ‘contingency’ measures to tem-
porarily stiﬂe massive capital inﬂows, and have been less comprehensive than in
other countries.7 As a result, it is not possible to describe the capital-account
liberalisation process in Switzerland in the terms used for the other countries, or
to specify a date for the abolition of capital controls.
Since 1999, the euro-area countries pursue a common monetary policy within
a uniﬁed policy framework. Monetary policy is entirely focused on maintaining
price stability, and thus no active exchange-rate policy is pursued. In terms of our
categorisation of exchange-rate regimes, the euro-area countries thus pursue a
7 The restrictions imposed by the Swiss authorities over the years fall mostly into group (d)
according to the IMF’s categorisation of exchange-control types: a ‘residual’ group of restrictions
encompassing, for instance, limitations on interest payments on deposit accounts from non-
residents, reserve requirements which discriminate between foreign and domestic banks, etc.
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completely ﬁxed regime (‘super-ﬁx’) with respect to each other, and a ﬂexible
regime vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Additionally, the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB) has the obligation of cooperating with potential candidate
countries which are in ERM 2.
b. A Summary Classiﬁcation of External Policy Regimes
In the ﬁrst part of this section, the matrix in Table 1 provided a summary
classiﬁcation of the external policy regimes pursued in the survey countries be-
tween March 1979 and November 2000, based on the exchange-rate arrange-
ments and on whether or not capital controls were in place. On the basis of the
account in the rest of the section, we were then in a position to categorise the
actual regimes pursued in the survey countries according to the categories speci-
ﬁed by this classiﬁcation model, and to divide the total period under investigation
into sub-periods for each country. As explained earlier, this will enable us to
systematically relate the degree of capital mobility and different levels of con-
straint on domestic monetary policy to the exchange-rate policy pursued during a
certain sub-period. Applying this categorisation scheme to our case countries, we
end up with sub-periods for each country as listed in Table 2. The classiﬁcations
deviate in certain instances from the ofﬁcial descriptions, based on the ‘soft’ de
facto policy analysis in Section 2a, above.
An important conclusion of this section is that it is difﬁcult to make a completely
accurate and consistent classiﬁcation of the exchange-rate regimes actually
pursued in different countries over an extended period of time. The ‘same’ regime
may also mean different things in terms of nominal exchange-rate variability –
not only in different countries but even in the same country over different time
spaces. Such differences are the effect of credibility and other historical and
symbolic factors, which cannot easily be incorporated in a simple and tractable
classiﬁcation model. Where it is appropriate, we have clearly accounted for the
various parameters and the various ‘discretionary’ considerations that have been
allowed to inﬂuence the classiﬁcation of regimes in the countries studied over
different periods of time. The important thing to keep in mind for the remainder
of this article is that any classiﬁcation of an exchange-rate regime is approximate.
3. MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS AND DATA CONSIDERATIONS8
If we want to assess the behaviour of monetary policy, the dependent variable
should be one that reﬂects policy, with due consideration taken to the issue of
8 The exact data series used in Section 5, along with sources, are listed in the Appendix.
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comparability over time and across countries. The correct variable to observe
may be the primary policy instrument, over which the monetary authorities do
have direct control, for example a policy interest rate. It may also be the opera-
tional variable, over which the monetary authorities seek to exert control in order
to steer monetary policy in the desired direction to reach its ﬁnal goals, for
example price or exchange-rate stability.
Unfortunately, the correct variable to observe is not the same in all countries,
nor has it remained the same over time within any given country. It is not even
always clear what the ‘correct’ variable is, particularly in historical data. Some-
times it is not revealed, and even where it is, it is not necessarily the ofﬁcially
declared targets that matter most at any given moment – there is a considerable
discretionary element involved. That the choice of variable can critically inﬂu-
ence the results is shown by previous research on the subject (see, e.g., Uctum,
1999).
The most important indicator is an interest rate (see Choi and Ratti, 2000).9
Most of the studies referred to in Section 1 use one-month, three-month or some
unspeciﬁed (short-term) interest rate. However, studies of central-bank opera-
tions in different countries and over different time periods covered by our sample
(Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh, 1989; Batten et al., 1990; Bernanke and Mishkin,
1992; Kasman, 1992; Goodhart and Viñals, 1994; and Borio, 1997) suggest that
a shorter-term interest rate (such as the overnight rate) would, on balance, be a
more appropriate indicator of monetary policy (although not ideal for every country
and time period – see Moschitz, 2004). The choice of interest rates, when com-
paring several countries over an extended period of time, will necessarily reﬂect
a tradeoff between consistency, comparability, and availability. Sometimes, due
to availability constraints, there is little choice involved at all in the equation
(such is the case for several of our focus countries during the earlier part of the
sample period).
We have chosen, in this paper, to use two different interest rates as policy
indicators: in Section 4, we test policy interest rates, because the approach taken
in that section favours the use of an indicator that is changed in discrete steps at
a less frequent basis; in Section 5, we use interbank interest rates for overnight
and up to one-week contracts, according to availability.
9 Monetary aggregates may be an important complementary indicator. Some of our case countries
targeted money supply even into the 1990s (notably Switzerland). However, others did not, and the
problems of ﬁnding an aggregate with policy content for all the countries, and the fact that these
aggregates on a monthly basis are likely to be erratic and subject to revisions, have convinced us
that money supply is a less adequate policy indicator than interest rates in the context of the
methodology employed in this paper. Results on tests equivalent to those in Section 5 for narrow
money supply growth rates (monetary base and M0) are available from the authors on request, but
not reported here.
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Because of the potential speed of transmission and, particularly in dealing with
short-term interest rates, the case can effectively be made for using data of higher
frequency than monthly (see, e.g., Bajo-Rubio et al., 2001). Going back over
20 years – considerably longer than any available high-frequency study – even
monthly data take some effort to come by, let alone data of higher frequency.
Thus, due mainly to data-availability constraints, a priority for consistency of
data over time and across countries, and a focus on general patterns over the
short-to-medium term rather than on day-to-day events, we use monthly data.10
Finally, knowing what to compare with is obviously a major consideration. In
terms of relating the degree of monetary-policy autonomy to the degree of rigid-
ity of the exchange-rate regime, some tradeoff must be made. Theory, or com-
mon wisdom, does not predict that a country pegging its currency to, say, the
DEM will be subject to asymmetric inﬂuence by US monetary policy but only, in
principle, by the policy of the anchor country. The difﬁculty, in practice, is the
multitude of different anchors used by the different case countries over time. The
ideal way of dealing with the problem of knowing what to compare with would
have been to measure variability vis-à-vis the actual anchors used in each coun-
try in each sub-period. Problems of comparison would have remained, however,
and it is not evident that such an approach – to the extent that it would at all be
possible to reconstruct time series with indicators for each exact anchor – would
provide better grounds for analysis than a more general benchmark. Several
previous papers have thus proxied a ‘global policy’ as the benchmark; others
have added to the main benchmark (usually Germany) a complementary bench-
mark (usually the United States). This paper follows the latter convention and
thus follows a double-benchmark approach, arguing that the accumulated indica-
tions given by benchmarking Germany and the United States (the US dollar
being an important anchor for some of the case countries in the 1970s and 1980s)
should provide grounds for some passably solid conclusions as to the degree of
‘foreign’ inﬂuence over our case countries’ monetary policies.
4. ANALYSIS OF CROSS-COUNTRY RESPONSIVENESS OF
POLICY INTEREST-RATE CHANGES
In this section, we calculate the responsiveness of policy interest-rate changes,
that is the responsiveness to changes in the interest rate that is set directly by the
10 Using monthly data if one month is a longer time horizon than that at which agents form their
expectations can present temporal-aggregation problems. One way to remedy this is, as noted, to
run the model on daily data. In the absence of such data, a possible solution could be to include a
moving-average (MA) term. However, we still could not be certain if the aggregation problems are
solved. Moreover, this would present us with problems of interpretation.
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monetary authority (central bank). This requires that we make the a priori as-
sumption that a benchmark country ‘leads’ monetary policy with respect to the
small focus countries. We then analyse how responsive the small countries’
policy interest rates are to changes in the benchmark countries’ policy interest
rates. This is done by calculating the elasticity of policy-interest-rate changes and
the average lag for each focus country and sub-period. The deﬁnitions are as
follows:
  
Elasticity    ,= ⋅∆∆
I
I
I
I
a
b
b
a
(1)
where the upper-case I’s refer to the levels (not the logarithms) of the policy
interest rates. The elasticity measures the average percentage response in the
small country’s (a’s) policy interest rate to a one percentage point change in
the benchmark country’s (b’s) policy interest rate. The average lag is deﬁned as
the average number of periods that pass between a change in the benchmark
country’s policy interest rate and the next change in the policy interest rate of the
small country.11 Thus, we have two measures: one that measures the responsive-
ness in terms of the magnitude of the response, and one that captures the time
aspect of responsiveness.
We calculated elasticities and lags for each sub-period of each case country on
monthly data vis-à-vis Germany and the United States. The speciﬁc interest rates
used varied as no country exhibited a consistent time series of one single repre-
sentative policy interest rate over the entire 22-year period. Over most of the
1980s, discount rates as reported in IMF International Financial Statistics were
used. In later sub-periods, various central-bank rates were used, with (pairwise)
comparability as a primary selection criterion. Since the early-to-mid-1990s, most
countries included (with the exception mainly of Switzerland) have had a speciﬁc
interest rate – usually a repurchase rate – as explicit primary policy instrument,
which facilitated the job of matching different rates in later periods.
The results are summarised in Table 3a–b.12 Judging by the averages in this
table, exchange-rate regime is not a good predictor of policy autonomy. The most
striking result, perhaps, is that not a single one of the average elasticities is
signiﬁcantly different from zero, indicating some degree of autonomy even for
11 The indications of ‘average lag’ should be interpreted with caution since an active but gradual
interest-rate policy by the small country with frequent policy-rate changes in periods where few
changes are made in the benchmark-country rate will give the impression of a ‘long lag’, while, in
effect, the indicator simply reﬂects the average of several changes spread over a long time. It is not
evident that this type of policy is necessarily less responsive to foreign inﬂuences than one which
follows a different strategy; the frequency of interest-rate changes by the central bank also depends
on the bank’s exact operational framework.
12 Country-by-country results are available from the authors on request.
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TABLE 3
Responsiveness of Policy Interest Rates, Summary
a. Average elasticity of interest-rate changes for all countries/sub-periods according to exchange-
rate regime; standard deviations in parentheses
Exchange Rate
Flexible/ Cooperative/ Unilaterally Superﬁx
Managed Float Semi-ﬁxed Inﬂexible (EMU)
Restrictions Yes vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE –
on Capital 0.12 (0.75) 0.38 (1.73) 0.29 (0.94)
Movements vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US
0.38 (1.05) 0.61 (1.81) 0.37 (1.30)
No vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DEb vis-à-vis DE
0.69 (1.96) 1.16 (5.46) 0.73 (1.17) 1.00 (0.00)
vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis USa vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US
0.77 (3.80) 0.69 (1.82) 0.62 (2.20) 1.83 (2.17)
b. Average lag (number of months)
Exchange Rate
Flexible/ Cooperative/ Unilaterally Superﬁx
Managed Float Semi-ﬁxed Inﬂexible (EMU)
Restrictions Yes vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE –
on Capital 3.75 2.91 3.92
Movements vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US
6.59 2.96 6.34
No vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DEb vis-à-vis DE
3.79 1.13 3.84 0.00
vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis USa vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US
5.65 4.33 5.71 1.57
Notes:
a IE P2 and PT P3 have been left out of the calculation of averages, since no changes in the US rate were
undertaken during those periods.
b FI P4 has been left out of the calculation of averages, since no changes in the German rate were undertaken
during that period.
countries/periods with ﬁxed exchange rate arrangements and no capital controls.
However, none of the elasticities is signiﬁcantly different from unity, either
(and for regimes without capital controls are consistently closer to one than to
zero), so in some sense, the conclusion depends on the choice of null-hypothesis.
Another general observation is that elasticities with respect to German and US
policy are close in levels, although German policy presumably better approxi-
mates the actual anchor policy pursued (where there is one). However, German
policy innovations do generate a quicker response than US innovations for all
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TABLE 4
Elasticities of Policy Interest Rate Changes: Comparisons of Mean Elasticities
(t-Statistics)
a. Vis-à-vis German interest rates
Regime 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
1a 1.99** 0.96 1.33 1.13 3.35***
1b 0.90 0.78 1.94* 0.18
2a 0.86 0.41 1.39
2b 1.59 0.74
3a         3.00***
b. Vis-à-vis US interest rates
Regime 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4
1a 0.79 0.85 0.92 0.05 0.18 3.28***
1b 0.31 0.09 1.26 0.34 0.82
2a 0.16 1.10 0.03 1.84*
2b 0.95 0.13 1.44
3a 1.15 3.15***
3b         1.58
Note:
*/**/*** Null hypothesis that sample means are equal is rejected at 10/5/1 per cent signiﬁcance level,
respectively.
regimes. Since the policy interest rate is the same since January 1999 for all EMU
countries, the elasticity of policy interest rates of all EMU countries with respect
to Germany is (trivially) unity with lag time zero in the last period.
In the context of comparing the degree of autonomy offered by different
regime types, and in order to extract the full information content of the results
shown in Table 3, we look for signiﬁcant differences in elasticities across
regimes. To do so, we performed pairwise two-sample t-tests across all regimes.
The outcomes of these tests are shown in Table 4a–b. Pairwise comparisons of
‘a-regimes’ and ‘b-regimes’ separately indicate that exchange-rate regimes do
not inﬂuence policy autonomy regardless of whether capital controls are in place
or not, and regardless of benchmark. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences between
regimes 1, 2 and 3, when the capital-mobility dimension is controlled for.
Comparing the same exchange-rate regime across the capital-mobility dimension
(i.e. 1a–1b, 2a–2b, and so on), we see that lifting capital controls signiﬁcantly
increases the elasticity vis-à-vis German policy, except for EMS countries. When
US policy interest rates are the benchmark, however, this result does not hold
(because the variability of elasticities vis-à-vis the US is too high). The EMU policy
rate, ﬁnally, is not signiﬁcantly more responsive to US policy rates than were the
individual focus countries’ policy rates after capital controls had been lifted.
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We will further discuss the implications of these results in the concluding
section. The next section looks at market interest rates.
5. ANALYSIS OF CROSS-COUNTRY RESPONSIVENESS OF
MARKET INTEREST-RATE CHANGES
In this section, we calculate multipliers for market interest rates on the basis of
bivariate Granger causality tests in order further to empirically assess our hypoth-
esis of asymmetry in the transmission of monetary-policy indicators between the
benchmark countries and the focus countries. The interpretation of these multi-
pliers is equivalent to that of the elasticities in Section 4. The Granger-causality
technique (with variations) is applied for similar purposes in for instance Fratianni
and von Hagen (1990), Karfakis and Moschos (1990), Katsimbris and Miller
(1993), Henry and Weidman (1995), Hassapis et al. (1999) and Uctum (1999)
(see Section 1 above).
The choice of lag-length is a crucial step in the choice of model to be evalu-
ated, particularly in a simple bivariate setting such as that used here. We here
apply a model-determination procedure based on the Granger concept of causal-
ity and the ﬁnal prediction error (FPE) criterion, as originally proposed by Hsiao
(1981). The advantage of the FPE as compared to most other criteria is that it
does not require that the number of lags of the variables that enter into the model
be the same.13 The basic estimated equation takes the form:
  
X X Y Zt m t m n t n t t
n
n
m
m
= + + + +− − −
==
∑∑      **α β γ δ ν1
11
, (2)
where X and Y are ﬁrst-differences of the logs of the tested variables, m* and
n* are the ‘optimal’ lags as chosen by the model-selection criterion and Z is
the error-correction term (whose coefﬁcient is zero in case the two tested
series are not cointegrated in levels). If the model-selection procedure implies
a one-way model, just one equation is estimated; if a bilateral system is implied
by the procedure, two equations are estimated, and if the procedure implies
non-causality between the variables, then, of course, no equation is estimated.
The models were estimated with generalised least squares (GLS) regressions.
We then calculated multipliers based on the regression parameters from the
above models.14
13 A similar motivation for the use of the FPE criterion is given, for instance, in Erenburg and
Wohar (1995) and Bajo-Rubio and Montávez-Garcés (1999).
14 For more details on how to compute multipliers, see, e.g., Lütkepohl (1991) or Gardner and
Perraudin (1993).
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TABLE 5
Long-run Multipliers for Market Interest-rate Changes
(Standard errors in parentheses)a
Exchange Rate
Flexible/ Cooperative/ Unilaterally Superﬁx
Managed Float Semi-ﬁxed Inﬂexible (EMU)
Restrictions Yes vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE –
on Capital 0.22 (0.21) −0.08 (3.61) 0.45 (0.80)
Movements vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US
−0.03 (0.12) −0.08 (1.14) 0.08 (0.12)
No vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE vis-à-vis DE
1.74 (6.76) 0.84 (1.40) 0.43 (0.83) 1.00 (0.00)
vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US vis-à-vis US
0.31 (3.78) 0.26 (3.78) −0.67 (1.13) 1.92 (2.12)
Note:
a The average multipliers shown in this table are potentially inﬂuenced by a number of outliers in the country-
by-country results. We therefore made the same calculations (including the two-sample t-tests shown in
Table 6) with outliers suppressed from the sample. These calculations show that the results are qualitatively
robust to the inclusion or non-inclusion of outliers.
15 Again, country-by-country results are not reported, but are available on request from the authors.
The calculated multipliers are summarised in Table 5.15 Again, none of the
regime averages of the multipliers turns out signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Some are, however, signiﬁcantly different from unity this time; all under capital
controls, and – in the one such case which refers to a multiplier measured against
German interest rates – under a ﬂexible exchange rate. Without capital controls,
however, multipliers increase the more ﬂexible the exchange rate: totally oppo-
site the common wisdom. But variability also increases along with the averages,
and overall the errors are too large to be able to pin down the size of the
multipliers to a particular level. The fact that, under an open capital-account
regime, the variability of the average multipliers is larger for more ﬂexible
exchange rates, could of course in itself be interpreted as (weak) evidence that
more ﬂexible exchange rates do afford more short-term autonomy.
Table 6a–b shows the result of pairwise two-sample t-tests which are performed
across all regimes to test if average long-run multipliers from regime sub-
samples deviate from each other. When we compare exchange-rate regimes within
one and the same capital-account regime, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference
between regime 1 and regime 2, but we do ﬁnd it between regime 3 and the
others. Regime 3 (unilateral ﬁx), then, is the odd man out. This result is robust
to the choice of benchmark and to the imposition or not of capital controls.
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TABLE 6
Long-run Multipliers for Market Interest-rate Changes: Comparisons of Mean Multipliers
(t-Statistics)
a. Vis-à-vis German interest rates
Regime 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
1a −3.96*** 1.51 −7.50*** −5.01*** −4.28***
1b 4.29*** 1.34 5.27*** 4.88***
2a −2.49** −3.91*** −3.41***
2b 4.08*** 4.08***
3a         0.55
b. Vis-à-vis US interest rates
Regime 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4
1a −1.56 0.80 −1.32 −13.49*** 8.88*** −16.13***
1b 1.70* 0.13 1.67* 6.21*** −5.27***
2a −1.35 −3.88*** 6.78*** −13.07***
2b 1.29 4.75*** −4.61***
3a 16.33*** −24.01***
3b           −19.95***
Note:
*/**/*** Null hypothesis that sample means are equal is rejected at 10/5/1 per cent signiﬁcance level,
respectively.
Oddly, however, under capital controls, the average multiplier for regime 3 – as
compared to regimes 1 and 2 – is signiﬁcantly higher, and in the absence of capital
controls it is signiﬁcantly lower. Comparing the same exchange-rate regime across
the capital-mobility dimension, we ﬁnd that capital controls matter, except under
a ﬁxed exchange rate. Multipliers are mostly (but not consistently) signiﬁcantly
higher when no capital controls are imposed
The euro-area short-term market rate, ﬁnally, is signiﬁcantly more responsive
to the development of the US rate than the corresponding previous national rates,
regardless of exchange-rate and capital-account regime. This result differs from
what we previously found for policy interest rates.
6. CONCLUSION
The main results are as follows. Firstly, our calculations of measures of
foreign inﬂuence over interest-rate policy in 11 small European countries in the
1980s and 1990s (two kinds of foreign interest-rate multipliers) typically give
reasonable values, mostly between zero and unity, but quite variable. Secondly,
comparing these measures pairwise across different exchange-rate regimes
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indicates little difference in the degree of nominal monetary-policy autonomy
enjoyed by those countries that pursue ﬂexible exchange-rate regimes as com-
pared to those that have kept their exchange rates ﬁxed: the latter countries are
not more exposed to foreign inﬂuences in any systematic way. Thirdly, compar-
ing these measures across capital-account regimes (are capital controls imposed
or not?) indicates mostly – but not consistently – higher measures of foreign
inﬂuence and higher variability of the multipliers for countries/periods without
capital controls.
The overall conclusion is that we cannot reject our hypothesis of no systematic
relationship between exchange-rate regimes and monetary policy autonomy. This
conclusion is also in line with some previous ﬁndings for other countries, over
different time periods, using different estimation techniques (see Fratzscher, 2002;
and Frankel et al., 2002). A reasonable interpretation of the results is that the
small countries investigated here have been able to enjoy a degree of monetary
policy autonomy even with a ﬁxed exchange rate, and even after they abolished
capital controls. With capital controls, they were offered an extra layer of protec-
tion against foreign inﬂuence (at least temporarily), but the capital-control instru-
ment may have been an unreliable one when it was best needed (under various
types of peg arrangements). This is the conservative conclusion – the one that
emphasises the result that no multiplier is signiﬁcantly different from zero. The
source of autonomy in this case may have been: that the pegs were adjustable
enough to allow such autonomy, imperfect capital mobility, real shocks upsetting
the equilibrium relationship between the countries tested, or a combination of
all three.
There is, however, an alternative interpretation which is equally consistent
with the results, but somewhat more speculative, namely that over the medium
and long term following an ‘independent’ target for monetary policy (an inﬂation
target, say), which does not deviate much from the targets of those countries to
which one is closely ﬁnancially integrated, is as constraining as locking the
exchange rate to some particular level. Another way of putting the same idea is
to say that for a central bank setting interest rates to control price developments
in the medium or long run, purchasing-power parity must basically hold. No
exploitable degree of autonomy other than that which results in an ‘autonomous’
rate of inﬂation is possible for the type of time horizons central banks work with.
Actual nominal exchange-rate ﬂuctuations in the short run and – particularly –
exchange-rate regimes pursued, on the other hand, are of secondary importance
in terms of autonomy.
The second of these interpretations rests on the result that with a liberalised
capital account, we could not reject the hypothesis that multipliers equalled unity
(in fact, they were on average closer to one than to zero), and that in no single
case were the average multipliers higher for countries with ﬁxed exchange rates.
The difference between these interpretations can be viewed mainly as a difference
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in the understanding of autonomy, and more particularly in the time aspect of it
(short-term or long-term autonomy); alternatively, one could say that it is a
question of the choice of null hypothesis: is the glass half-full or half-empty?
It is also worth repeating that our results are based on actual outcomes in terms
of transmission of policy. By not having the opportunity to compare with the
hypothetical ex ante preferred policy, we may be exaggerating the role of actual,
historical autonomy at the expense of the potential for autonomy.
Finally, certain shortcomings to estimating the multipliers just pairwise the
way we have done here, warrant a few suggestions of how this research could be
developed. Firstly, if transmission runs in some more intricate way between the
variables, the bivariate approach will not give an adequate representation of
actual co-dependencies. Also, if some important inﬂuencing variable is left out
(for instance, a possible effect of real shocks), the results may overstate the
relationship between the variables that are kept in. Secondly, by splitting up the
full sample period into shorter periods, some of these sub-periods become too
short to get reliable results. Moreover, the role of exchange rates may not be
accurately reﬂected just by splitting up the whole sample period into discrete sub-
periods according to exchange-rate regime for each country: since exchange-rate
variability moves along a gradual scale, the choice of where to draw the line
between different regime types will always contain a discretionary element. The
same argument of discretion can, in principle, be made when it comes to capital
controls.
Finally, we may note that the adherence to a larger currency area has not
necessarily provided the euro-area countries with more insulation vis-à-vis ‘glo-
bal’ inﬂuences and autonomy at a regional level: our tests on market interest rates
indicate that the euro-area short-term rate is signiﬁcantly more responsive to the
development of the US rate than were the corresponding previous national rates,
and that this result is robust to the choice of exchange-rate and capital-account
regime.
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APPENDIX Continued
Dummy variables:a
• Austria: none;
• Belgium: 1993:08–1994:01;
• Denmark: 1979:12, 1993:08–10, 1995:03–04;
• Finland: 1979:10–11, 1980:04–05, 1981:09–10, 1982:05–06, 1982:10–12, 1986:03–05,
1991:11–1992:01, 1992:09–11;
• Greece: 1994:05–06, 1997:10–11, 1998:03–05;
• Ireland: 1983:04–05, 1986:08–09, 1992:11, 1993:02–03;
• Netherlands: none;
• Norway: 1981:10–11, 1982:05–06, 1982:08–11, 1986:05–06, 1987:11–1988:01, 1992:12–
1993:01;
• Portugal: 1980:02–04, 1982:06–08, 1983:06–08, 1983:10–11, 1986:08–1987:01, 1988:02–03,
1993:07–08, 1995:04–05;
• Sweden: 1981:09–11, 1982:10–1983:01, 1992:11–1993:02;
• Switzerland: none;
• Benchmarks: none.
Note:
a The use of dummy variables has been restricted to a minimum, but were in many cases necessary to eliminate
outliers, and to achieve convergence in the calculation of multipliers for market interest rates. Market, as well
as policy, interest rates took on extreme values in several instances during currency crises or during periods of
extreme deﬂationary pressures for the case countries.
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6 On the interplay between money
market development and changes in
monetary policy operations in small
European countries, 1980–2000
Jens Forssbæck and Lars Oxelheim
The implementation, as well as the underlying ‘philosophy’, of monetary policy
has undergone radical changes in most industrial countries during the last few
decades. These changes have been paralleled by a similarly radical development
of ﬁnancial markets – including money markets (short-term debt markets), which
are the main ‘forum’ for the implementation of monetary policy. The instruments
available to a central bank usually fall into one of three categories: direct regula-
tions (e.g. interest-rate regulations and credit ceilings), standing facilities (deposits
and loans at the central bank available to banks at their own initiative), or discre-
tionary operations (e.g. repurchase transactions, foreign-exchange swaps, issuance
of central-bank securities or outright transactions in short-term markets). In the
post-war period, up to the early or mid-1980s, central banks used to rely primarily
on the former two categories. The ﬁnancial deregulation wave of the 1980s and
1990s largely coincided with, or was conditional on, a general reorientation of
monetary-policy operating procedures toward the third category. Both the tools
used by central banks and the variables on which the tools were designed to
operate shifted – essentially from a Keynesian demand-side-oriented monetary
policy operating on monetary aggregates, to an inﬂation-oriented monetary policy
operating on interest rates and playing on market terms.
In this chapter, we study the parallel processes of ﬁnancial market deregulation
and development on the one hand, and reform of the operative frameworks of
monetary policy on the other, and the extent and nature of the association between
the two processes, in 11 small, European countries from the beginning of the 1980s
and up to the launch of EMU. We focus on the development of domestic money
markets, and address aspects of this development such as the size and structure
of various market segments, and institutional and regulatory changes, besides
empirically examining the extent of reorientation of monetary policy instruments.
We hypothesise that the parallel processes are intertwined and that developments
in any one particular country are best described as a continuous interplay of market
outcomes and policy choices.1 We also provide tentative empirical evidence to that
effect.
The 11 countries in our study are basically just a complete list of the developed
European countries that unambiguously ﬁtted the ‘small, open economy’ criterion
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(and had their own currencies) during the 1980s and 1990s. The countries are:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. The diversity of these countries in terms of
monetary policy regimes pursued (from hard-currency countries such as Austria,
to countrieswith near-emerging-market status, such asGreece) and level of institu-
tional integration (from core EMUcountries such as theNetherlands to sonderweg,
non-EU countries such as Norway) also make them an excellent laboratory as
regards the link between money market development and the conduct of mon-
etary policy. The choice of study period is based on previous research on the
ﬁnancial-market ‘transformation’ process (Oxelheim 1996).
The chapter is structured in the following way. We begin by reviewing the main
developments in domestic moneymarkets. These largely comprise two interlinked
processes: deregulation and liberalisation on the part of authorities, and innovation
and growth on the part of ‘markets’. These two processes are treated in separate
sub-sections. The next section mirrors the ﬁrst in that it analyses the changing
operative procedures of central banks along two lines: the decreasing role of direct
controls (closely related to the general deregulation of ﬁnancial markets), and the
increasing role of market operations. In the following section, we identify the
main drivers of the changes in central-bank operations. Thereafter, we empirically
examine the sources and effects of ﬂuctuations in money-market liquidity in the
case countries and tentative evidence of a determinant of the intensity of open
market operations. A ﬁnal section concludes.
General developments in domestic money markets
The countries covered in this chapter all followed the general trend among indus-
trial countries of broad-based ﬁnancial-sector deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s.
Below, we make a brief summary of that process. We go on to recount the main
developments in money market innovation, differentiation and growth, in each of
the countries.
Financial deregulation
The regulations in force in a majority of European countries until the 1970s
or, in most cases, the 1980s were of four major types: interest-rate controls,
quantitative credit and investment regulations, restrictions on the issuance of
ﬁnancial instruments andmarket-entry/branching or ownership restrictions. These
‘repressive’ regulations typically served multiple purposes but the major ones
were to achieve monetary control and to achieve broader social/economic policy
objectives.
As can be seen from Table 6.1, which summarises the situation around 1980
in terms of regulation in the sample countries, several countries applied all major
types of regulation. Portugal, for instance, was in 1980 very much still marked by
the effects of the nationalisation of ﬁnancial sector in 1974 and a system whereby
the Banco de Portugal was equipped with almost limitless authority to intervene
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Table 6.1 Financial repression in 1980
Interest-rate
restrictions
Speciﬁc
credit
controlsa
Overall
credit
growth
limit
Investment
obligations
Issuing
restrictions
Branching
restric-
tions
Austria
√ √ √ √ √ √
Belgium
√ √
–b
√ √ √
Finland
√ √
– –
√ √
Greece
√ √ √ √ √ √
Ireland
√ √ √
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Netherlands –
√ √
–
√ √d
Portugal
√ √ √ √ √ √
Denmark
√ √e √c – √ –
Sweden
√ √
–
√ √ √
Norway
√ √ √ √ √
Switzerland
√
– – –
√ √
n.a.: Information not available.
Notes:
a Quotas or ceilings imposed on individual banks or groups of banks/ﬁnancial institutions, and similar
detailed credit controls.
b Abolished in 1978.
c Formally guidelines.
d No real restrictions, but a separation in a legal sense of different types of credit institution was
made, and the rules on prudential supervision varied accordingly.
e Abolished in 1980.
Sources: Edey andHviding (1995); OECDFinancialMarket Trends (various); Oxelheim (1990, 1996);
Vihriälä (1997); Wyplosz (2001); various national sources.
in all aspects of ﬁnancial intermediation. All or most regulation types were also
used, in Austria, Greece, Norway and Sweden for instance.
(a) Interest-rate regulations were in force in all countries in the sample except
the Netherlands at the start of the study period (see Table 6.1). Administrative
control over interest rates – in particular, keeping interest rates at low levels – was
used as a general monetary-policy instrument, as a way to boost demand and as a
means of providing cheap ﬁnancing for the government.
Interest-rate controls began to be dismantled in the late 1970s in Austria,
Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden. By the mid-1980s, interest rates in
Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden (as well as the Netherlands) had been
essentially liberalised. In most of the continental-European countries, the main
steps were taken in the second half of the 1980s.
By 1990, Austria, Finland and Switzerland had also completely liberalised
interest rates; Belgiumhad, in principle, also deregulated interest rates, but retained
some minor controls on speciﬁc categories or types of credit. The last among the
survey countries to abolish interest-rate regulations, Greece and Portugal, com-
pleted the process a few years into the 1990s, in accordance with their gradual
implementation of European Community directives (see Rautava 1994; Edey and
Hviding 1995).
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The typical sequencing pattern was that the liberalisation of wholesale interest
rates occurred ﬁrst, followed by lending rates and deposit rates.2 The process was
mostly gradual, and sometimes hesitant on the part of the authorities. An illus-
tration of this is that formal rules and restrictions (a ceiling, a quota etc.) were
often initially followed by implicit regulations in the form of recommendations or
various types of agreement before being de facto liberalised. Such was the case
in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.
These implicit regulations were enforced through the understanding that the cen-
tral bank could, and would, enforce its goals by means of the reinstatement of
formal regulations if deemed necessary; see, e.g., Grønvik (1994).3
(b)Quantitative credit and investment restrictions, in one form or another, were
employed in a majority of the countries (again, see Table 6.1). The low-interest-
rate policies pursued by several of the countries which, in combination with high
inﬂation rates, led to very low (or even negative) real interest-rate levels. This,
in turn, led to high credit demand, indicating that credit had to be rationed and
the market as a whole had to be regulated in detail, as regards both prices and
quantities.
As an effect of the co-dependence of various types of regulation, credit con-
trols to some extent became obsolete or irrelevant as interest rates were being
liberalised.4 Hence, most of these regulationswere abolished inAustria, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, Netherlands and Sweden in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. Belgium
had initiated the deregulation of credit in 1979 but the process tookmore or less the
entire 1980s to be completed. Of the other countries, Switzerland had not applied
quantitative controls since the 1970s. Norway abolished credit regulations in 1988,
Portugal around 1990, and Greece a few years into the 1990s.
(c) Issuing restrictions on securities were used to control the extension of credit
through direct channels (i.e. through issues in the open market). Usually, rules and
regulations on minimummaturities etc. were combined with various authorisation
requirements.
The initial emergence of short-term securities markets in several countries was
directly conditional on the abolition of one or several restrictions on the issuance
of debt securities. Conversely, where such deregulations did not occur, or occurred
late, an important condition for the emergence and growth of markets was lack-
ing. Controls on (debt) securities issuance were mostly in place for slightly longer
than interest rate and credit controls. Exceptions are Denmark (which had a rela-
tively free and internationally oriented bond market based on private debt already
in the 1970s), and the Netherlands, where regulation was comparatively limited.
Switzerland was low on formal regulation but the growth of the domestic market
was hampered by business practice, as well as by tax policy and other factors.
Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland lifted issuing controls in the ﬁrst half
of the 1980s. In some countries important liberalisation measures were imple-
mented in the mid-1980s (for instance in Norway – see Norges Bank, Penger &
Kreditt, 26:1, 1995). The Netherlands, although comparatively liberal in several
respects, applied rules on minimummaturities which constrained the development
of short-term markets and were fully abolished only in 1990.
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In other countries, important steps toward the opening-up of securities markets
occurred in the context of a reform of government-ﬁnancing systems. Such is the
case, for example, in Austria and Belgium - around 1990 – (De Broeck et al.
1998) and Greece - early/mid-1990s – (Soumelis 1995). Generally, however, the
liberalisation of markets for private debt was slower than other categories. For
instance, the Portuguese ﬁxed-income market was not formally opened to all
domestic issuers until 1994 and to foreign issuers 1995 (de Pinho 2000). Also,
as previously mentioned, market development was in some cases stiﬂed by the
existence of various types of more or less informal authorisation requirement. For
instance, Switzerland abolished numerous cartel-like conventions and permanent
securities-issuance syndicates of banks in 1990.
(d) Market-entry rules or line-of-business regulations — the separation of
banking and securities businesses, the separation of commercial banking from
investment or savings banking, and other branching restrictions — limited the
segmental integration within the ﬁnancial system. A similar effect is implied
by regulations limiting ownership linkages between different types of ﬁnancial
institution, between ﬁnancial institutions and other industry sectors, and between
domestic and foreign institutions. In addition, one sort of ‘ownership restriction’
was the indirect control by the government of the ﬁnancial sector through the dom-
inance of state-owned banks in combination with market-entry restrictions. This
applies primarily to the countries with previously entirely nationalised ﬁnancial
sectors (Greece and Portugal) but also, to some extent and during some periods,
in other countries. In Norway, for instance, ownership of major banks was one
consequence of the banking crisis around 1990.
Regulations within this category were partly or wholly lifted in the 1980s and
early 1990s in some countries, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark (where
de-compartmentalisation of the banking sector had occurred already in 1975),
Finland, Norway and Sweden. Moreover, a ‘spontaneous’ functional market inte-
gration (taking place, for instance, through banks establishing subsidiaries within
the securities-trading business, or purchasing ﬁnance companies) is often consid-
ered a major feature of the ﬁnancial-market transformation process undergone by
the industrial countries in the 1980s; see e.g. the survey in OECD (1989). To some
extent, this implies a diminishing practical importance of remaining regulations.
Restrictions on foreign-bank entry should also be included in this category. In the
sample, Finland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden were among those countries that
opened their domestic markets for foreign banks during the 1980s. In some other
countries, including theNetherlands and Switzerland, rules on foreign-bank access
to the domestic market were already relatively liberal at the start of the 1980s,
whereas in much of the rest of the continental European countries signiﬁcant steps
were taken only with the implementation of the EU’s Second Banking Directive
(effective in 1993).
In the area of ownership control, the deregulation wave made a compara-
tively modest impression in the 1980s and 1990s, and several such regulations
remained in the mid-1990s (Herring and Litan 1995). State-ownership of a large
proportion of domestic ﬁnancial institutions also outlived ﬁnancial integration
in some countries. The Greek banking sector, for instance, was still completely
200 201
[19:23 2007/1/12 4892-mayes-ch06.tex] Ref: 4892 MAYES: Open Market Operations and Financial Markets Page: 125 120–152
Money market development and policy operations 125
dominated by state-owned banks when ownership regulations were abolished. In
terms of assets, the government’s ownership share was about 75% (see Hope
1993). In other countries, state-ownership of banks became an effect of banking
crises in the early 1990s: after the crises, the governments of Norway and Finland
ended up with ownership shares of 52% and 35%, respectively; see the Banker
(1993); also see the Economist (1992) and Warner (1993) for short background
articles on the deregulation and privatisation of Portuguese banks.
The deregulation process in the 11 focus countries is summarised in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Summary of the ﬁnancial deregulation process
Deregulation initiated
in… (item(s) ﬁrst
liberalised):
Financial sector lastly liberalised
by… (item(s) last deregulated):
Austria 1979 (some interest rates
liberalised)
1990s (authorisation requirement for
securities issues lifted)
Belgium 1978 (credit ceiling
abolished)
1992 (decompartmentalisation /
decartellisation of banks)
Finland 1983 (some interest rates
liberalised)
1991 (authorisation requirement for
securities issues lifted etc.)
Greece 1987 (some interest rates
liberalised)
Mid-1990s (deregulation of banking)
Ireland 1984 (some interest rates
liberalised; credit
guidelines lifted)
Late 1980sa
Netherlands 1981 (credit controls
lifted)b
c 1990 (minimum-maturity
requirement for securities
abolished)
Portugal 1984 (some interest rates
liberalised; market-entry
rules eased)
1994 (securities markets fully
opened for private issuers)
Denmark 1980 (bank lending
ceilings lifted)c
1989 (issuing controls on securities
completely abolished)
Sweden 1978 (some interest rates
liberalised)
1985 (ceilings on bank lending lifted)
Norway c 1980 (some interest
rates deregulated)
1990 (all quantitative controls and
most issuing controls abolished by
this time)
Switzerland Early 1980s (interest rates
on bonds liberalised)d
c 1990 (issuing restrictions
abolished; permanent
securities-issuance syndicates
dissolved)
Notes:
a Minor interest-rate ‘rigidities’ (in the shape of informal agreements) remained until the mid-1990s.
b Less regulated overall at the start of the 1980s than most other markets here included; interest rates
were essentially already free in the 1970s.
c Less regulated overall at the start of the 1980s than most other markets here included:
a decompartmentalisation of banking had already been carried out in 1975; some interest rates were
free during the 1970s (but partly reregulated in 1979), etc.
d Most other interest rates already free.
Sources: See Table 6.1.
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Money market growth and development
Themoneymarket is usually deﬁned as amarket for short-termdebt, generallywith
original maturities of up to one year (Stigum 1983). One main segment of money
markets is the interbank market. The other segments are primary and secondary
markets for various short-term securities, and a derivatives market. The foreign-
exchange (FX) markets and domestic money markets are also closely interlinked
through the existence ofmarkets for forward-exchange contracts and swaps, which
make certain types of FX transaction equivalent to single-currency transactions.
Because the interbank segment is deﬁned in terms of participants and the ‘open-
market’ segments usually in terms of instrument there is a considerable overlap
between these segments. The interbank market is sometimes taken to mean the
market for very short-term, that is, overnight up to a few weeks, deposits and
loans. Central-bank facilities for such deposits and loans are included. Virtually all
types of instrument – including derivatives – are traded interbank. The segmental
structure is therefore not wholly clear, and tends to vary from country to country.
Table 6.3 summarises the starting years for themain segments in all 11 countries.
It indicates a progressive convergence during the 1980s and 1990s of the presence
of different types of money-market instrument.
The most traditional money-market segment is the interbank deposit market.
It includes the central bank’s deposit and loan facilities and its structure and
function are, as a consequence, to a high degree determined by the incentives
regarding banks’ liquidity management implied by the central bank’s choice of
operative framework. Deposit markets turned up in most countries as monetary
policy instruments changed during the 1980s and 1990s. The segment largely
retained its importance throughout the 1990s in spite of the emergence of alter-
native instruments (such as repurchase agreements in particular). For instance,
transactions in the uncollateralised segment were estimated at about twice the size
of collateralised transactions in the euro area in 1999 (Santillán et al. 2000).
In the short-term securities markets, considerable dissimilarities can be seen
between the focus countries, both in terms of the relative total size of the market
as well as in terms of the relative importance of speciﬁc segments of the market,
as evidenced in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.4.
In the short-term securities segment, Treasury bills or equivalent short-term
government securities are typically the most important sub-market. In several
countries (Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Sweden, for example), short-term
government securities have existed for a long time, but were traditionally non-
marketable, and sold directly to ﬁnal holders at regulated rates until a decade or
two ago. True markets for T-bills mostly emerged in connection with relaxations
or complete abolition of issuing restrictions (years are shown in Table 6.3).
Two other main cash-instrument types — commercial paper (generally issued
by non-bank entities) and certiﬁcates of deposit (a securitised bank liability) —
were introduced in several countries in the mid-1980s but, as revealed by
Table 6.4, their importance varies greatly. In some cases (for example Finland
and Sweden), the introduction of CDs preceded the introduction of tradable
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government securities. In other cases, diversiﬁcation of the market to other than
government issues occurred several years after a T-billmarket had been established
(Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal).
Commercial-paper markets gained importance in some (but far from all) coun-
tries toward the late 1980s (Norway, Sweden) or further into the 1990s (Belgium,
Ireland). There seems to be some indication that where commercial-paper markets
could be benchmarked against a liquid government-bill market (or other instru-
ment with amarket-supporting role), their development came earlier andwasmore
extensive (Alworth and Borio 1993).
In addition to these cash instruments, various derivative instruments play an
important role, as do repurchase agreements (repos), which – according to BIS
estimates – was the fastest growing instrument/transaction type internationally
during the 1990s. However, data are scarce. Reporting in different countries is also
such that available historical data are not readily comparable (BIS 1999). Existing
data indicate considerable variations in derivatives as well as repo markets. For
example, in Belgium, repos became the main ﬁnancing tool for domestic banks
in the 1990s and largely replaced more traditional interbank transaction types
(Commission of the European Communities 1999). Similar trends were visible in
other countries (particularly those with ample stocks of collateral). Others were
partly stiﬂed by thin debt markets (the Netherlands, Norway), ambiguities with
regard to regulatory policies, legal status and tax treatment (Ireland, Portugal,
Switzerland), or excessive concentration of market participants.
Changes in central-bank operations 1980–20005
Until the mid-1980s central banks relied largely on traditional deposit and loan
facilities (standing facilities), supported by various direct controls, for the conduct
of monetary policy. The ordinary credit facilities were mostly supplemented by
some sort of tranche-division system (Denmark, Finland), penalty-rate system
(Austria, Sweden), or a combination of both (Belgium, the Netherlands) to allow
central-bank control of the marginal cost of banks’ borrowing under the facilities,
and thereby of the supply of liquidity to the banking system.
All our focus countries reformed their operative frameworks for monetary
policy substantially during the 20 years we study. In some countries, the revi-
sion of the monetary-policy operating framework took the form of comprehensive
reforms (Denmark 1992, Switzerland 2000); in others, developments proceeded
more piecemeal (see Table 6.5). In several countries (Belgium, Finland, the
Netherlands) the trend toward a gradually increasing diversiﬁcation of liquidity-
supply instruments became visible toward the mid-to-late 1980s. Others followed
suit during the 1990s (Denmark, Portugal, Austria).
The diminishing role of quantitative controls
The diversiﬁcation of instruments used by central banks as well as by other
money-market participants during the 1980s and 1990s was paralleled with the
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Table 6.5 Some major changes in central-bank operating procedures between repression
and EMUa
Country Year Change of monetary policy (instruments)/main
components of change
ATb 1995 Reform of liquidity-management arrangements:
introduction of repurchase transactions for
liquidity provision and of central-bank CDs for
liquidity absorption; reduction of reserve ratios.
BEb Mid-1970s Abolition of reserve requirements.
1985 Introduction of a more ﬂexible discount-setting
system, and revision of the central bank’s credit
and deposit facilities (resulting ultimately in the
emergence of an efﬁcient day-to-day interbank
market).
1991 Tender procedures introduced for the issuance of
government paper, leading to more
market-oriented procedures for monetary policy,
including the gradual adoption of repurchase
transactions as the main liquidity-management
instrument.
FIb 1983 Quotas for central-bank credit abolished; banks
asked to manage liquidity through call-money
market.
1987 Open-market operations in CDs initiated.
1991 Repurchase transactions introduced by the central
bank.
1992–95 Several adjustments in the technical design of the
central bank’s credit and deposit facilities, as
well as that of the minimum-reserve system.
GRb c 1990 The central bank switches its operational regime
from direct regulation to indirect instruments.
1997 Repurchase transactions initiated by the central
bank.
IEb Mid-1980s The exchequer-account overdraft facility is
abolished; collateralised operations introduced.
Mid-1990s The central bank stops discounting exchequer
bills, and adopts repurchase transactions as its
keynote operation; minimum reserve ratios
substantially reduced.
NLb 1994 Reform of liquidity-policy framework;
central-bank CDs introduced.
1998 Reform of liquidity-policy framework.
PTb 1985 The central bank starts to issue treasury bills on
behalf of the government.
1986 The central bank is formally authorised to issue
short-term securities and to pay interest on the
government’s and the credit institutions’
deposits.
Continued
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Table 6.5 cont’d
Country Year Change of monetary policy (instruments)/ main
components of change
1992 Repurchase transactions initiated by the central
bank.
1994 Revision of liquidity-policy framework:
central-bank CDs introduced; the central bank’s
credit facilities still relatively complex, with
some facilities subject to quotas, some available
at penalty rates.
DK 1992 Comprehensive reform of monetary-policy
instruments: revision of the central bank’s credit
and deposit facilities (so as to stimulate
money-market activity); introduction of
central-bank CDs for liquidity absorption and of
repurchase transactions for liquidity provision;
no reserve requirements.
1999 Extension of collateral basis for the central bank’s
repos and some other minor changes of
technical nature.
SE 1985 Reform of the central-bank’s credit and deposit
facilities: the ﬁxed-quota-and-penalty-rate
system was abolished, and an ‘interest-rate
ladder’ was introduced.
1988 Changes in operating procedures: liquidity may
be supplied to banks by lending on market terms.
1990 Reserve requirements lifted (formally set to zero).
1993–97 The central bank issues its own CDs to soak up
liquidity.
1994 New interest-rate-management system introduced
(motivated largely on the new monetary-policy
regime—the inﬂation target), based on
Bundesbank-type repos, with the ﬁxed repo rate
serving as target for the overnight interbank rate.
NO 1984–1987 The central bank conducts ‘temporary bond
purchases’—effectively a form of repurchase
transactions.
1985 The certiﬁcates market was launched, expressly
for the purpose of involving the public more
directly in the money market, increasing the
control of the central bank over the supply of
liquidity and enhancing the efﬁciency of
monetary-policy transmission.
1987 Reserve requirements abolished.
Mid-1990s Simpliﬁcation of the central bank’s credit and
deposit facilities; (re)introduction of repurchase
transactions for liquidity provision.
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Table 6.5 cont’d
Country Year Change of monetary policy (instruments)/main
components of change
CH 1998 Repurchase transactions initiated by the central
bank.
2000 Reform of monetary-policy framework:
interest-rate targeting strategy replaces the
traditional monetary-targeting strategy;
repurchase transactions become the central
bank’s keynote operation.
Notes:
a All EMU countries’ central banks together with the ECB make up the ESCB (European System
of Central Banks) and have shared a common policy framework since 1999 (Greece since 2001); the
main
reﬁnancing operations of the ESCB are executed by the national central banks.
Selected sources: BIS (1997b); Schweizerische Nationalbank, Bulletin Trimestriel 4 (1999); Borio
(1997); Danmarks Nationalbank (1992, 1999); Hasko (1996); Hasko and Kuisma (1995); Hörngren
(1994); Kasman (1992); Kneeshaw and van den Bergh (1989); Kuosmanen (1996); Mehlbye and
Topp (1996); Norges Bank (1995); Oxelheim (1996); Pinto (1996); Sveriges Riksbank (1994).
lifting of most direct regulations. This sub-section therefore focuses on one direct
control that remained in use by many central banks — the minimum reserve
requirement.
During the 1990s, practically all our case countries followed an international
trend among industrial countries toward lowering or completely abolishing reserve
requirements (see Table 6.6). The major arguments behind these reforms were
to reduce the tax effect of reserve requirements and to neutralise the compet-
itive disadvantage of subjected depository institutions vis-à-vis other ﬁnancial
institutions — domestic or foreign (Bank of Japan 1995).
The original objectives of the reserve-requirement instrument were to maintain
banks’ liquidity even in the case of large deposit withdrawals, and to inﬂuence
liquidity for monetary-policy purposes. The function of reserve requirements as
a mechanism to control monetary-aggregate quantities on an ongoing basis was
largely abandonedduring the late 1980s or early 1990s. Nowadays, reserve require-
ments serve threemain purposes. One is as ameans of providing for banks’ ongoing
liquidity needs (having banks in a position of reliance on the central bank facilitates
the conduct of monetary policy). A second purpose is to improve the ﬂexibility
of banks’ liquidity management (reserves can be used to settle interbank pay-
ments). Finally, reserve requirements (particularly if unremunerated) can provide
seigniorage income for the central bank, thereby contributing to its proﬁtability
and (economic) independence (Grønvik 1994; Bank of Finland Bulletin 12 1996;
BIS 2003).
Countries that abandoned the use of reserve requirements more or less entirely
relatively early on include Belgium (mid-1970s), Norway (1987) and Sweden
(1990). In Norway, for example, both primary reserves (that is, cash-reserve
requirements) and secondary reserves (compulsory bond holdings by banks and
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Table 6.6 Reserve requirements
1970s Late 1980sa Late 1990sb
RRIF Max. RRIF Max. Diff. RRIF Max. Diff.
Austria
√
10.5c
√
9.0d
√ √
5.0
√
Belgium
√
6.2e × × × × × ×
Finland
√
3.2f
√
7.8 × √ 2.0 √
Greece
√
n.a.
√
n.a. n.a.
√
12.0 ×
Ireland
√
13.0f
√
10.0g –
√
3.0 ×
Netherlands
√
7.0h
√
var.
√ √
var.
√
Portugal
√
15.0e
√
17.0i × √ 2.0 ×
Denmark
√j 3.0 × × × × × ×
Sweden
√
5.0e
√
4.0 × ×k × ×
Norway
√
5.5l × × × × × ×
Switzerland
√
n.a.
√
2.5
√ √
2.5 ×
Memo:
Eurosystemm .. .. .. .. ..
√
2.0 ×
RRIF: Reserve requirements in force√
Yes
× No
Max.: Maximum reserve ratio applied.
Diff.: Different ratios for different types of liabilities/deposit (this information was unavailable for a
majority of countries for the 1970s; therefore the column has been left out for that decade).
.. Not applicable
N.a. Not available
Notes:
a 1988 unless otherwise indicated;
b Individual country ratios of EMU countries refer to ratios applied before the launch of the
Eurosystem;
c 1972;
d 1990;
e 1974;
f 1979;
g 1986;
h 1973;
i 1989;
j Temporarily in force 1975–76;
k The required reserve ratio was set to zero in April 1994, and has not been used as a policy instrument
since;
l 1976;
m since 1999.
Sources: BIS (1997b); Bank of Japan (1995); Borio (1997); Central-bank bulletins (various); ECB
(1998); Holbik (1973); Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989); OECD Financial Market Trends
(various); Pinto (1996).
insurance companies) had been used since the 1960s. From 1971 only the pri-
mary reserve requirements were used in Norway, but they were altered often and
by a lot.
Minimum reserve requirements were in use as a liquidity-management
instrument until the late 1990s in the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, and Ireland;
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but the only country where they played a signiﬁcant role for active liquidity man-
agement until the late 1990s was Greece (until its entry into the EMU), where the
instrument was deemed necessary to retain control over the liquidity supply in
the face of large capital inﬂows (this parallels earlier experiences in, for instance,
Portugal).
The increasing role of market instruments in central-bank operations
Threemain types of discretionary instrument predominate: short-term (cash) secu-
rities, repurchase operations, and swaps. Effective open-market operations to some
extent presuppose an existing market to operate in. Thus, central banks have typ-
ically, at some point or other, come to favour the creation of markets, and have
often stimulated and supported their development. This holds for interbank deposit
markets as well as for short-term securities markets.
The absence of an efﬁcient interbankmarket is bad news because banksmay then
rely on central-bank facilities to gain access to liquidity even when other banks are
very liquid, creating a situation of excess liquidity in the banking system and poorer
monetary transmission.6 For monetary policy to bite, banks’ marginal liquidity
needs must be settled with the central bank. Hence, when – as a consequence of
ﬁnancial deregulation – direct controls (such as speciﬁc credit quotas to individual
banks) can no longer be used to deal with excess-liquidity problems, there appears
an incentive for central banks to create adequate instruments to drain liquidity and
to stimulate the formation of markets for alternative short-term assets. Examples
are the establishment of efﬁcient day-to-day interbank markets in Belgium and
Sweden (1985–88), both of which were anticipated effects of changes in the lay-
out of monetary-policy operating procedures (BNB 1985; Kneeshaw and Van
den Bergh 1989). More generally, the initial emergence of a markka money mar-
ket was stimulated by the Bank of Finland’s decision to withdraw its presence
from the forward exchange market (around 1980). Parallels exist in, for example,
Denmark and Portugal (Danmarks NationalbankMonetary Review, August 1996;
Pinto 1996).
The emergence of short-term securities markets adds a dimension to liquidity
management for central banks. In practice, cash operations in short-term secu-
rities by central banks are relatively rare, even where the size of these markets
is sufﬁciently large to make such operations feasible (Borio 1997). One reason
is that other types of operation are more ﬂexible. Other reasons which have car-
ried some weight in several countries are the wish to avoid potential conﬂict with
other public-policy objectives – notably public-debt management (for example in
Denmark and Portugal) and tax policy, and the wish to avoid circumvention of
limits on central-bank lending to the government. These problems are particularly
relevant in emerging stages of money-market development (Mehran et al. 1996;
Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh 1989).
To avoid conﬂicts of interest and to increase the effectiveness of monetary
policy, it has been relatively common for central banks in small countries to
issue their own securities (central-bank CDs) in the primary market in order to
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absorb liquidity from the banking system. In some cases, this was one of the main
strategies of the central bank. Countries where the issue of central-bank paper
played an important role during shorter or longer periods include Finland (from
1987 onward, but particularly during the 1990s), the Netherlands (1994–9), and to
some extent Ireland and Portugal among the EMU countries; and Denmark (1992
onward) and Sweden (1992–6) among the non-EMU countries.
Even in the absence of outright transactions in securities, the existence of a
liquid securities segment in the money market is often argued to facilitate the
central bank’s operations by providing collateral for repurchase agreements and
similar collateralised transactions. To the extent that it does so, the varying
degrees to which short-term securities markets have emerged in the focus coun-
tries imply correspondingly varying possibilities for the respective central banks
to exploit the ﬂexibility and other advantages of repurchase agreements and sim-
ilar instruments.7 During the course of the 1990s this type of instrument was
adopted as a main liquidity-management instrument in Austria (1995), Finland
(mid-1990s), Denmark (1992), the Netherlands (refers to ‘special loans’), Sweden
(1994), Switzerland (1998), and then, from the time of its inception in 1999, in
the whole Eurosystem (see Table 6.7).
In principle, of course, any type of security — not just short-term securities —
may be used to underpin collateralised transactions. The common argument that
efﬁcient short-term securities markets are needed for the conduct of open-market
operations by central banks is therefore not necessarily particularly strong (see,
however, below). Recent developments, in which the ECBhas gradually expanded
its palette of security types eligible for collateral in repurchase operations, are
also an illustration of this. In the US (BIS 2001) and the UK (Bank of England
2002), where that palette is somewhat narrower, the debate in recent years has
been more concerned with the ‘quality’ (rather than the original maturity) of the
collateral: more speciﬁcally, the concern has been with the feasibility of open
market operations and the eligibility of private securities for central bank oper-
ations in an environment of declining government issues (McCauley 2001, and
Wojnilower 2000).
Nonetheless, the introduction of the commonmonetary-policy framework in the
euro area in 1999 altered the use of short-term paper as collateral for central-bank
operations quite substantially. In most EMU countries, the use of short-term paper
(particularly T-bills) as collateral for the ECB’s reﬁnancing operations increased
as compared to the pre-EMU collateralised transactions of the respective national
central banks. In Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands, the proportion remained
largely unchanged, whereas in Portugal and Finland, it decreased.8
Some countries without liquid short-term markets relied on foreign-exchange
operations (particularly swaps) for liquidity management. The pre-eminence of
swaps over spot or regular forward-exchange operations simply reﬂects the greater
importance of swaps in the interbank market. Swaps are the major instrument
by which banks cover their forward foreign-exchange commitments to customers
(Hooyman, 1994). Countrieswhere FX swaps played a signiﬁcant role for liquidity
management by the central bank and/or by the banking system as a whole include
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Austria, the Netherlands and Denmark. In Switzerland, USD-CHF swaps were
the principal market operation of the National Bank during the period between the
early 1980s and the late 1990s.9
There was a clear trend from the mid-1990s onward in the EMU group of coun-
tries toward a ‘non-spontaneous’ convergence in the arsenal of instruments used
by the central banks, in the explicit anticipation of adopting a uniﬁed operational
framework. This becomes clear from studying which instruments were adopted
by the central banks, and also from the motivations given for the speciﬁc reforms
made to the national, pre-EMU operational frameworks by the monetary authori-
ties themselves in annual accounts and other ofﬁcial documents. However, there
is also a case for arguing that the choice of instruments for the Eurosystem to
some extent reﬂected broader international trends in central-bank operations: an
argument which is somewhat strengthened by the observation that the non-EMU
countries in our sample have largely undergone similar changes in this respect
(often prior to corresponding changes in the EMU countries, as in the case with
the adoption of repos in Denmark and Sweden).
Changes of central-bank operating procedures: main drivers
Because ﬁnancial market regulations were partly designed as monetary policy
instruments, the deregulation process is in itself sufﬁcient reason for reformation
of the operational framework of central banks: as somepolicy instruments are taken
away, others must replace them. Therefore, the main drivers of changes in central
bank operating procedures largely coincide with those of ﬁnancial deregulation in
general. Beyond this somewhat trivial explanation, the literature and the central
banks’ own accounts offer ﬁve main reasons.
First, monetary-policy instruments were changed in several countries in order
to adapt the operational frameworks of the respective monetary authorities to new
regimes and/or new targets formonetary (and exchange-rate) policy. The examples
are manifold: the Austrian central bank, on embarking on its new ‘hard-currency’
policy in the late 1970s, put weight behind the new policy formulation by entering
(and keeping a permanent presence in) the foreign-exchangemarket (Glück 1994);
the Bank of Finland’s 1994 revision of intervention procedures and clearer focus
on interest rates were motivated by the new inﬂation target for monetary policy
(Kuosmanen 1996; Finland at this time adopted an inﬂation target); the same goes
for the new interest-rate management system adopted by the Swedish Riksbank
the same year (Hörngren 1994) and that of the Swiss National Bank which has
been in force since January, 2000.
Second, structural factors outside the central banks’ control made some of the
traditional instruments outdated and the adoption of new ones necessary. Such
structural factors may be quite varied. One of the primary reasons, for instance,
given by the Norwegian central bank for the revisions of its operational framework
in the 1990s was the need to adapt to the change in the underlying structural
liquidity position of banks (from a deﬁcit throughout the 1980s and up to 1992–3
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to a surplus in the years around 1995), which, in turn, was attributed primarily
to the weakening government budget; see Norges Bank (1995) and various issues
of the Economic Bulletin of the Bank of Norway. More important, however, were
the structural changes resulting from the general transformation of the ﬁnancial
system— a trend affecting all countries. The expansion of the ﬁnancial overhang
in the economy occurred more or less entirely outside the central banks’ balance
sheets, and therefore reduced the share of the ﬁnancial systemoverwhichmonetary
authorities could exert direct control. The result was an increasing need for indirect
ways to exercise control over the non-monetary components of the money supply.
In other words, the development produced (among other things) alternative liquid
assets which continually challenged the precision and purpose of a policy relying
heavily on, for example, regulating the growth rate of such or such a monetary
aggregate. One consequence was that interest rates emerged as a more relevant
operating variable (prominent exceptions to the rule were, importantly, countries
with largely bank-based ﬁnancial systems such as Germany and Switzerland).
To that extent, this second reason for central banks to change their instruments
is related to the ﬁrst one: structural changes outside the central banks’ control
indirectly called for new instruments by requiring that policy operate on different
variables.
A third factor relates both to the expansion and diversiﬁcation of ﬁnancial
markets domestically and to the increasing international integration of ﬁnancial
markets. Greater interest-rate ﬂexibility and narrowing differentials between rates
of return in different currencies gave rise to the need for instruments whereby
liquidity (and thereby interest rates) could be managed more ﬂexibly in time and
in magnitude, and with a greater measure of accuracy than that offered by, say,
discounting, interest-rate controls, and lending ceilings.10
Fourthly, the increasing importance of expectations in a world of free ﬁnancial
markets favoured the adoption of instruments better suited for signalling the cen-
tral bank’s monetary policy stance. By this token, the need for the possibility of
more ﬂexibly adjusting short-term interest rates and the need for tools appropriate
and effective for signalling medium- to long-term policy intentions were among
the reasons mentioned for the change of operational targets in Sweden in 1994
(BIS 1997b; Sveriges Riksbank 1994). Similarly, on introducing repurchase trans-
actions as one of its key operations and the lending rate for secured transactions as
the new main policy interest rate, the Danish Nationalbank gave the motive that
changes of the discount rate had become too ‘powerful’ (in other words, too blunt)
to be a useful tool (Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review 2, 1999).11
A ﬁfth broad category of reasons relates to the wish more generally on the part
of central banks to stimulate money-market activity and improve monetary-policy
transmission, and to achieve a clearer separation of monetary policy implemen-
tation from government-debt management, and from other social-policy goals
(favouring certain sectors in the economy by granting access to cheap credit
etc.) which were auxiliary reasons for the imposition of ﬁnancial-market regu-
lations. Because ﬁnancial regulations were often of a multiple-purpose variety,
and because the central bank was typically responsible for the implementation of
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the regulatory policy, the distinction between monetary policy and other ‘types’ of
policy had previously not always been very clear-cut. For instance, the experience
of the Portuguese central bank was that the controls used to attain monetary-policy
goals up to around 1990 increasingly conﬂictedwith other public-policy objectives
and with the ambition to achieve effective policy transmission. The consequence
was increased uncertainty and frequent unexpected changes of variables used to
calculate credit ceilings and quotas, rendering credit control less and less useful
or relevant (Pinto 1996). In Norway, the sentiment at the central bank around
1980 was that direct controls were no longer effective and, in fact, only made the
credit market more difﬁcult to control and the interpretation of information more
problematic (Vale 1995).
Sources and effects of ﬂuctuations in money-market liquidity
and the scope for open market operations
In order to analyse broad changes in monetary-policy stances and instruments over
the 20-year period from around 1980 up to the launch of EMU, we extracted the
principal sources and uses of money-market liquidity as well as the main instru-
ments used to inﬂuence liquidity from the central banks’ balance sheets over three
shorter periods: one in the early 1980s, one in the late 1980s (or early 1990s),
and one period in the late 1990s. The general methodology closely follows that
suggested by Borio (1997; Annex I). The frequency is weekly where available,
otherwise monthly (see the notes to Table 6.8). This somewhat impedes compa-
rability between periods and/or across countries. Still, we considered it better to
use the weekly-frequency data where such were available. The lower-frequency
(monthly) data may to an extent over-/understate some items because operations
of central banks often have shorter maturities than one month.12
Table 6.8 shows the principal sources of liquidity in our survey countries over the
three different periods. The variability of the autonomous positionwas consistently
much higher than the average position. This indicates that autonomous factors did
not generally have permanent ‘structural’ effects. More generally, it implies that
we cannot make statistically signiﬁcant conclusions about the average size of the
positions.
Policy can be assumed to work against the autonomous position (to have the
opposite sign), so as to offset its net effect on liquidity supply (banks’ reserves at the
central bank). This assumption is supported by the data but, aswith the autonomous
position, the variability of the policy position far exceeded its size, leaving little
or no room for conclusions about the average stance of policy. Generally, policy
appears to have offset autonomous inﬂuences imperfectly — that is, the average
size aswell as the standard deviation (variability) of autonomous factors aremostly
higher than that of policy.
The resulting effect varies. Overall, ﬂuctuations in net liquidity changes were
comparatively low in Belgium and the Netherlands. Per contra, average net
liquidity changes were more variable in Denmark and Norway. Comparing data
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within countries but across periods, there also appears to have been an upward
trend in liquidity ﬂuctuation in these two latter countries, possibly along with Ire-
land. The opposite trend seems to apply to Sweden. In Finland, liquidity ﬂuctuation
dropped between periods one and two, then rose again. For Portugal, this pattern
is inverted. These differences with regard to the variability of net liquidity changes
reﬂect differences in the variability of the autonomous position fairly well. That
can be taken as another indication that policy smoothed out liquidity ﬂuctuations
though only imperfectly.
Finally, the reasonable expectation of seeing more activist policy in latter years
is not invariably borne out by the data; rather, the standard deviation of the policy
position (which can be used as an indicator of policy activism) seems to have
covaried strongly with that of the autonomous position. Taken together, this rein-
forces the indication that the job of the central banks in the sample was primarily
to forecast and offset factors outside its direct control that inﬂuence the domestic
market.13
The variability of the main autonomous factors is shown in Table 6.9. Note that
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 contain only variability (standard deviations), not the aver-
age positions (again, these are generally statistically insigniﬁcant). Seen over all
countries and periods, the two most important autonomous sources of ﬂuctuation
in money-market liquidity (and thus the major factors that the central banks have
had to counter in their policies) were net foreign assets and net lending to the
government. Of these, the latter in many cases almost ceased to be a source of
ﬂuctuation in the last period, since central-bank lending to the government was
prohibited for members of the European Union. For these countries, this item
continued to inﬂuence liquidity only through marginal holdings of government
securities and through the government’s deposits at the central bank.
Table 6.9 Autonomous sources of liquidity—contribution of different components
Net foreign assets Net lending to
government
Other net assets Currency
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
AT n.a. 3.28 2.71 n.a. 0.08 0.19 n.a. 0.36 2.07 n.a. 2.19 1.29
BE 1.90 2.82 0.33 2.87 2.70 0.07 1.09 2.83 0.42 1.41 0.84 2.28
FI 3.92 3.51 6.45 1.43 0.72 0.01 1.30 0.96 1.00 1.63 0.35 1.16
GR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
IE 7.00 10.45 10.77 6.30 12.05 8.38 2.89 1.27 5.05 2.48 3.21 3.11
NL 3.12 0.83 0.63 3.91 8.97 0.05 3.65 0.57 0.80 0.88 0.89 0.80
PT 5.00 6.11 7.64 6.75 5.88 12.28 3.21 3.34 3.57 2.38 1.69 2.69
DK 14.26 19.28 28.89 20.59 17.77 26.89 9.54 6.88 3.30 2.89 2.77 1.86
SE 3.93 5.12 4.64 20.75 13.57 0.85 2.74 6.21 1.16 2.82 3.11 1.76
NO n.a. 30.89 13.09 n.a. 19.43 16.59 n.a. 4.28 6.44 n.a. 4.13 2.52
CH n.a. n.a. 4.38 n.a. n.a. 6.31 n.a. n.a. 0.95 n.a. n.a. 3.48
The table shows the variability (standard deviations) of average weekly (monthly) changes as % of the
average level of base money. Deﬁnitions, notes and sources, see Table 6.8.
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Table 6.10 Policy position—contribution of different componentsa
Standing facilities Market operations
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
ATb n.a. 0.64 0.18 n.a. 2.79 3.21
BE 2.83 2.45 1.09 0.00 0.00 2.56
FI 10.13 2.96 0.02 30.78 30.09 100.25
GR n0.a0. n0.a0. n0.a0. n0.a0. n0.a0. n0.a.
IE 6.21 8.53 1.42 .00 11.77 6.40
NL 5.90 3.00 1.47 2.43 6.88 0.75
PTc n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
DK 23.41 12.55 0.00 0.01 0.00 44.71
SEd 17.47 5.98 5.58 0.00 8.59 7.61
NOc n.a. 30.52 n.a. n.a. 19.79 n.a.
CH n.a. n.a. 0.33 n.a. n.a. 11.39
The table shows the variability (standard deviations) of average weekly (monthly) changes as % of the
average level of base money. Deﬁnitions and sources, see Table 6.8.
Notes:
a The precision of the designation of the various instruments used by the central banks to
inject/withdraw liquidity into the categories of ‘standing facilities’ and ‘market operations’,
respectively, is constrained by the limits of the information contained in the regularly published
balance sheets of the respective central banks; no in-depth analysis of the de facto nature of the
various instruments used has been possible.
b The ‘Market operations’ component includes certain types of foreign-exchange operation;
operations in the domestic market were negligible until 1995.
c Lack of data due to the fact that the Central Bank’s balance sheet does not discriminate among
different policy instruments (NO, P3), or makes only a functional categorisation (liquidity-
absorbing/-injecting assets/liabilities: PT, P1–P3).
d The series for Period 2 are not completely consistent due to changes in operating procedures in
August, 1988; ﬁgures are estimates.
The net-foreign-assets portion of the autonomous position should — all else
equal — be more variable in countries with far-reaching exchange-rate commit-
ments, where the central bank was active in the foreign-exchange market or in
other ways made more extensive use of foreign-exchange reserves to uphold that
commitment (such as Austria and the Netherlands). Conversely, it should be less
variable in countries where exchange-rate commitments were absent, or secondary
to monetary policy (such as Switzerland, or Sweden in Period 3). However, no
clear such pattern can be discerned, although Denmark ﬁts well into the picture.
For the other countries in the study there was a tendency for net foreign assets to
be a more important source of liquidity ﬂuctuation in ‘weak-currency’ countries –
regardless of exchange-rate regime – and a less important one in ‘hard-currency’
countries. (This tendency, however, must be considered very tentative, given the
imprecision of any categorisation of hard- and weak-currency countries; for evi-
dence of the inﬂuence of exchange-rate regimes on short-term interest rates, see
Forssbæck and Oxelheim 2006.)
In some countries (Denmark, Norway, and to some extent also Ireland, Portugal
and Sweden), foreign inﬂuences along with net lending to the government were
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consistently and by far and away the most important source of liquidity ﬂuctu-
ation (and thereby domestic short-term interest-rate ﬂuctuations). The historical
development of the foreign-assets position is varied: its contribution to liquidity
ﬂuctuations increased between the early 1980s and the late 1990s in Denmark,
Finland (though at a lower level), Ireland, Portugal, and (slightly) in Sweden; it
decreased in Belgium and the Netherlands. Similarly, it decreased between the
late 1980s/early 1990s in Austria and Norway. Net lending to the government
was particularly variable for the Scandinavian non-EMU countries (Denmark,
Norway and Sweden). This might well be interpreted as an illustration to what
has been said about the unclear separation of various forms of public policy;
notably the unclear separation of the central bank function from other public-
policy issues, such as ﬁnancing of the government. It would, in that case, indicate
that the Scandinavian central banks were among the least economically indepen-
dent among those covered here. This corresponds rather well to the indicators of
central-bank independence reported elsewhere (see Grilli et al. (1991) for one of
the original contributions in this ﬁeld).
Table 6.10 shows the respective contributions of standing facilities and market
operations to the central banks’ liquidity-policy positions. The data largely con-
ﬁrm the indications given earlier in this study, and results of earlier cross-country
studies, of an increased market-orientation of monetary policy operating proce-
dures. The variability of that portion of the policy position which is made up of
standing facilities has decreased across the board, and in most cases this decrease
ﬁnds a corresponding increase in the variability of the position stemming from
market operations.
The results from Table 6.10 provided us with a measure of the extent, or inten-
sity, of open market operations in the different countries at different periods.
In order to test the hypothesis of a relationship between choice of instrument type
and the degree of market development, we performed a series of tests, the results
of which are reported in Table 6.11 and Figure 6.2. The dependent variable is given
by the 22 observations of the variability of the market operations component of
the policy position in Table 6.10; the independent variable is the relative size of
the short-term securities market (as shown in Figure 6.1) at the periods corre-
sponding to the observations of the dependent variable. In order to counteract the
problem of a limited number of observations as much as possible we performed
both least-squares and non-parametric regressions. Caveats are still warranted,
both because of the imprecision and comparability problems of the data gener-
ated from the central banks’ balance sheets, and because of the questionability of
using the size of short-term securities markets as a yardstick for the feasibility of
open market operations (as discussed above); ﬁnally because the limited number
of observations still provide limited degrees of freedom for elaborating the model
tested.
As seen in Table 6.11, a simple linear regression does not indicate any signiﬁ-
cant correlation between the two variables, but a quadratic speciﬁcation provides
some support for the notion of a positive, but marginally decreasing, association
between the intensity of open market operations and market development. Given
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Table 6.11 Results of regression of the intensity of market operationsa on relative market
size (p-values in parentheses)
Least squares estimation Wilcoxon non-parametric estimation
I II I II
Intercept 5.644 −0.361 4.334** 0.276
(0.102) (0.930) (0.032) (0.912)
Market size 0.094 1.725** 0.038 1.046**
(0.707) (0.040) (0.789) (0.040)
(Market size)2 −0.058** −0.033*
(0.041) (0.054)
Adjusted R2 −0.042 0.123
Wilcoxon robust R2 0.004 0.208
F-statistic 0.146 2.470 0.080 2.489
(0.707) (0.111) (0.781) (0.110)
No. of obs. 22 22 22 22
Note:
a As measured by the variability in the policy position due to discretionary operations, see Table 6.10.
the limitations mentioned above, however, and some difﬁculty with the intuition
of a quadratic speciﬁcation to the right of the optimum (see Figure 6.2), the results
must be considered tentative.
Conclusion
Up to the late 1970s and early 1980s, in our case countries’ moneymarkets (as well
as the ﬁnancial sectors in general) were typically underdeveloped and highly regu-
lated (possibly with a couple of exceptions). Since then, policy, primarily through
the effect of a general deregulation of the ﬁnancial sectors, has been one of themain
determinants of money-market development. However, beyond motives and rea-
sons forﬁnancial deregulation that are valid for theﬁnancial sector as awhole (such
as technological advances, increasing internationalisation of business activities
and ﬁnancial innovation – the combination of which factors led to ever increasing
opportunities to evade or circumvent existing national ﬁnancial regulations and
restrictions –, an increasing realisation on the part of policy makers of the incom-
patibility of highly repressed ﬁnancial systems with efﬁcient resource allocation,
and international ‘peer pressure’ in the context of international organisations and
institutions for international economic cooperation), we would argue that there are
also additional ‘policy’ motives for promoting the formation of efﬁcient money
markets, speciﬁcally. In particular, we found motives in terms of the need of the
central banks for an arena in which to conduct open market operations and in other
ways to control the supply of liquidity to the banking system, as regulations, con-
trols and restrictions became increasingly ineffectual or unavailable as instruments
for monetary-policy implementation.
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Figure 6.2 Estimated relationship between the intensity of open market operations and
the relative size of short-term securities markets (Wilcoxon non-parametric
estimates as in Table 6.11).
Such generalisations, however, cannot explain the signiﬁcant differences in
the path of money market development among the countries we study. These
differences – in terms of the size of the market in total, as well as the structure
and relative importance of the main market segments – instead largely seemed
to persist during the entire period studied. A rough division, for instance, can
be made between countries with and countries without a signiﬁcant short-term
securities segment. However, in those countries that do have such segments,
these segments still vary substantially with regard to size, liquidity and the rela-
tive importance of different types of securities. For example, the development of
Finland’s short-term securities market was based on bank CDs, while most other
countries’ markets were based on government bills; in Greece, the governmenT-
bill market, though large, did not give rise to a signiﬁcant market for other types
of short-term paper, and the market long remained very illiquid; from a relatively
small market toward the late 1990s Ireland developed a market for commercial
paper which remains unparalleled in relative size in any of the other countries
(possibly with the exception of the Swedish CP market).
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We therefore conclude that the development over time may best be charac-
terised as a continuous interplay between policy decisions and market outcomes.
The development process is thus highly path-dependent, and largely reﬂects
ad hoc policy decisions, which are often, in themselves, responses tomarket devel-
opments. There may also be considerable potential spill-over effects from other
policy areas, such as taxation and competition policy, to the extent that such poli-
ciesmay indirectly act restrictively, even in the absence of explicit ﬁnancial-market
regulations and controls, or impose certain – possibly unforeseen – incentives upon
market participants.
Such country-speciﬁc, path-dependent interactions may also apply to the inﬂu-
ence that central banks have had on the development of money markets in the
respective countries. Financial-market innovation in general, and the emergence
of increasingly sophisticated money-market instruments in particular, should, all
else equal, weaken monetary policy transmission by the continuous supply of
substitutes to central-bank money. In other words, our ﬁndings of a development
towards more sophisticated and efﬁcient domestic money markets should on bal-
ance weaken the effects of monetary policy. However, if there is anything to the
story of an interplay between market formation and the operative framework of
monetary policy — the simple mechanics that as markets change, central-bank
operations change, and vice versa — then the timing and sequencing of ﬁnancial
deregulation/the abolition of direct controls, as well as more subtle aspects of
central bank policy may bring home some important lessons.
We found ﬁve main reasons, or sets of reasons, why monetary-policy operating
procedures changed during the period of study. First, monetary-policy instruments
were adapted to changes in the targets or goals of monetary policy (for example,
from an exchange-rate target to an inﬂation target). Second, central banks adapted
their operative frameworks to structural changes outside their control (for example,
the reliance on the part of central banks on certain types of regulation became out-
dated as innovation in the moneymarket increased opportunities for market agents
to circumvent such controls). Third, the development of money markets domes-
tically as well as a stronger international integration of these markets increased
the central banks’ need for instruments that allowed them to manage liquidity
supply more ﬂexibly and with a greater degree of accuracy. Fourth, the growing
importance of expectations in a deregulated ﬁnancial system increased the need
for instruments which could be used to signal the central bank’s policy stance.
The ﬁfth set of reasons was a general wish to stimulate money-market activity in
order to improve monetary-policy transmission, and to clarify the separation of
monetary policy from other types of public policy (such as government ﬁnancing).
These ﬁve broad categories, which account for the often substantial revisions
of central-bank policy strategies in the focus countries over the period studied,
are clearly not independent of each other, and often overlapping, but they do
indicate that central banks had an inﬂuence on money-market development that
was signiﬁcant (in some cases it appears to have been decisive). However, the
relationship goes the other way too. There seems to be some connection between
comparatively radical changes in domestic money-market development (in terms
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of innovation, market growth and regulatory changes) and greater changes in
monetary-policy instruments. In addition, we also found tentative evidence in
favour of the hypothesis of a correlation between market development and the
intensity of open market operations.
Although the structure of money markets in the countries studied remained
highly varied during the study period and the interplay between policies andmarket
outcomes may have carved out different paths of development for the countries, in
terms of the instruments which came to be increasingly favoured by central banks
during the period, however, there are more signs of convergence from the mid-
1990s onward: in the EMU countries as a matter of course (since they have, both
de jure and de facto, adopted a uniﬁed operational framework) but also in the non-
EMU countries, as well as many other industrialised countries. A salient feature
of this particular development is that, in recent years, repurchase agreements and
variations on collateralised lending/borrowing have become the dominant instru-
ment used by central banks to implement monetary policy. A general explanation
for this is that this type of instrument answers well to many of the needs of central
banking – for example ﬂexibility and the possibility to effectively signal the policy
stance to ﬁnancial markets. By and by, central banks have also typically broadened
their collateral base (that is, the list of securities types that they will accept in a
buy/sell-back operation), which diminishes the need for a large short-term securi-
ties markets for repo transactions, thus making this type of operation feasible even
in countries where the short-term securities segment is ill-developed.
If there are substantial similarities in the adoption and abandonment, respec-
tively, of monetary-policy instruments, there seem to be larger differences in the
sources and effects of ﬂuctuations in money-market liquidity across the different
countries. We studied changes in the sources and effects of ﬂuctuations in money-
market liquidity over the 1980s and 1990s in our focus countries by analysing the
respective central banks’ balance sheets. A general conclusion is that the greatest
inﬂuence on liquidity ﬂuctuations is factors outside the central banks’ control, and
that the main effect of monetary policy is to offset these factors (which central
banks typically do imperfectly). The overall, as well as the relative, importance
of the autonomous factors (primarily the inﬂuence of capital ﬂows through net
foreign assets and net lending to the government), however, vary considerably
between the countries and periods although the net-foreign-assets component is
the most important source in almost all our case countries. Based on our results,
we argued that these differences could be explained by simple institutional factors,
such as the exchange-rate regime. Further, our data indicate a credibility issue.
Notes
1 The cross-country comparisons of central bank operating procedures that exist – e.g.,
Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989), Batten et al. (1990), Bernanke and Mishkin
(1992), Kasman (1992), Goodhart and Vi nals (1994), Hooyman (1994), Bisignano
(1996), Borio (1997), BIS (1986; 2001), Kopcke (2002) – consistently indicate that
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changes in the operative frameworks of central banks have been both effects and drivers
of broader changes in ﬁnancial markets. This is the link we focus on here. For more
general considerations of the political economy of ﬁnancial market development, see,
e.g. Pagano and Volpin (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (2003).
2 The usual argument given for this sequence of events is that agents in wholesale markets
are assumed to be more professional, thus better qualiﬁed to handle market-determined
rates; see, for example, Mehran et al. (1996).
3 The ‘empirical’ relevance of implicit interest rate regulations is illustrated by Pech’s
(1994) estimation that in the early 1990s almost half of all credit extended to industry
in Austria, though formally free from regulations, was in fact subsidised.
4 Temporary regulations have been resorted to in extreme cases even in recent years.
The latest example is the imposition by the Bank of Greece of a 12% credit-expansion
ceiling on commercial banks in 1999 after consumer credit had expanded more than
30% p.a. in 1998 and 1999 (Bank of Greece, Monetary Interim Report, 1999).
5 General references for this sub-section not cited elsewhere include BIS (1986; 1997a),
and Aspetsberger (1996).
6 In Switzerland, for instance, the underdeveloped domesticmoneymarket, the unaccom-
modative attitude of theNational Bankwith regard to reserve imbalances (resulting from
its long-standing reserves target — now abolished) and the comparatively high cost of
Lombard (overdraft) facilities led Swiss banks to hold reserves substantially in excess
of those required under reserve requirements (Kasman, 1992).
7 Several advantages are perceived with repos as an instrument for monetary policy rela-
tive to more orthodox cash instruments (Turner and van ‘t dack, 1996; BIS, 1999). One
advantage is that they do not directly inﬂuence the underlying asset prices. A second
is their ﬂexibility: they break the link between the maturity of the asset and the trans-
action, and can essentially be tailored to suit prevailing liquidity conditions. Thirdly,
because repo transactions are backed by (high-quality) collateral, the risk involved is
typically very low. This also means that they convey relatively accurate information on
the market’s interest-rate expectations over the short term. Finally, repos are seen as
appropriate for signaling the central bank’s monetary-policy stance.
8 In Portugal, the decline in short-term paper as collateral refers primarily to T-bills,
which decreased from initially very low levels (3% ). In Finland, however, collateral
paper mostly consisted of bank CDs, the use of which dropped from about 30 to 20%
after the adoption of the common monetary-policy framework in the euro area. See
Santillán et al. (2000).
9 By 1987, the National Bank’s holdings of currency swap contracts amounted to approx-
imately half of its foreign-currency assets, which in turn amounted (together with gold)
to almost 90% of its total assets. Roughly that situation remained until 1998, when the
Nationalbank began to broaden its arsenal of instruments (Banque Nationale Suisse,
Bulletin Trimestriel 4, December, 1999). Also see Zurlinden (1996).
10 As ﬁnancial integration between countries increases, the narrowing interest-rate dif-
ferentials vis-à-vis other countries imply that even very small interest-rate movements
can generate considerable cross-border capital ﬂows, making exchange-rate or money-
supply targets increasingly difﬁcult to meet. Hence the increasing need for instruments
which would enable the central bank to inﬂuence domestic short-term rates with greater
ﬂexibility and accuracy.
11 One additional motive for the Nationalbank to increasingly use secured transactions in
its operations to extend liquidity to the banks was to lower the risk involved in these
operations. A reason for wanting to do so may have been concern with the solvency of
the banking system (Finland, Norway and Sweden experienced rather severe banking
crises at the time).
12 The average size of the positions as well as their variability tend to increase with the
total length of the period covered, and therefore tend to be higher for those countries
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for which monthly rather than weekly data are used: an indication that the data should
be interpreted with caution.
13 One potentially complicating factor here is that if we believe that the central bank’s
policy measures can in and of themselves give rise to ‘innovations’, we have an endo-
geneity problem of the ‘autonomous’ factors: the central bank inﬂuences these factors
indirectly through its own actions.
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Abstract
We discuss the prospects for Chinese money market development and transition to market-based
monetary policy operations based on a comparative historical analysis of the present Chinese situation and
the development in 11 European countries from 1979 up to the launch of the European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). Central banks in the latter group of countries typically had an incentive to
encourage the formation of efficient benchmark segments in the domestic money markets for the conduct of
open market operations as traditional quantity-oriented instruments became increasingly ineffective. China
is displaying many of the same symptoms as the European countries in the 1970s and 1980s, including poor
monetary transmission due to excess liquidity and conflicts of interest due to unclear priority among
multiple policy goals. We conclude that in a number of aspects, current Chinese monetary policy operations
are counter-productive to efforts to develop an efficient moneymarket that can serve as arena for an effective
market-based monetary policy, and provide policy recommendations.
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1. Introduction
The practical implementation, as well as the targets and the underlying objectives of monetary
policy underwent significant changes in most industrial countries during a period from the late
1970s until the late 1990s. These changes were paralleled by a transformation of financial
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markets – including money markets as the main ‘forum’ for the implementation of monetary
policy – consisting essentially of broad-based deregulation of credit systems on the one hand, and
a rapid growth of alternatives to central-bank money as sources of financing on the other. The
parallel processes of financial market development and reorientation of monetary policy are
intertwined1 and mutually reinforcing, and have their roots in domestic historical and political-
economy factors as well as in increased international financial integration (Forssbæck &
Oxelheim, 2003).
The weakness of the financial system is often argued to be an Achilles heel of the Chinese
economy, and China is committed under its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession
agreement to further opening up its financial system. This implies the removal of a large number
of administrative restrictions, controls and regulations. Required reforms include opening up the
capital account, liberalizing interest rates, and allowing foreign banks full access to the domestic
market. There is a large (and growing) literature on the fragility of the Chinese banking sector,
Chinese capital flows and capital flight, China’s exchange rate regime, etc. However, the co-
dependence between financial market development and increased effectiveness of monetary
policy in the face of increased international integration – through a reorientation of the targets as
well as the arsenal of instruments used by the central bank – is a less explored area of study.
Because the money market is a key link between a country’s financial system and its real
economy, and the primary arena for the conduct of monetary policy, a poorly functioning money
market is presently a key problem in China, as the development toward a market economy in
other sectors and commitments under the WTO accession agreement have taken the need for
reforms of beyond the point of no return. We argue in this paper that remnants of a traditional
‘dirigiste’, direct-control approach presently thwarts the effectiveness of monetary policy, and
that with a more open financial system these problems are likely to persist, or even accelerate.
We further argue that in several key respects – e.g. initial financial repression, increased
capital mobility, poor transmission, and multiple targets – relevant to this line of inquiry, the
present situation in China is comparable to that of several European countries in the 1980s.
Although potentially an economic giant, the size of the Chinese economy and its dependence on
external markets during the 1990s and early 2000s make it more comparable with small and open,
rather than with larger, developed economies.
The paper thus builds on research on money market development and monetary policy reform
in a sample of small or medium-sized, open European countries2 and extracts lessons for China
from the experiences of these countries. Apart from their dependence on external markets, the
choice of benchmark countries is also motivated by the fact that the money markets for these
countries’ currencies were virtually non-existent at the beginning of the 1980s, but then went
though phases of emergence, growth, sophistication and international integration over a period of
approximately 20 years. The process is thus in some sense ‘completed’, rather than still ongoing,
as in most other Asian countries (except Japan, which, however, is a special case for other
reasons), or in alternative possible benchmark countries. The countries also represent the full
J. Forssbæck, L. Oxelheim / Journal of Asian Economics 18 (2007) 257–283258
1 Existing cross-country comparisons of monetary policy operating procedures – e.g., Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh
(1989), Batten, Blackwell, Kim, Nocera, and Ozeki (1990), Bernanke andMishkin (1992), Kasman (1992), Goodhart and
Vin˜als (1994), Hooyman (1994), Bisignano (1996), Borio (1997), BIS (2001), Kopcke (2002), Forssbæck and Oxelheim
(2006) – consistently indicate that changes in central banks’ operative frameworks are causes as well as effects of changes
in the functioning and structure of the financial system.
2 The benchmark countries are the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Ireland, the Netherlands Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.
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spectrum with regard to the level of ambition of exchange-rate policy and ‘reputation’: from
hard-currency, low-interest-rate countries to countries with a near-emerging-market status. Due
to this diversity, our eleven benchmark countries constitute an excellent ‘laboratory’ with regard
to the link between money market development and the conduct of monetary policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly summarize Chinese monetary policy
in recent years. Section 3 describes the development of money markets in the benchmark
countries and puts China into that perspective. In Section 4 we address changes in central-bank
operations and the increasing role of open market operations. Section 5 considers the main
drivers behind these changes, whereas in Section 6 we provide an empirical evaluation of
Chinese monetary policy in light of the European experience. In Section 7, we discuss options for
Chinese monetary policy based on our empirical results. Finally, Section 8 summarizes our
findings and provides policy recommendations for China.
2. Chinese monetary policy in recent years – main contours of the development and
current problems
A brief summary of the People’s Bank of China’s (PBC) recent policies and performance
runs as follows. After the abolition of the dual exchange rate system in the mid-1990s, a fixed
exchange rate regime was adopted whereby the RMB was pegged to the USD. Four main
objectives of macroeconomic policy were attached to the reorientation of policy: economic
growth, price stability, full employment, and balance of payments equilibrium (Ping &
Xiaopu, 2003). Current account convertibility was adopted in 1996, and restrictions on capital
inflows were partially removed, whereas the enforcement by the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of remaining capital controls was strengthened (Ping & Xiaopu,
2003). Monetary policy was to some extent designed to support a more general policy to
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows (for an extensive analysis, see Prasad & Wei,
2005).
In 1998–2001, the PBC made (largely unsuccessful) attempts to increase credit growth
through open market operations and lowering of minimum reserve requirements. From 2003
onward, the attempts have rather been to tighten monetary policy, however with equally limited
effects of the ‘standard’ arsenal of instruments. The PBC has frequently had to resort to moral
suasion and various forms of ad hoc administrative measures to steer banks’ behavior in the
desired direction (BIS, 2005; Green, 2005; PBC, various; Roach, 2005; Van der Linden, 2005).
Steps have been taken toward further deregulating capital inflows, relaxing restrictions on
capital outflows and expanding permissible foreign exchange transactions since the early 2000s.
As a step toward gradually increasing the flexibility of the exchange rate (after intensive
international debate – see, e.g., Eichengreen, 2005; Goldstein, 2004; Prasad, Rumbaugh, &
Wang, 2005; Yang, Yin, & He, 2004), the US dollar peg was abandoned in July, 2005, the RMB
revalued by 2.1% and henceforth linked to a currency basket through a managed float system.
There is increasing attention to the poor transmission of monetary policy in China (PBC,
various; Ping, 2004). The problem is due to deficiencies both in the step between the central bank
and the banking system, and between the banks and the public. Five such deficiencies can be
identified: (1) The non-responsiveness of the banking system to the central bank’s policy (in
particular, their insensitiveness to interest-rate changes) is largely due to the excess supply of
liquidity. If banks do not have to borrow in the money market to meet their liquidity needs, they
do not care about the price at which money can be borrowed there. (2) As a consequence of
banks’ own insensitiveness to the pricing of money, they do not appropriately pass on variations
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in these prices to their customers; hence, central bank policy has a very limited effect on the
consumption and investment behavior of firms and households. (3) Even if interest rate changes
are passed on by banks on the margin, the effect is diluted, since the banks have limited ability
and incentive to adequately price risk and differentiate the price of credit to different categories of
borrowers accordingly (cf. governance problems within the banking sector below). (4) Borrowers
are themselves insensitive to variations in the cost of funds because they do not face any
consequences in the event of failure to service the debts (state-owned enterprises), and because
credit-driven consumption is still extremely limited (households). (5) The continuing habit of the
PBC to exert control over the price, quantity, and direction of credit through informal measures
(‘window guidance’, moral suasion) as a means to achieve policy objectives, and – more
generally – the remaining political influence over large parts of the banking sector, distort the
market mechanism in the bank loans market, leading to continuing mispricing and misallocation
of credit.
The current policy dilemmas faced by Chinese monetary authorities are by nomeans unique in
historical perspective. The way out of them in those industrialized countries that have preceded
China has been three-fold: the parallel processes of financial deregulation, formation of efficient
domestic short-term securities markets (money markets), and reform of central bank operating
procedures. These processes are not only parallel, but intertwined and partially overlapping, and
have all been initiated in China. In order to ‘position’ the current Chinese situation vis-a`-vis our
benchmark countries, the following two sections make a comparative analysis of the
development in the European countries and progress so far in China.
3. Financial deregulation and money market development: China and Europe
compared
The European benchmark countries in this paper all followed the general trend among
industrial countries of broad-based financial-sector deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s. Below,
we make a brief summary of that process.3 We then go on to describing major trends in financial
innovation, differentiation, and market growth, with a focus on money markets. The findings are
used for comparisons with the present state of affairs in China.
3.1. Deregulation of the financial sector
Financial regulations and restrictions can be divided into a few main categories:
� pricing regulations (mostly various types of interest-rate regulations);
� quantitative credit restrictions (specific or general);
� investment obligations and liquidity requirements (the requirement on financial institutions to
hold minimum quantities of certain assets);
� restrictions on the issuance of financial instruments; and
� market-entry rules and ownership (asset) restrictions.
J. Forssbæck, L. Oxelheim / Journal of Asian Economics 18 (2007) 257–283260
3 For a more comprehensive account of the process of financial deregulation in the Nordic countries, see Oxelheim
(1996); a survey of this process for a large number of countries, includingmany emerging-market countries, is provided in
Williamson and Mahar (1998); beyond these, the best sources for specifics on deregulation in particular countries are
usually publications from the central bank of the country in question. OECD’s Financial Market Trends is also a useful
source.
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Table 1 summarizes the regulatory state of affairs for China in the mid-2000s and around 1980
in the benchmark countries, and illustrates the comparability of the situation. In spite of steps
toward deregulation having been taken in China since the mid-1990s, the financial system is still
repressed and largely based on regulatory infractions in financial market activity. Similar steps
toward deregulation had been taken in several of the benchmark countries during the 1970s (of
which, among others, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands), but a majority of the
countries still applied at least some regulations within most of the categories.
3.1.1. Interest-rate regulations
In China, interbank interest rate ceilings were abolished in 1996, the central bank rediscount
rate liberalized 2004, and the lending interest rate ceilings for banks were removed in 2004. The
interest rate liberalization process is still ongoing, however, and administrative influence over
price-setting is still exerted—both directly (as regards, e.g., deposit rates) and implicitly (Green,
2005; Liu, 2005).
Interest-rate deregulation had begun in the late 1970s and was completed by the mid-1980s in
Scandinavia, Ireland and the Netherlands. The last among the benchmark countries to abolish
interest-rate regulations, Greece and Portugal, completed the process a few years into the 1990s,
in accordance with their gradual implementation of European-Community directives (see
Rautava, 1994; Edey & Hviding, 1995).
The general pattern in our benchmark countries was that the liberalization of wholesale
interest rates occurred first, followed by lending rates and deposit rates. The process was mostly
gradual, and sometimes hesitant on the part of the authorities. An illustration of this is that formal
rules and restrictions (a ceiling, a quota, etc.) were often initially followed by recommendations
or various types of agreements before being de facto liberalized. These ‘implicit’ interest rate
regulations were enforced through the understanding that the authorities could, and would,
enforce their goals by means of the reinstatement of formal regulations if deemed necessary (see,
e.g., Grønvik, 1994).
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Table 1
Financial-market regulation in China 2005 and in the European benchmark countries 1980
Interest-rate
restrictions
Specific
credit
controlsa
Overall credit
growth limit
Investment
obligations
Issuing
restrictions
Market-entry
and ownership
restrictions
China � �b �b �c � �
11 benchmark countries � (10) � (10) � (7) � (6) � (10) � (9)
– (1) – (1) – (4) – (4) n.a. (1) – (1)
n.a. (1) n.a. (1)
(�): Regulation in force; (–): Regulation not in force; n.a.: Information not available. Figures in parentheses refer to
number of countries. Sources: Edey and Hviding (1995), OECD Financial Market Trends (various), Forssbæck and
Oxelheim (2003), Hope and Hu (2006), Oxelheim (1990, 1996), Ping and Xiaopu (2003), Vihria¨la¨ (1997), Wyplosz
(2001), PBC (2005) and other various national sources.
a Quotas or ceilings imposed on individual banks or groups of banks/financial institutions, and similar detailed credit
controls.
b Quotas have formally been scrapped but the central bank exerts/exerted discretionary control of credit growth through
‘guidelines’ or ‘moral suasion’.
c State-owned commercial banks were relieved from directed credit in 1994 by the creation of three so-called ‘policy
banks’; the latter, and possibly the former as well, remain subject to this type of regulation.
234 235
3.1.2. Credit controls and other quantitative regulations
In China, credit quotas were formally abolished in 1998. However, the PBC still routinely
controls the quantity of credit on a more discretionary basis, and is to some extent able to
influence both the quantity and the direction of bank credit through informal means (see, e.g.,
BIS, 2005). Clearly, de facto credit controls are still being applied, which – although presumably
a handy instrument for monetary authorities to apply to adjust short-run imbalances – is, as we
shall later argue, a major impediment to the long-run development of a more effective indirect,
market-based operational framework for monetary policy.
The link between prices and quantities implies complementarity of various types of
regulations. In combination with interest-rate regulations, quantitative credit and investment
restrictions, in one form or another, were employed in a majority of our benchmark countries,
both as a general monetary-policy instrument, as a tool to ration and control the allocation of
credit, and to provide cheap financing for the government.
Conversely, however, complementarity also implies that quantitative regulations to some
extent become obsolete or irrelevant as interest rates are being liberalized. Consequently, most
credit rules were abolished in our benchmark countries over about the same time span as, and
usually with a short lag to, interest-rate liberalization.
3.1.3. Issuing restrictions
Also complementary to interest-rate restrictions and controls on bank credit, issuing
restrictions on securities are used to control the transfer of credit through direct channels (that is,
through market issues). Typically, rules and regulations on minimum maturities, etc., have been
combined with various authorization requirements.
In China, securities issuance (both debt and equity) remains surrounded by formal and
informal restrictions. Before the mid 1980s, resource allocation was entirely in the hands of the
central government; State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were financed over the government fiscal
budget and the central government used state-owned commercial banks as fiscal agents. A few
local, unofficial and unregulated markets for equity and bonds began to develop spontaneously in
the 1980s (Green, 2003), but only by the opening of the stock exchanges in Shanghai and
Shenzhen in December 1990 did the Chinese government begin to pay attention to the regulation
and supervision of such markets. A two-way approach was adopted, by which basically a formal
central regulatory framework was introduced, combined with cautious segment-by-segment
liberalization of financial markets and state bank reforms (largely motivated by declining fiscal
revenues and the accumulation of bad loans in the state-owned banks, which limited the
government’s ability to meet SOEs’ financing needs). In 1992, the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) was established, and a quota system was introduced to control securities
issuance. Further reforms have been undertaken since the mid-1990s, and new instruments
successively introduced (see Section 3.2), but the government’s characterization of the existing
exchanges as ‘controlled experiments’ is illustratory of the general attitude of the authorities and
of the cautious and gradualist approach adopted by the Chinese government.
In our benchmark countries, the regulation of debt securities issuance was mostly in place for
slightly longer than interest-rate and credit controls. About half the countries in the benchmark
sample lifted issuing controls in the early-to-mid-1980s. In others, important steps toward the
opening-up of securities markets occurred in the context of a reform of government-financing
systems only toward the early-to-mid-1990s (De Broeck, Guillaume, & Van der Stichele, 1998;
Soumelis, 1995). Generally, however, the liberalization of markets for private debt was slower
than other categories. In addition, market development was in some cases stifled by the existence
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of various types of more or less informal authorization requirements—a sort of parallel to the
‘implicit’ interest-rate controls mentioned above.
3.1.4. Market-entry rules and ownership regulations
State-owned banks dominate the financial sector in China. The four state-owned banks had a
market-share of 57% in 2003. Local banks (20%), 10 joint stock commercial banks (14%), three
policy banks (8%) and foreign banks (1%) constitute the rest of the Chinese banking sector (Van
der Linden, 2005). Institutional reforms of PBC and state-owned banks have been undertaken
since 1993, but were initially largely unsuccessful, because they did not fundamentally alter
incentive structures and remove soft budget constraints within the banking sector (see, e.g., Park
& Sehrt, 2001). A 5-year time-table for a gradual opening of the banking sector was announced in
2001, and reform thereafter has included the transfer of power over banking regulation and
supervision from the PBC to the China Banking Regulation Commission (CBRC), financial
restructuring of the largest state-owned banks – both through Asset Management Companies
(AMCs) and through recapitalization directly over the government budget – and a full abolition
of line-of-business, ownership and foreign-entry restrictions in the banking sector as a result of
WTO negotiations (still ongoing; see Hope & Hu, 2006; Liu, 2005). In 2006, we have also
witnessed the privatization of some of the largest state-owned banks.4
In some of our benchmark countries, branching regulations were partially or wholly abolished
in the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, a ‘spontaneous’ functional market integration (taking
place, for instance, through banks establishing subsidiaries within the securities-trading business,
or acquiring finance companies) is often considered a major feature of the financial-market
transformation process undergone by the industrial countries in the 1980s.5 To some extent, this
implies a diminishing practical importance of remaining regulations.
To this category may also be counted restrictions on foreign-bank entry. In the benchmark
sample, about half of the countries opened their domestic markets for foreign banks during the
1980s or earlier, whereas in much of the rest of them, significant steps were taken only with the
implementation of the EU’s 2nd Banking Directive (effective in 1993).
In the area of ownership control, the deregulation wave made a comparatively modest
impression in the 1980s and 1990s, and several such regulations remained in the mid-1990s (see,
e.g. Herring & Litan, 1995). State-ownership of a large proportion of domestic financial
institutions also outlived financial deregulation in some benchmark countries. This applied
primarily to the countries with previously entirely nationalized financial sectors (Greece6 and
Portugal), but state-ownership of banks also became an effect of system-wide banking crises in
the early 1990s in a few of the countries.7
To summarize, the deregulation of domestic financial sectors in the European benchmark
countries began between the late 1970s (Austria, Scandinavian countries) and the mid-1980s
(Greece, Ireland), and was completed mostly around 1990, or a few years into the 1990s. In
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4 Including that of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), which, as of mid-October 2006, is expected to be
the biggest IPO in history so far.
5 See, for example, the survey in OECD (1989).
6 The Greek banking sector, for instance, was still completely dominated by state-owned banks when ownership
regulations were abolished. In terms of assets, the government’s ownership share was about 75 percent (see Hope, 1993).
7 Thus, the government’s ownership share of banks in Norway and Finland were 52 and 35 percent, respectively, in the
early 1990s (Banker, 1993). Also see the Economist (1992) and Warner (1993) for short background articles on the
deregulation and privatization of Portuguese banks.
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China, liberalizations began in the mid-1990s. It is difficult to measure the level of repression, but
based on the categories of restrictions still in de facto use in the mid-2000s, it would appear as
though the process still has some way to go.
3.2. Money market growth and development
Table 2 summarizes starting years for some of themainmoneymarket segments in the European
benchmark countries and inChina. In the former, during the 1980s and 1990s a certain convergence
in terms of the presence of different types of money-market instruments occurred. Considerable
dissimilarities remained, however, in terms of the relative total size of the domestic market as well
as in terms of the relative importance of specific segments of the market (see Table 3).
The most traditional money-market segment is the interbank deposit market, whose
importance is largely determined by the monetary authorities’ choice of operative framework and
by the existence of alternative segments. Deposit markets turned up in most countries as
monetary-policy instruments changed during the 1980s and 1990s. In China, the CHIBOR
interbank market was established in 1996 and opened to foreign banks in 1998.
In the short-term securities markets, treasury bills or equivalent short-term government
securities are typically the most important sub-market. In several benchmark countries, short-
term government securities had existed for a long time before the 1980s, but were traditionally
non-marketable, and sold directly to final holders (usually banks) at regulated rates. In none of
the benchmark countries did true markets for t-bills turn up until after 1980.
The Chinese t-bill market is so far insignificant. The aggregate supply of tradable government
bonds was in 2003 equivalent of about 32 percent of GDP—a low figure as compared with the
average for developed markets, which is about 100 percent. The maturity structure of bonds is
such that less than 5% are 2-year or less, indicating a short-term (government) bill market of
somewhere around 1% of GDP. According to other sources, trade in (long-term) government
bonds amounted to 95% of all traded debt in 2002 (Bottelier, 2004).
Two other main cash-instrument types – commercial paper (CP, generally issued by non-bank
entities) and certificates of deposit (CD, a securitized bank liability) – were introduced in several
benchmark countries in the mid-1980s, but as revealed by Table 3 their importance varies greatly.
A CD market does not exist in China beyond the PBC’s own central bank bills, which were
introduced in 2003. The development of this segment has been fast, however, with an increase of
outstanding amounts to an estimated 7% of GDP in March 2005.
Commercial-paper markets emerged in far from all the benchmark countries. In many cases,
the markets have also shrunk somewhat from their peaks in the early 1990s. There seems to be
some indications that where commercial-paper markets could be benchmarked against a liquid
government-bill market (or other instrument with a market-supporting role), their development
came earlier and was more extensive (see Alworth & Borio, 1993).
In China, the PBC announced rules for issuance of ‘short-term financing bills’ in late 2004 but
the market for corporate debt (including longer-term corporate bonds) has remained
insignificant. Other types of traded debt assets include banks’ non-performing loans (NPL)
through four state-owned Asset Management Companies (AMCs, established in 1998).
Beyond the above reported cash instruments, various derivative instruments play an important
role, as do repurchase agreements (repos), which – according to BIS estimates – was the fastest
growing instrument/transaction type internationally during the 1990s. Data, however, are scarce.
Reporting in different countries is also such that available historical data are not readily
comparable (for a survey of repo markets in G-10 countries, including data availability, see Bank
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for International Settlements, 1999). Existing data indicate considerable variations in derivatives
as well as repo markets (see Forssbæck & Oxelheim, 2003). In some benchmark countries, repo
markets were partly stifled due to thin debt markets (the Netherlands, Norway), ambiguities with
regard to regulatory policies, legal status and tax treatment (Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland), or an
excessively high degree of concentration of market players (see Commission of the European
Communities, 1999).
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Table 2
Money-market innovations, money-market development in different benchmark countries
China 11 benchmark countries
Interbank deposit market 1996 1978a–1993
n.a. (4)
‘-IBOR’ reference rate 1996 1987–1994
n.a. (1)
Treasury bills or treasury notes 1986b 1975c–1991
Certificates of deposit (CDs) 2004d 1982–1993
– (4)
n.a. (1)
Central-bank CDs 2003 1987–1995
– (5)
Commercial paper (CP) 2004d 1983–1994
– (4)
Single-currency interest-rate futures 2006 1984–1996
Single-currency interest-rate swaps and/or options – 1985–1994
n.a. (1)
Foreign-exchange or currency swapse 1980 1976–1990
n.a. (1)
Repo market 1991 1980s–1998
– (2)
n.a. (2)
Repos adopted by central bank 1998f 1984g–1998
– (1)
n.a. (2)
Years refer to year of introduction, year of deregulation of market, or year of establishment of a viable market. (–):
Not applicable/a viable market in the instrument does not exist; n.a.: Information not available. Figures in parentheses
refer to number of countries. Sources: Alworth and Borio (1993), BIS (1999), Batten et al. (1990), De Broeck et al.
(1998), De Teran (2004), Euromoney country surveys (various), Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2003), Green (2005),
Holbik (1991), Hope and Hu (2006), Khoury (1990), Kullberg (1991), Norges Bank (1995), OECD Financial Market
Trends (various), Oxelheim (1996), Ping and Xiaopu (2003), Pinto (1996), Yang et al. (2004); various national
sources.
a A market existed in Denmark since the 1970s but remained inactive until the reform of the monetary-policy operating
framework in 1992.
b Refers to year when limited trading was first permitted.
c Irish ‘Exchequer bills’ were marketed since the 1960s.
d Refers to ‘short-term financing bills’.
e Refers to ‘interbank swaps’: central banks have been using swaplike instruments for considerably longer—the
German Bundesbank, e.g., since 1958 (Hooyman, 1994).
f Operations have since largely seized due to inadequate supply of underlying instruments.
g Some central banks were making ‘repo-like’ advances against collateral before this year.
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A repo market was established in China in the early 1990s; since 1997, it is split up into an
interbank market and a corporate market (hosted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange). Available
evidence indicate that repo transactions in government bonds are by far the most important
contract type traded interbank (PBC, various; Ping, 2004), but it is not clear to what extent these
are transactions with the central bank; nor is it possible to directly compare the importance of this
market with other central bank facilities for the settling of liquidity imbalances (see Section 5). A
first set of rules to govern Chinese banks’ derivatives trading was introduced in 2004 (De Teran,
2004), but a viable market does not yet exist. However, the establishment of the Financial Futures
exchange in September 2006 may mean an essential step forward.
4. Changes in central-bank operations8
Until the mid-1980s central banks in our benchmark countries relied largely on traditional
credit and deposit facilities (standing facilities), supported by various direct controls, for the
conduct of monetary policy. The ordinary credit facilities were mostly supplemented by some
sort of tranche-division system (for example, Denmark, Finland), penalty-rate system (Austria,
Sweden), or a combination of both (Belgium, the Netherlands) in order to allow central-bank
control of the marginal cost of banks’ borrowing under the facilities, and thereby of the supply of
liquidity to the banking system.
All our benchmark countries reformed their operative frameworks for monetary policy quite
substantially during the 20 years we study. In some countries, the revision of the monetary-policy
operating framework took the form of comprehensive reforms (for example, Denmark 1992,
Switzerland 2000); in others, developments proceeded in a more piecemeal manner. In several
countries (Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands) the trend toward a gradually increased
diversification of liquidity-supply instruments became visible toward the mid-to-late 1980s.
Others followed suit during the 1990s (Denmark, Portugal, Austria).
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Table 3
Short-term securities markets in China, 2004, and in benchmark countries in 1985 and 1995
T-bills CDs CB CDs CP/other Total
China in 2004 <1.0 – 6.7 n.a. 7 (est.)
11 benchmark countries, 1985
-range 0.8–24.6 (9) 0.1–3.9 (4) – 1.1 (1) 0.8–24.3 (9)
-mean 8.5 1.8 – 1.1 9.4
– (2) (7) (11) (10) (2)
11 benchmark countries, 1995
-range 2.0–31.1 (11) 0.2–12.9 (8) 1.7–4.9 (3) 0.5–8.2 (7) 4.0–31.3 (11)
-mean 10.0 3.3 3.7 3.2 15.5
– (0) (3) (8) (4) (0)
Outstanding amounts (% of GDP at year-end); (–): Not applicable/a viable market in the instrument does not exist; n.a.:
Data not available. Figures in parentheses refer to number of countries. Sources: Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance
(BMF) and Austrian Federal Financing Agency (BFA); Ministe`re des Finances Belge, Administration de la Tre´sorerie;
Danmarks Nationalbank; Suomen Pankki; Bank of Greece; Central Bank of Ireland; De Nederlandsche Bank; Norges
Bank; Banco de Portugal; Sveriges Riksbank; Banque Nationale Suisse; People’s Bank of China; BIS, Quarterly Review:
International Banking and Financial Market Developments (various); Green (2005); GDP figures from IMF International
Financial Statistics and Deutsche Bank.
8 General references for this sub-section not cited elsewhere include BIS (1986, 1997a), and Aspetsberger (1996).
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4.1. The diminishing role of quantitative controls
The diversification of instruments used by central banks as well as by other money-market
agents in our benchmark countries during the 1980s and 1990s was paralleled with the lifting of
most direct regulations. This sub-section therefore focuses on one direct control that remained in
use by many central banks—the minimum reserve requirement.
During the 1990s, practically all our benchmark countries followed an international trend
among industrial countries toward lowering or completely abolishing reserve requirements (see
Table 4). The major arguments behind these reforms were to reduce the tax effect of reserve
requirements and to neutralize the competitive disadvantage of subjected depository institutions
vis-a`-vis other financial institutions—domestic or foreign (see European Commission,
‘Minimum Reserve Requirements and Monetary Policy’, Weekly Review of Financial Market
Developments 37, November, 1997).
The objectives of the reserve-requirement instrument were originally to maintain banks’
liquidity even in case of large deposit withdrawals, and to influence liquidity for monetary-policy
purposes. Nowadays, reserve requirements mainly serve three purposes in developed economies.
One is as a means of providing for banks’ ongoing liquidity needs (having banks in a position of
reliance on the central bank facilitates the conduct of monetary policy). A second purpose is to
improve the flexibility of banks’ liquidity management (reserves can be used to settle interbank
payments). Finally, reserve requirements (particularly if unremunerated) can provide seigniorage
income for the central bank, thereby contributing to its profitability and (economic)
independence (see, e.g. Grønvik, 1994; Bank of Finland Bulletin 12, 1996; BIS, 2003).
Benchmark countries that abandoned the use of reserve requirements more or less entirely
relatively early on include Belgium (mid-1970s), Norway (1987) and Sweden (1990). In Norway,
for example, both primary reserves (that is, cash-reserve requirements) and secondary reserves
(compulsory bond holdings by banks and insurance companies) had been used since the 1960s.
From 1971 only the primary reserve requirements were used in Norway, but they were altered
often and by much.
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Table 4
Reserve requirements in China, 1999 and 2004, and in benchmark countries in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s
Reserve requirements
in force
Maximum reserve
ratio applied
Differentiated ratios for
different types of liabilities
China, 1999 � 13.0 –
China, 2004 � 7.5 �
11 benchmark countries, 1970sa � (11) 3.0–15.0 (9) n.a. (11)
n.a. (2)
11 benchmark countries, late 1980sb � (8) 2.5–17.0 (7) � (3)
– (3) n.a. (1) – (7)
n.a. (1)
11 benchmark countries, late 1990sc � (7) 2.0–12.0 (7) � (3)
– (4) – (8)
(�): Yes; (–) No; n.a.: Information not available. Figures in parentheses refer to number of countries. Sources:Bank of Japan
(1995), BIS (1997b), Borio (1997), Central-bank bulletins (various), ECB (1998), Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2003), Holbik
(1973), Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989), OECD Financial Market Trends (various), Pinto (1996) and PBC (2005).
a Exact years vary; see Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2003) for detailed country-by-country indications.
b 1988, except Ireland (1986) and Portugal (1989).
c Refers to individual country ratios applied in 1998/1999 before the launch of the Eurosystem.
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Minimum reserve requirements did play a role (at least formally) as liquidity-management
instrument until the late 1990s in the Netherlands and, to some extent, in Austria, Finland, and
Ireland. However, the only benchmark country where they played a significant role for active
liquidity management in the late 1990s was Greece (until its entry into the EMU), where the
instrument was deemed necessary to retain control over the liquidity supply in the face of large
capital inflows. This parallels earlier experiences in, for instance, Portugal, other emerging
market economies, and the present situation in China, where since the 1990s the PBC still relies
heavily on reserve requirements to manage liquidity.
China has lowered reserve requirement ratios since the 1980s and 1990s (see Fig. 1), but there
is no clear-cut trend, and an indication of the PBC’s continued reliance on this instrument type is
its introduction of a differentiated reserve requirement system in 2004 to increase flexibility and
precision. However, minimum reserve requirements do not bite as a monetary policy tool unless a
properly functioning pricing mechanism in the money market gives banks an incentive not to put
their liquidity into reserves (i.e. keep them close to the minimum requirement). This is not the
case in China, where the reserve holdings of the banks have more or less consistently been in
excess of 5 percent beyond the required ratio (see Fig. 2).
4.2. The increasing role of market instruments in central-bank operations
Three main types of market instruments predominate: short-term securities, repurchase
operations, and swaps. The prevalence in our benchmark countries and in China of these main
instrument types is examined in the present sub-section.
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Fig. 1. Minimum reserve requirements in China, 1985–2004. Source: People’s Bank of China.
Fig. 2. Excess reserve ratio of Chinese banks, 1998–2005 (average at year-end). Source: People’s Bank of China.
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Effective open-market operations to some extent presuppose an existing market to operate in.
Thus, central banks have typically, at some point or another, come to favor the creation of
markets, and have often stimulated and supported their development. This holds for interbank
deposit markets as well as for short-term securities markets.
The absence of an efficient interbank market is bad news for the central bank to the extent that
banks thenmay rely on central-bank facilities to gain access to liquidity even when other banks are
very liquid, creating a situation of excess liquidity in the banking system and poorer monetary
transmission.9 Formonetary policy to bite, banks’marginal liquidity needsmust be settledwith the
central bank. Hence there is a need for central banks to create adequate instruments to drain
liquidity and to stimulate the formation of markets for alternative short-term assets. Instead,
traditionally in our benchmark countries, specific credit quotas to individual banks were used to
atone for this problem. In the general climate of decontrol in the mid-1980s, however, it seems
ultimately to have been widely accepted that stimulating the emergence of efficient markets was a
more constructive path to pursue. Examples are the establishment of efficient day-to-day interbank
markets in Belgium and Sweden (in both cases around 1985–1988), which were more or less
anticipated effects of changes in the layout of monetary-policy operating procedures (BNB, 1985;
Kneeshaw&Van denBergh, 1989).More generally, the emergence of amarkkamoneymarketwas
stimulated by the Bank of Finland’s decision to leave the forward exchangemarket to the devices of
the banks themselves (around 1980). Parallels exist in, for example, Denmark and Portugal (see
Danmarks Nationalbank Monetary Review, August 1996; and Pinto, 1996).
The emergence of short-term securities markets adds a dimension to liquidity management for
central banks. In practice, cash operations in short-term securities by central banks are relatively
rare, even where the size of these markets is sufficiently large to make such operations feasible
(see Borio, 1997; BIS, 2003). One reason is that other types of operations are more flexible. Other
reasons which have carried some weight in several benchmark countries are the wish to avoid
potential conflict with other public-policy objectives (notably public-debt management, for
example in Denmark and Portugal, and tax policy), and the wish to avoid circumvention of limits
on central-bank lending to the government.10
To avoid conflicts of interest and to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy, it has been
relatively common for central banks in the benchmark countries to issue their own securities
(central-bank CDs) in the primary market in order to absorb liquidity from the banking system. In
some cases, this has been one of the main strategies of the central bank. Countries where the
issuance of central-bank paper has played an important role during shorter or longer periods include
Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal among the EMU countries, and Denmark and
Sweden among non-EMU countries. This is currently the main type of market operation in China.
Even in the absence of outright transactions in securities, the existence of a liquid securities
segment in the money market is often argued to facilitate the central bank’s operations by
providing collateral to repurchase agreements and similar collateralized transactions. To the
extent that it does so, the varying degrees to which short-term securities markets have emerged in
the benchmark countries imply correspondingly varying possibilities for the respective central
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9 In Switzerland, for instance, the underdeveloped domestic money market, the unaccommodative attitude of the
National Bank with regard to reserve imbalances (resulting from its long-standing reserves target – now abolished – ) and
the comparatively high cost of Lombard (overdraft) facilities led Swiss banks to hold reserves substantially in excess of
those required under reserve requirements (Kasman, 1992).
10 These problems are particularly relevant in emerging stages of money-market development; see, e.g., Mehran,
Laurens, and Quintyn (1996), Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989).
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banks to exploit the flexibility and other advantages of repurchase agreements and similar
instruments. During the course of the 1990s, repurchase transactions were adopted as a main
liquidity-management instrument in Denmark (as from 1992), Sweden (1994) and Switzerland
(1998), in Austria (1995), Finland (mid-1990s), the Netherlands (refers to ‘special loans’) and
then, from the time of its inception in 1999, in the whole Eurosystem (see Table 5).
In China, the PBC started cash and repurchase operations in government bonds in 1998.
Temporary reverse repos in bonds were conducted in 2002 but operations then seized because of
inadequate supply of bonds. The question here is not so much the original maturities of the assets,
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Table 5
Monetary policy targets and main central bank operations in China, 2005, and in benchmark countries before the launch of
EMU
Orientation/overall target
Exchange
rate
Inflation Economic
growth
Financial
stability
Employment Other
China � (official
target)
� � � � �
11 benchmark
countries
� (9) � (5) � (1)
Main operating variable
Overnight
interest rate
1–3 month
interest rate
Other interest
rate
Money
supply
Credit
growth
Other
China � �
11 benchmark
countries
� (3) � (4) � (2) � (1) � (1) � (1)
Main instrument
Repurchase
operations or
equiv.
Deposit and
loan facilities
Issuance of
central
bank CDs
Foreign
exchange
swaps
Reserve
requirements
Other
China � � � �
11 benchmark
countries
� (7) � (2) � (1) � (1)
Collateral for repurchase transactions
Government
bonds
Treasury
bills
Mortgage
bonds
Bank
CDs
Central
bank CDs
CP/other
private
securities
China �
11 benchmark
countries
� (10) � (11) � (2) � (3) � (1) � (4)
Other open-market operations (not main instrument)
Repurchase
operations or
equiv.
Issuance of
central bank
CDs
Sales of other
short-term
securities
Outright money
market
operations
Various foreign
exchange
operations
Other
China �
11 benchmark
countries
� (2) � (2) � (3) � (2) � (8) � (1)
Sources: Banco de Portugal, Economic Bulletin 1 and 2 1998, and Annual Report 1998; Bank of Finland Bulletin 9/1998;
Bank of Greece, Monetary Policy Interim Report November 1998 and March 1999, and Annual Report 1998; Borio
(1997); Central Bank of Ireland, Annual Report 1998; Danmarks Nationalbank,Monetary Review 2, 1999; Norges Bank,
Penger & Kreditt 1998/4, and Annual Reports 1997 and 1998; BIS (2003); PBC, China Monetary Policy Report (various
quarters 2002–2005); Ping (2004); Ping and Xiaopu (2003).
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but the absence of a market at all. Government issues are all that exists in the medium-to-long-
term segments; the short end is dominated by PBC bills, but there is scant demand for either,
because the pricing mechanism does not work.11 The general conclusion in terms of the PBC’s
open market operations is that debt markets in the mid-2000s are too shallow for effective buy-
sellback or sell-buyback operations.
Some benchmark countries without liquid short-term markets have relied on foreign-
exchange operations (particularly swaps) for liquidity management. The pre-eminence of swaps
over spot or regular forward-exchange operations simply reflects the greater importance of swaps
in the interbank market. Swaps are the major instrument by which banks cover their forward
foreign-exchange commitments to customers (see Hooyman, 1994). Benchmark countries where
FX swaps have played a significant role for liquidity management by the central bank and/or by
the banking system as a whole include Austria, the Netherlands and Denmark. In Switzerland,
USD-CHF swaps were the principal market operation of the National Bank during the period
between the early 1980s and the late 1990s.12
AChinese foreign exchange swap market was established in 1980 after the first restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions were removed in 1979, and an interbank foreign exchange market
introduced in 1994 as the dual exchange rate system was abolished (Yang et al., 2004). In the
mid-2000s, these markets do not play any substantial role for the central bank’s liquidity
management with the domestic banking sector (BIS, 2003; Ping, 2004).
5. Changes in central-bank operating procedures: main drivers
Because financial market regulations were partly designed as monetary policy instruments,
the deregulation process is in itself sufficient reason for reform of the operational framework of
central banks: as some policy instruments are taken away, others must replace them. Beyond this,
the literature and the central banks’ own accounts offer five main reasons for the more or less
universal reform of central bank operating procedures in industrial countries in the 1980s and
1990s (see, e.g., Mehran et al., 1996, and Forssbæck & Oxelheim, 2003, for elaborations).
First, monetary-policy instruments were changed in several benchmark countries in order to
adapt the operational frameworks of the respective monetary authorities to new regimes and/or
new targets for monetary (and exchange-rate) policy.
Second, the financial deepening of the benchmark economies occurred more or less entirely
outside the central banks’ balance sheets, and therefore reduced the share of the financial system
over which monetary authorities could exert direct control. The result was an increasing need for
indirectways to exercise control over the non-monetary components of the money supply (price-
oriented as opposed to quantity-oriented instruments).
A third factor relates both to the expansion and diversification of financial markets
domestically and to the increasing international integration of financial markets. Greater interest-
rate flexibility and narrowing differentials between rates of return in different currencies gave rise
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11 As an illustration, Green (2005) reports that the mispricing by the market of a long-term government bond issue made
underwriters unable to resell the bonds without incurring major losses, forcing the PBC to step in and buy a large portion
of the issue—effectively amounting to central bank financing of the government.
12 By 1987, the National Bank’s holdings of currency swap contracts amounted to approx. half of its foreign-currency
assets, which in turn amounted (together with gold) to almost 90% of its total assets. Roughly that situation remained until
1998, when the National Bank began to broaden its arsenal of instruments (Banque Nationale Suisse, Bulletin Trimestriel
4, December, 1999). Also see Zurlinden (1996).
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to the need for instruments whereby liquidity (and thereby interest rates) could be managed more
flexibly in time and in magnitude, and with a greater measure of accuracy than that offered by,
say, discounting, interest-rate controls, and lending ceilings.
Fourthly, the increasing importance of expectations in a world of free financial markets
favored the adoption of instruments better suited for signaling the central bank’s monetary policy
stance.
A fifth broad category of reasons relates to the wish more generally (on the part of monetary
authorities) to stimulate money-market activity and improve monetary-policy transmission, and
to achieve a clearer separation of monetary policy implementation from government-debt
management, and from other social-policy goals (favoring certain sectors in the economy by
granting access to cheap credit, etc.) which were auxiliary reasons for the imposition of financial-
market regulations. Because financial regulations were often of a multiple-purpose variety, and
because the central bank was typically responsible for the implementation of the regulation
policy, the distinction between monetary policy and other ‘types’ of policy had previously not
always been very clear-cut.
Do these five reasons apply to the Chinese situation today? The simple answer is maybe, but not
generally. The objectives of monetary policy remain manifold and not necessarily compatible, and
the priorities between different goals are unclear – in other words, no major regime shift has taken
place; the financial system – as we have seen – is still underdeveloped, and financial intermediation
beyond the explicit or implicit control of the central bank is limited; as a result of the former, anddue
to the remaining financial repression, the role of expectations is still limited. Reasons three andfive,
however, deserve closer attention in theChinese case. There is a need formore flexible and accurate
instruments, and it is a declared objective of the PBC to stimulate money market activity and
improve monetary policy transmission. The reason is – simply, and in parallel with several of the
benchmark countries – thatmonetary policy presently is ineffective (see Ping, 2004, amongothers).
The reason it does not work, however, is not obviously the same. In the next session, we analyze
sources of fluctuations in the liquidity of the Chinese banking system and the effects of Chinese
monetary policy against the backdrop of the experience of our benchmark countries.
6. Determinants and effects of Chinese monetary policy operations in historical
international comparison
In order to analyze the sources and effects of liquidity fluctuations in China we construct the
following stylized balance sheets for the PBC and a number of benchmark central banks based on
the actual published balance sheets:13
NFAþ NLGþ NLBþ ONA ¼ CICþ BR; (1)
where NFA = net foreign assets; NLG = net lending to the government; NLB = net lending to
banks; ONA = other net assets; CIC = currency in circulation; and BR = bank reserves.
The sum of the components on each side of the equality is the monetary base. Differencing
gives the possibility to analyze the contributions of the various components to net changes in the
liquidity of the banking system. The changes in the components are scaled by the average size of
the monetary base over each sample period (in the case of the moving average time series for
J. Forssbæck, L. Oxelheim / Journal of Asian Economics 18 (2007) 257–283272
13 The framework for analysis is due to Borio (1997); for a more detailed analysis of the balance sheet of the benchmark
central banks, see Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2003).
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China in Figs. 3 and 4, over the 12 preceding months), in order to allow for comparisons over time
and across countries.
Define the percentage autonomous liquidity position at time t + i,
ALPtþi ¼
ðDNFAþ DNLG þ DONA� DCICÞtþi
ð1=TÞ
PT�1
j¼0 ðCICþ BRÞt� j
; (2)
where T is the number of observations in each sample period (the number of observations over
which the scaling factor is averaged), and i can be zero, positive, or negative, depending on the
temporal relationship between a particular observation and the scaling factor.
Correspondingly, let the percentage net policy position at time t + i be defined by
NPPtþi ¼
DNLBtþi
ð1=TÞ
PT�1
j¼0 ðCICþ BRÞt� j
: (3)
The sum of the contribution of the autonomous factors and the policy position constitutes net
liquidity provision, which – in accordance with identity (1) – must then also be defined as
NLPtþi ¼
DBRtþi
ð1=TÞ
PT�1
j¼0 ðCICþ BRÞt� j
: (4)
The policy position, finally, can then be broken down into its various components (such as
standing facilities, various types of open market operations, etc.) depending on the degree of
detail provided by the respective central bank’s balance sheets. When it comes to the PBC, this
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Fig. 3. Autonomous position, policy position, and net liquidity provision in China (in per cent of monetary base; 12month
moving averages, 2001–2004). Source: calculations based on data from the People’s Bank of China.
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degree is not very high, and it basically just separates between claims on (different types of)
financial institutions on the asset side and debt securities issuance on the liabilities side. For some
of the European countries’ central banks, open market operations (OMOs) in the form of foreign
exchange operations were not identifiable. The distinction between standing facilities and OMOs
is therefore not entirely watertight in our sample, and it is even likely that the OMOs component
is somewhat underestimated as a general rule.
Table 6 provides a summary, where the autonomous and policy positions and their various
components are averaged over the relevant time periods.
Figs. 3–5 give a more detailed picture of the Chinese case. Fig. 3, first, shows that net liquidity
follows the autonomous determinants of liquidity infusion closely, whereas policy generally
works in the opposite direction. Both the autonomous position and the policy position became
markedly larger as of the beginning of 2003, resulting in a rather sharp increase in net liquidity.
Of the autonomous factors (Fig. 4), changes in cash and in net lending to the government
appear relatively stationary, whereas the net foreign assets contribution describes a clear and
rather sharp upward trend. The by far most volatile contribution, however (in contrast to the
benchmark countries), is that of changes in other net assets. The hike in this series after the end of
2003 is wholly due to a relatively large increase in the balance sheet item ‘other assets’ between
November and December 2003, and – particularly – to the disappearance from the liabilities side
of all ‘savings deposits of non-financial institutions’ between December 2003 and January 2004.
No explanation is offered in the PBC’s quarterly monetary policy reports for the relevant time
period(s), so the interpretation remains open.
Fig. 5A and B, finally, illustrates an attempt to trace the development over time in the use of
different types of monetary policy instruments. In the figure the solid lines show the variability
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Fig. 4. Contributions to autonomous liquidity position in China (in per cent of monetary base; 12 monthmoving averages,
2001–2004). Source: calculations based on data from the People’s Bank of China.
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(measured as 12-month rolling standard deviations) over 4 years (2001–2004) of the PBC’s
policy position due, respectively, to standing facilities (panel A) and open market operations
(panel B). As a comparison the figure also reproduces the average corresponding variabilities for
the included benchmark countries at three points/periods in time (cf. Table 6, rows 8 and 9). A
‘corridor’ of the cross-country variation in these variabilities is also added. We can see that the
trend-wise development over time for the benchmark countries clearly shows the gradual demise
of standing facilities and corresponding rise of OMOs as main policy instrument over the 20-odd
year period.
The considerably shorter time for which the Chinese development is studied shows no similar
clear trend. Instead, the variability in the policy position of the PBC is comparatively low and
stable, and at the lower standard deviation bound as compared to the benchmark countries. A
tentative conclusion would be that OMOs in China are not yet very extensive in international
comparison, possibly reflecting the relatively underdeveloped state of financial markets in
general and money markets in particular. A further conclusion of the overall analysis – one that
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Table 6
Sources of liquidity fluctuations, summary (average positions over the respective time periodsa as percentage of the
monetary base; variability of positions shown as standard deviations in parentheses; for the benchmark countries, the
variability in the positions is shown as the average of country-by-country standard deviations)
China
2000–2004
7 benchmark
countries,
early 1980s
8 benchmark
countries,
late 1980s
10 benchmark
countries,
late 1990s
1. Autonomous position
(=4 + 5 + 6 � 7)
1.76 (4.57) 0.56 (10.11) 0.05 (8.69) �1.01 (10.24)
2. Policy position (=8 + 9) �0.63 (2.33) �0.38 (10.12) 0.75 (8.00) 0.85 (11.49)
3. Net liquidity (=1 + 2) 1.13 (4.21) 0.18 (4.34) 0.79 (5.78) �0.16 (7.64)
Breakdown of autonomous position
4. DNet foreign assets 1.37 (1.69) 0.84 (5.59) 0.26 (6.43) 0.16 (7.95)
5. DNet lending to government �0.14 (2.12) 1.01 (8.94) 0.21 (7.72) �0.57 (7.16)
6. DOther net assets 0.78 (3.52) �0.88 (3.49) �0.27 (2.80) �0.57 (2.48)
7. DCurrency in circulation 0.24 (3.92) 0.39 (2.07) 0.15 (1.88) 0.02 (2.10)
Breakdown of policy position
8. Standing facilities �0.18 (1.90) �0.31 (10.99) 0.37 (5.16) �0.03 (1.26)
9. Open market operations �0.44 (1.39) �0.06 (1.04) 0.28 (4.73) 0.73 (10.86)
aThe following periods apply:
China: Jan. 2000–Dec. 2004 (monthly data).
7 benchmark countries, early 1980s: Belgium, Jan. 7, 1980–June 30, 1980 (weekly data); Denmark, Jan. 1979–Dec. 1980
(monthly data); Finland, Jan. 8, 1980–May 30, 1980 (weekly data); Ireland, Dec. 1979–Feb. 1981 (monthly data);
Netherlands, Jan. 5, 1981–May 25, 1981 (weekly data); Portugal, Jan. 1980–Dec. 1981 (monthly data); Sweden, Jan.
1980–Oct. 1981 (monthly data).
8 benchmark countries, late 1980s: Austria, Oct. 31, 1989–Jan. 31, 1990 (weekly data); Belgium, Jan. 2, 1989–June 26,
1989 (weekly data); Denmark, Jan. 1988–Dec. 1989 (monthly data); Finland, Jan. 6, 1989–May 31, 1989 (weekly data);
Ireland, Dec. 1988–Jun. 1990 (monthly data); Netherlands, Oct. 2, 1989–Feb. 26, 1990 (weekly data); Norway, Portugal,
Jan. 1988—Dec. 1989 (monthly data); Sweden, Jan. 1987—Oct. 1988 (monthly data).
10 benchmark countries, late 1990s: Austria, Jan. 7, 1998–May 31, 1998 (weekly data); Belgium, Jan. 5, 1998–May 29,
1998 (weekly data); Denmark, Dec. 1997—Nov. 1998 (monthly data); Finland, Dec. 31, 1997–May 29, 1998 (weekly
data); Ireland, Dec. 1997—Dec. 1998 (monthly data); Netherlands, week 1, 1998–week 25, 1998 (weekly data); Norway,
Dec. 1997—Dec. 1998 (monthly data); Portugal, Jul. 1996—Jun. 1998 (monthly data); Sweden, Dec. 31, 1998–May 31,
1999 (weekly data); Switzerland, Sept. 30, 1999–Apr. 10, 1999 (weekly data).
Sources: The figures are calculated on the basis of data from the respective central banks’ balance sheets, mostly taken
from annual and/or interim reports; in some cases obtained as spreadsheet documents directly from the central bank.
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Fig. 5. Variability of policy position in China and the benchmark countries China (12 month rolling standard deviations,
2001–2004, upper x-axis) and benchmark countries (three time periods between early 1980s and late 1990s, lower x-axis).
Panel A: Variability in policy position due to standing facilities. Panel B: Variability in policy position due to open market
operations. Sources: See Table 6.
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would tend to support previous analyses (e.g., Green, 2005; Ping, 2004) – would be that the
policy actions of the PBC in general are comparatively small and ineffectual relative to the effects
of autonomous determinants of liquidity and to the overall size of the monetary base. Any
conclusion, however, about the form and relative importance of the PBC’s various operations has
to be delivered with the caveat of what was mentioned above, viz. that the separation between
different kinds of operations in the PBC’s balance sheets is not very transparent. A more general
remark about the direction and speed of the development is that in the perspective of a 20-year
development in Europe, it is of course not surprising that China still has some way to go, and
appears to still remain in the early stages of this development.
7. Effectiveness of monetary policy operations—discussion
In this section we present some conclusions regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy
operations during the financial transition period of our benchmark countries based on Forssbæck
and Oxelheim (2003) and discuss the relevance of these in terms of Chinese monetary policy
options. First, autonomous factors are often the most important sources of liquidity fluctuations in
the domestic money market. The central bank is frequently ‘unsuccessful’ in offsetting these
influences other than imperfectly. In short, this means that the job of the central bank is primarily to
forecast and offset factors outside its direct control that influence the domestic market, and only
then (marginally) to ‘steer’ the money market.14 The two most important autonomous sources of
fluctuation in money-market liquidity (and thus the major factors that the central banks have to
counter in their policies) are net foreign assets and net lending to the government. The net-foreign-
assets portion of the autonomousposition should – all else equal – bemorevariable in countrieswith
far-reaching exchange-rate commitments, where the central bank has been active in the foreign-
exchangemarket or in otherwaysmademore extensive use of foreign-exchange reserves to uphold
that commitment. However, Forssbæck andOxelheim (2003) instead find that net foreign assets are
a more important source of liquidity fluctuation in ‘weak-currency’ countries (regardless of
exchange-rate regime), and a less important one in ‘hard-currency’ countries.
This leads up to the second main conclusion: non-credible policy (for example exchange rate)
commitments lead to ineffective central bank operations. If the central bank’s target variables are
influenced to a great extent by factors beyond its control, then not only is the effectiveness in
achieving the desired policy goals impeded, but so also is its choice among the range of instruments
at its disposal, as well as its capacity to influence the overall structure of the money market.
Thus, thirdly, autonomous factors affect central bank instruments and moneymarket structure.
On a more general level, this emphasizes the need for consistency in the policy pursued.
The consistency issue links the third conclusion to the fourth one. Economic independence of
central banks leads to more effective central bank operations and vice versa. If economic
independence of the central bank can be approximated by the influence on liquidity fluctuations
of net lending to the government, then the central bank’s ability to effectively anchor money
market interest rates and to stabilize the exchange rate, is increasingly impeded the more it has to
counter liquidity fluctuations resulting from the obligation to fulfill other public-policy goals
(such as government financing).
J. Forssbæck, L. Oxelheim / Journal of Asian Economics 18 (2007) 257–283 277
14 One potentially complicating factor here is that if we believe that the central bank’s policy measures can in and of
themselves give rise to ‘innovations’, we have an endogeneity problem of the ‘exogenous’ factors: the central bank
influences these factors indirectly through its own actions.
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Below, we use these four conclusions in order to structure a discussion about the roots of the
present ineffectiveness of Chinese monetary policy.
Based on conclusion 1 above: Large capital inflows and resulting build-up of foreign exchange
reserves has been the most important source of liquidity in the early 2000s. Base money growth
increased trend-wise from 2% to 17% between 1998 and 2003 (Goldstein, 2004). Foreign
exchange reserves as a share of GDP increased from 15% in the first quarter of 2001 to 40% at the
end of 2004 (Goldstein, 2004). The PBC’s operations during the last few years have largely been
geared toward offsetting these undesired money-supply effects of capital inflows.
Estimations by Green (2005) show that the PBC’s open market operations are almost perfectly
correlated with capital inflows. Yet, Green reports that the operations are able to sterilize less than
50% of the effect of these inflows on the money supply. According to the estimates, between mid-
2004 and early 2005, foreign exchange inflows added cumulatively to the money base in the order
of RMB 100 bn per month, indicating an annual growth rate of around 70%. The asymmetry of
capital controls giving a bias toward net capital inflows has exacerbated this problem.
Based on conclusions 2 and 4 above: The multiple, and often incompatible, goals of monetary
policy – stable dollar exchange rate, inflation, growth, employment, financial stability, etc. – are
evidently a major problem for Chinese monetary policy. The very recent problems of the PBC to
make monetary policy ‘bite’ are clearly influenced by the exchange rate regime, for example.
Given the level of financial risk in the economy, the possibility of misleading interest rate levels,
and other factors, it is not obvious that the currency is/was under-valued (for discussions, see,
e.g., Eichengreen, 2005; Goldstein, 2004; Prasad et al., 2005); whether it was or not, however, it
would appear as though a revaluation came to be expected for at least 2 years before the modest
revaluation was finally implemented in July 2005. This partially explains the troubles of the PBC
of conducting a monetary policy which was much too expansionary for domestic conditions, but
still not expansionary enough to keep capital inflows at bay (the share of non-FDI capital inflows
also significantly increased during this period; see BIS, 2003, 2005; Prasad &Wei, 2005; Van der
Linden, 2005). In short, the exchange rate goal was non-credible, which worsened the conditions
for monetary policy operations. More generally, an exchange rate stability goal increasingly
undermines monetary policy autonomy as capital controls erode, which – by definition –
compromises some or several of the other goals. The internal deregulation of the financial sector
and the full market access of foreign banks (implying the possibility of interest arbitrage between
foreign and the domestic Chinese markets) will further erode the remaining restrictions on the
capital account (Liu, 2005).
Not just non-credible exchange rate goals disturb monetary policy; another example may be
the attempts to simultaneously achieve the goals to safeguard financial stability and prop up
employment in the publicly owned manufacturing sector. Large state-owned enterprises are
squeezed by remaining commitment to production planning, and are unable to compete with the
private sector. State-owned banks are forced to finance state-owned enterprises (SOE) with
successively new loans (which are frequently not repaid), in order to avoid large-scale
unemployment and social unrest. Remaining political influence over the banking sector, lack of
incentives for adequate credit assessment and monitoring (because of the seemingly unlimited
willingness of the government to bail out banks) and lack of legal enforcement of financial
contracts, as well as general property-rights and transparency issues, lead to massive mis-
allocation of savings (2/3 of savings are channeled to the public sector through the banking
system) and to the accumulation of non-performing assets on banks’ balance sheets (estimates of
non-performing loans range from 20 to 50% of the largest banks’ total loan portfolios, or 30 to
80% of GDP; see Van der Linden, 2005).
J. Forssbæck, L. Oxelheim / Journal of Asian Economics 18 (2007) 257–283278
250 251
Based on conclusion 3 above: At least two more reasons for excess liquidity in the Chinese
banking system exist. First, the financial system in general is underdeveloped and unable to
absorb the large monetary overhang in the economy; i.e., there is a lack of alternative
investments, especially for short-term funds (see money market structure, above). Second,
there exist de facto lending restrictions. There is much to suggest that more or less official
administrative control of the quantity and direction of banks’ lending is currently the most
important instrument at the PBC’s disposal to contain money supply growth. At the
same time, these practices are counter-productive to the longer-term interests of the PBC
to improve the transmission mechanism to the extent that they leave banks awash with
liquidity.
8. Concluding remarks
Up to the late 1970s and early 1980s, money markets (as well as the financial sectors in
general) in our benchmark countries were typically underdeveloped and highly regulated. Since
then, politics – through financial sector deregulation, government debt policy, and de-
politicization of monetary policy – has been one of the main determinants of money-market
development.
We argue that financial deregulation as an ‘active’ or ‘passive’ response of politicians to
developments beyond their control, the need to find new and more flexible sources of
government borrowing, and the need to establish a forum for effective monetary-policy
implementation—go a long way to explain the significant cross-country differences among our
benchmark countries in terms of money-market size and structure, as well as the timing and
direction of various policy decisions and outcomes. A main observation is also that a policy
decision, once taken, cannot easily be reversed, as the development over time may be
characterized as a continuous interplay between policy decisions and market outcomes. The
development process thus becomes highly path dependent, and largely reflects political ad-hoc
decisions, which are often, in themselves, responses to market developments. There are also
considerable potential spill-over effects from other policy areas. Therefore, a gradualist
approach and ‘controlled’ financial deregulation like in China is difficult, because – from the
point of view of the policy purpose–financial market regulations are complementary (doing
away with one undermines the purpose of another), and – more generally – ‘controlled’ and
‘deregulated’ are in some sense mutually exclusive.
Chinese monetary policy is largely characterized by this type of spill-over effects, and is
full of inherent inconsistencies and conflicts of interest, giving rise to a large degree of
discretionary, ad hoc policy measures. As a consequence, China will only be able to partially
emulate other countries’ experiences, but outcomes will reflect exogenous factors affecting its
policy and policy responses to those factors, if anything is to be learned from the benchmark
countries we study here, where central banks have often had a decisive influence on money-
market development. The (possibly) good news is that – according to historical comparison –
China remains at an early stage of the development, in terms of basic ‘meters’ of all the three
processes characterizing the path from regulation-based to market-based monetary policy:
financial deregulation, market growth, and the intensity of open market operations. The bad
news is that the policy tools presently at the authorities’ disposal are increasingly blunt and
ineffectual.
Some benchmark countries have changed the basic monetary-policy regime one or more times
during the period studied (Finland, Greece, Portugal and Sweden are the most obvious examples,
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excepting the changeover to EMU). Changes in monetary-policy conditions and operations are
correspondingly big in these countries. Among the benchmark countries that essentially stuck to
the same policy regime (exchange-rate targets, mostly) throughout the 1980–1998 period, some
saw less dramatic changes in the indicators used to analyze monetary policy (Austria, Belgium),
while in others, the changes were of average magnitude (Netherlands) or comparatively big
(Denmark).
A few lessons (or policy recommendations) for China directly related to the money market
could be the following.
� A general recommendation and a clear lesson from the European experience is to focus
objectives as well as operative targets of monetary policy.
� One part of this increased focus could be increased flexibility of the exchange rate: As
explained above, whether the RMB is under-valued or not, the rigid exchange rate (the de facto
effects of the modest revaluation and move to a ‘managed float’ in July 2005 remain to be seen)
has undermined attempts so far to foment broader and deeper financial markets, not least a
functioning money market, and is directly counter-productive to the effectiveness of the PBC’s
market operations. With the so-far rigid currency regime, the absence of adjustment to capital
movements on the exchange rate effectively implies that adjustments are being ‘passed on’ to a
domestic financial system which is not developed enough to handle it. A more flexible
exchange rate would also stimulate the development of the foreign-exchange market, including
a market for FX derivatives linked to the domestic money market.
� The banks’ continued lack of de facto independence as economic entities is distorting the
financial intermediation process as well as the PBC’s own capacity for effectively
implementing policy. For market operations to work, there must be a market of independent
market participants acting on the basis of market criteria—i.e., the PBC must not be able to use
its political clout to force the banks to respond to various measures when in fact they have no
economic incentive to do so. The privatization of the state-owned banks may work in the right
direction to the extent that the government just retains a small stake in the banks and by that
reduces its influence.
� Creation of short-to-medium term securities market based on bank liabilities, such as a CD
market; this could help banks clean up their balance sheets (instead of piling up liquidity or
channeling it into speculative fixed investments), as well as providing alternative investments
to drain the money market of excess liquidity.
� Create a viable treasury bill (short-term government debt) market; with the present continued
weakness of the banking system, it is unlikely that a CD market could function as a benchmark
segment for the short end of the debt market.
It should be noted that many of these solutions rely on more broad-based institutional reforms
towork properly. China is still largely a ‘commando economy’, which – whether that command is
explicitly or implicitly exerted – eliminates the proper incentives to reach market clearing
outcomes in whatever market. Imbalances will persist without a firmer and more unconditional
commitment to market principles.
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